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VALUES OF LIFE
IN THE MODERN WORLD

SELECTIONS FROM
TWENTIETH CENTURY PROSE

With Critical Notes

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PREFACE

One of the aims of University education is to give young people the correct values of life, so that they may lead happy and useful lives themselves and contribute a little to the happiness of those with whom they live. The present anthology is meant to serve, in its own way, a similar purpose.

It is very necessary to-day that young persons should bring to bear a sober mind on the problems which face them. The world has become a much smaller place due to the progress of science, and it is also a troubled and unhappy world. Everyone, young or old, should have well-balanced views so that there may be greater understanding in the world. The essays in this volume are a plea for adopting a sane point of view.

This anthology is different from other anthologies. It does not contain purely literary and imaginative essays of a discursive nature, but it gives its readers something more substantial: it seeks not only to inform, but also to enlighten, their minds.

These essays deal with many of the subjects in which a young man with some intellectual curiosity is likely to be interested: Education, Culture, Philosophy, Art, Science and Politics. An educated person should be able to talk in an intelligent manner on these subjects. Universities should turn out such young persons and the country needs them to-day. This selection, therefore, should serve a useful purpose in giving ideas to students on issues which are relevant to the modern world.

These essays have another distinctive feature. They

represent prose written in the twentieth century. There are essays by Benson, Leacock, Tagore and Forster which are examples of fine literary prose, simple, graceful, persuasive and marked by a geniality of tone. The purpose of other writers is matter-of-fact, simple and straightforward, meant to impart information. Students should be able to learn from both these styles; and should try to express in an equally simple but effective manner the ideas which they get from these essays.

The first essay is by A. C. Benson and is a plea for good behaviour, tolerance and understanding. Along with the second essay, by Stephen Leacock, it gives some idea of the true atmosphere which should prevail in a college and a University. The essay on the value of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell should enlarge a young man's conception of what is possible, and rid him of that dogmatic assurance which is another form of ignorance.

The two essays, "What I Believe" by E. M. Forster, and "The Citizen of the Future" by Sir Josiah Stamp, contain a certain amount of idealism, which is an ennobling experience for young minds.

There are two essays on Art. The one, by Tagore, tells us about the true impulse behind Art, while the second by an artist and teacher, Maria Petrie, tells us what Art can do for us.

In the realm of Science, Prof. Ritchie's essay tells us about the nature, method and achievements of Science, while in another, Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon reject many of the wrong notions and prejudices about racial superiority which have brought so much unhappiness to the world.

In an extract from *the Discovery of India* Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru speaks about the changes necessary

to bring about enlightened nationalism in India. Prof. Cole's essay on World Affairs is a guide to the present condition of the world and will help students to know the different ideologies of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and to realize how these two great nations can possibly be brought to a better understanding of each other. Prof. Toynbee, with much learning and insight, points out the grim phase mankind is passing through, and reminds us that unless everybody, young or old, has faith in the correct values of life and the courage to see that these values prevail, civilization may well go under.

This anthology will, we hope, appeal not only to the student but also to the general reader who in reading finds both pleasure and food for thought.

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CONTENTS

		PAGE
	PREFACE	iii
I.	A. C. BENSON: *The Point of View*	1
II.	STEPHEN LEACOCK: *On the Need for a Quiet College*	14
III.	BERTRAND RUSSELL: *The Value of Philosophy*	23
IV.	E. M. FORSTER: *What I Believe*	31
V.	RABINDRANATH TAGORE: *What is Art*	43
VI.	MARIA PETRIE: *Art and Society*	57
VII.	A. D. RITCHIE: *Science as a Creative Power*	70
VIII.	JULIAN HUXLEY AND A. C. HADDON: *Racialism and Science*	92
IX.	SIR JOSIAH STAMP: *The Citizen of the Future*	107
X.	PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: *The Importance of the National Idea*	118
XI.	G. D. H. COLE: *Western Europe and World Affairs*	132
XII.	ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE: *Civilization on Trial*	156
	NOTES	170

I. A. C. BENSON

THE POINT OF VIEW

I HAVE lately come to perceive that the one thing which gives value to any piece of art, whether it be book, or picture, or music, is that subtle and evasive thing which is called personality. No amount of labour, of zest, even of accomplishment, can make up for the absence of this quality. It must be an almost wholly instinctive thing, I believe. Of course, the mere presence of personality in a work of art is not sufficient, because the personality revealed may be lacking in charm; and charm, again, is an instinctive thing. No artist can set out to capture charm; he will toil all the night and take nothing; but what every artist can and must aim at, is to have a perfectly sincere point of view. He must take his chance as to whether his point of view is an attractive one; but sincerity is the one indispensable thing. It is useless to take opinions on trust, to retail them, to adopt them; they must be formed, created, truly felt. The work of a sincere artist is almost certain to have some value; the work of an insincere artist is of its very nature worthless.

I mean to try, in the pages that follow, to be as sincere as I can. It is not an easy task, though it may seem so; for it means a certain disentangling of the things that one has perceived and felt for oneself from the prejudices and preferences that have been inherited, or stuck like burs upon the soul by education and circumstance.

It may be asked why I should thus obtrude my point of view in print; why I should not keep my precious

experience to myself; what the value of it is to other people? Well, the answer to that is that it helps our sense of balance and proportion to know how other people are looking at life, what they expect from it, what they find in it, and what they do not find. I have myself an intense curiosity about other people's point of view, what they do when they are alone, and what they think about. Edward FitzGerald said that he wished we had more biographies of obscure persons. How often have I myself wished to ask simple, silent, deferential people, such as station-masters, butlers, gardeners, what they make of it all. Yet one cannot do it, and even if one could, ten to one they would not or could not tell you. But here is going to be a sedate confession. I am going to take the world into my confidence, and say, if I can, what I think and feel about the little bit of experience which I call my life, which seems to me such a strange and often so bewildering a thing.

Let me speak, then, plainly of what that life has been, and tell what my point of view is. I was brought up on ordinary English lines. My father, in a busy life, held a series of what may be called high official positions. He was an idealist, who, owing to a vigorous power of practical organization and a mastery of detail, was essentially a man of affairs. Yet he contrived to be a student too. Thus, owing to the fact that he often shifted his headquarters, I have seen a good deal of general society in several parts of England. Moreover, I was brought up in a distinctly intellectual atmosphere.

I was at a big public school, and gained a scholarship at the University. I was a moderate scholar and a competent athelete; but I will add that I had always a strong literary bent. I took in younger days little interest in history or politics, and tended rather to live an inner life in the region of friendship and the artistic

emotions. If I had been possessed of private means, I should, no doubt, have become a full-fledged dilettante. But that doubtful privilege was denied me, and for a good many years I lived a busy and fairly successful life as a master at a big public school. I will not dwell upon this, but I will say that I gained a great interest in the science of education, and acquired profound misgivings as to the nature of the intellectual process known by the name of secondary education. More and more I began to perceive that it is conducted on diffuse, detailed, unbusiness-like lines. I tried my best, as far as it was consistent with loyalty to an established system, to correct the faulty bias. But it was with a profound relief that I found myself suddenly provided with a literary task of deep interest, and enabled to quit my scholastic labours. At the same time, I am deeply grateful for the practical experience I was enabled to gain, and even more for the many true and pleasant friendships with colleagues, parents, and boys that I was allowed to form.

What a waste of mental energy it is to be careful and troubled about one's path in life: Quite unexpectedly, at this juncture, came my election to a college Fellowship, giving me the one life that I had always eagerly desired, and the possibility of which had always seemed closed to me.

I became then a member of a small and definite society, with a few prescribed duties, just enough, so to speak, to form a hem to my life of comparative leisure. I had acquired and kept, all through my life as a schoolmaster, the habit of continuous literary work; not from a sense of duty, but simply from instinctive pleasure. I found myself at once at home in my small and beautiful college, rich with all kinds of ancient and venerable traditions, in buildings of humble and subtle grace. The

little dark-roofed chapel, where I have a stall of my own; the galleried hall, with its armorial glass; the low, book-lined library; the panelled combination-room, with its dim portraits of old worthies: how sweet a setting for a quiet life: Then, too, I have my own spacious rooms, with a peaceful outlook into a big close, half orchard, half garden, with bird-haunted thickets and immemorial trees, bounded by a slow river.

And then, to teach me how "to borrow life and not grow old," the happy tide of fresh and vigorous life all about me, brisk, confident, cheerful young men, friendly, sensible, amenable, at that pleasant time when the world begins to open its rich pages of experience, undimmed at present by anxiety or care.

My college is one of the smallest in the University. Last night in Hall I sat next a distinguished man, who is, moreover, very accessible and pleasant. He unfolded to me his desires for the University. He would like to amalgamate all the small colleges into groups, so as to have about half-a-dozen colleges in all. He said, and evidently thought, that little colleges are woefully circumscribed and petty places; that most of the better men go to the two or three leading colleges, while the little establishments are like small backwaters out of the main stream. They elect, he said, their own men to Fellowships; they resist improvements; much money is wasted in management, and the whole thing is minute and feeble. I am afraid it is true in a way; but, on the other hand, I think that a large college has its defects too. There is no real college spirit there; it is very nice for two or three sets. But the different schools which supply a big college form each its own set there; and if a man goes there from a leading public school, he falls into his respective set, lives under the traditions and in the gossip of his old school, and gets to know

hardly any one from other schools. Then the men who come up from smaller places just form small inferior sets of their own, and really get very little good out of the place. Big colleges keep up their prestige because the best men tend to go to them; but I think they do very little for the ordinary men who have fewer social advantages to start with.

The only cure, said my friend, for these smaller places is to throw their Fellowships open, and try to get public-spirited and liberal-minded Dons. Then, he added, they ought to specialize in some one branch of University teaching, so that the men who belonged to a particular department would tend to go there.

Well, to-day was a wet day, so I did what I particularly enjoy—I went off for a slow stroll, and poked about among some of the smaller colleges. I declare that the idea of tying them all together seemed to me to be a horrible piece of vandalism. These beautiful and sweet little places, with a quiet, dignified history and tradition of their own, are very attractive and beautiful. I went and explored a little college I am ashamed to say I had never visited before. It shows a poor plastered front to the street, but the old place is there behind the plaster. I went into a tiny, dark chapel, with a high pillared pediment of carved wood behind the altar, a rich ceiling, and some fine columned alcoves where the dignitaries sit. Out of the gallery opens a venerable library, with a regretful air of the past about its faded volumes in their high presses, as though it sadly said, "I am of yesterday." Then we found ourselves in a spacious panelled Hall, with a great oriel looking out into a peaceful garden, embowered in great trees, with smiling lawns. All round the Hall hung portraits of old worthies—peers, judges, and bishops, with some rubicund wigged Masters. I like to think

of the obscure and yet dignified lives that have been lived in these quaint and stately chambers. I suppose that there used to be a great deal of tippling and low gossips in the old days of the vinous, idle Fellows, who hung on for life, forgetting their books, and just trying to dissipate boredom. One tends to think that it was all like that; and yet, doubtless, there were quiet lives of study and meditation led here by wise and simple men who have long since mouldered into dust. And all that dull rioting is happily over. The whole place is full of activity and happiness. There is, if anything, among the Dons, too much business, too many meetings, too much teaching, and the life of mere study is neglected. But it pleases me to think that even now there are men who live quietly among their books, unambitious, perhaps productive, but forgetting the flight of time, and looking out into a pleasant garden, with its rustling trees, among the sound of mellow bells. We are, most of us, too much in a fuss nowadays to live these gentle, innocent, and beautiful lives; and yet the University is a place where a poor man, if he be virtuous, may lead a life of dignity and simplicity, and refined happiness. We make the mistake of thinking that all can be done by precept, when, as a matter of fact, example is no less potent a force. To make such quiet lives possible was to a great extent what these stately and beautiful places were founded for—that there should be in the busy world a corner where activities should not be so urgent, and where life should pass like an old dream, tinged with delicate colour and soft sound. I declare I do not know that it is more virtuous to be a clerk in a bank, toiling day by day that others should be rich, than to live in thought and meditation, with a heart open to sweet influences and pure hopes. And yet it seems to be held nowadays that

virtue is bound up with practical life. If a man is content to abjure wealth and to forego marriage, to live simply without luxuries, he may spend a very dignified, gentle life here, and at the same time he may be really useful. It is a thing which is well worth doing to attempt the reconciliation between the old and the young. Boys come up here under the impression that their pastors and teachers are all about fifty; they think of them as sensible, narrow-minded men, and, like Melchizedek, without beginning of days or end of life. They suppose that they like marking mistakes in exercises with blue pencils, and take delight in showing their power by setting punishments. It does not often occur to them that school-masters may be pathetically anxious to guide boys right, and to guard them from evil. They think of them as devoid of passions and prejudices, with a little dreary space to traverse before they sink into the tomb. Even in homes, how seldom does a perfectly simple human relation exist between a boy and his father: There is often a great deal of affection on both sides, but little *camaraderie.* Little boys are odd, tiresome creatures in many ways, with savage instincts; and I suppose many fathers feel that, if they are to maintain their authority, they must be a little distant and inscrutable. A boy goes for sympathy and companionship to his mother and sisters, not often to his father. Now a Don may do something to put this straight, if he has the will. One of the best friends I ever had was an elderly Don at my own college, who had been a contemporary of my father's. He liked young men; and I used to consult him and ask his advice in things in which I could not well consult my own contemporaries. It is not necessary to be extravagantly youthful, to slap people on the back, to run with the college boat, though that is very pleasant

if it is done naturally. All that is wanted is to be accessible and quietly genial. And under such influence a young man may, without becoming elderly, get to understand the older point of view.

The difficulty is that one acquires habits and mannerisms; one is crusty and gruff if interfered with. But, as Pater said, to acquire habits is failure in life. Of course, one must realize limitations, and learn in what regions one can be effective. But no one need be case-hardened, smoke-dried, angular. The worst of a University is that one sees men lingering on because they must earn a living, and there is nothing else that they can do; but for a human-hearted, good-humoured, and sensible man, a college life is a life where it is easy and pleasant to practise benevolence and kindliness, and where a small investment of trouble pays a large percentage of happiness. Indeed, surveying it impartially—as impartially as I can—such a life seems to hold within it perhaps the greatest possibilities of happiness that life can hold. To have leisure and a degree of simple stateliness assured; to live in a wholesome dignity; to have the society of the young and generous; to have lively and intelligent talk; to have the choice of society and solitude alike; to have one's working hours' respected, and one's leisure hours solaced—is not this better than to drift, into the so-called tide of professional success, with its dreary hours of work, its conventional domestic background? No doubt the domestic background has its interests, its delights; but one must pay a price for everything, and I am more than willing to pay the price of celibacy for my independence.

The elderly Don in college rooms, interested in Greek particles, grumbling over his port wine, is a figure beloved by writers of fiction as a contrast to all that is

brave, and bright, and wholesome in life. Could there be a more hopeless misconception? I do not know a single extant example of the species at the University. Personally, I have no love for Greek particles, and only a very moderate taste for port wine. But I do love, with all my heart, the grace of antiquity that mellows our crumbling courts, the old tradition of multifarious humanity that has century by century entwined itself with the very fabric of the place. I love the youthful spirit that flashes and brightens in every corner of the old courts, as the wallflower that rises spring by spring with its rich orange-tawny hue, its wild scent, on the tops of our mouldering walls. It is a gracious and beautiful life for all who love peace and reflection, strength and youth. It is not a life for fiery and dominant natures, eager to conquer, keen to impress; but it is a life for any one who believes that the best rewards are not the brightest, who is willing humbly to lend a cheerful hand, to listen as well as to speak. It is a life for any one who has found that there is a world of tender, wistful, delicate emotions, subdued and soft impressions, in which it is peace to live; for one who has learned, however dimly, that wise and faithful love, quiet and patient hope, are the bread by which the spirit is nourished—that religion is not an intellectual or even an ecclesiastical thing, but a far-off and remote vision of the soul.

I know well the thoughts and hopes that I should desire to speak; but they are evasive, subtle things, and too often, like shy birds, will hardly let you approach them. But I would add that life has not been for me a dreamy thing, lived in soft fantastic reveries; indeed, it has been far the reverse. I have practised activity, I have mixed much with my fellows; I have taught, worked, organized, directed. I have watched

men and boys; I have found infinite food for mirth, for interest, and even for grief. But I have grown to feel that the ambitions which we preach and the success for which we prepare are very often nothing but a missing of the simple road, a troubled wandering among thorny bypaths and dark mountains. I have grown to believe that the one thing worth aiming at is simplicity of heart and life; that one's relations with others should be direct and not diplomatic; that power leaves a bitter taste in the mouth; that meanness, and hardness, and coldness are the unforgivable sins; that conventionality is the mother of dreariness; that pleasure exists not in virtue of material conditions, but in the joyful heart; that the world is a very interesting and beautiful place; that congenial labour is the secret of happiness; and many other things which seem, as I write them down, to be dull and trite commonplaces, but are for me the bright jewels which I have found beside the way.

It is, then, from College Windows that I look forth. But even so, though on the one hand I look upon the green and sheltered garden, with its air of secluded recollection and repose, a place of quiet pacing to and fro, of sober and joyful musing; yet on another side I see the court, with all its fresh and shifting life, its swift interchange of study and activity; and on yet another side I can observe the street where the infinite pageant of humanity goes to and fro, a tide full of sound and foam, of business and laughter, and of sorrow, too, and sickness, and the funeral pomp of death.

This, then, is my point of view. I can truthfully say that it is not gloomy, and equally that it is not uproarious. I can boast of no deep philosophy, for I feel, like Dr. Johnson's simple friend Edwards, that "I have tried, too, in my time, to be a philosopher, but—I don't know how—cheerfulness was always breaking in."

Neither is it the point of view of a profound and erudite student, with a deep belief in the efficacy of useless knowledge. Neither am I a humorist, for I have loved beauty better than laughter; nor a sentimentalist, for I have abhorred a weak dalliance with personal emotions. It is hard, then, to say what I am; but it is my hope that this may emerge. My desire is but to converse with my readers, to speak as in a comfortable *tete-a-tete*, of experience, and hope, and patience. I have no wish to disguise the hard and ugly things of life; they are there, whether one disguises them or not; but I think that unless one is a professed psychologist or statistician, one gets little good by dwelling upon them. I have always believed that it is better to stimulate than to correct, to fortify rather than to punish, to help rather than to blame. If there is one attitude that I fear and hate more than another it is the attitude of the cynic. I believe with all my soul in romance; that is, in a certain high-hearted, eager dealing with life. I think that one ought to expect to find things beautiful and people interesting, not to take delight in detecting meannesses and failures. And there is yet another class of temperament for which I have a deep detestation. I mean the assured, the positive, the Pharisaical temper, that believes itself to be impregnably in the right and its opponents indubitably in the wrong; the people who deal in axioms and certainties, who think that compromise is weak and originality vulgar. I detest authority in every form; I am a sincere republican. In literature, in art, in life, I think that the only conclusions worth coming to are one's own conclusions. If they march with the verdict of the connoisseurs, so much the better for oneself. Every one cannot admire and love everything; but let a man look at things fairly and without prejudice, and make his own selection, holding to

it firmly, but not endeavouring to impose his taste upon others; defending, if needs be, his preferences, but making no claim to authority.

The time of my life that I consider to have been wasted, from the intellectual point of view, was the time when I tried, in a spirit of dumb loyalty, to admire all the things that were said to be admirable. Better spent was the time when I was finding out that much that had received the stamp of the world's approval was not to be approved, at least by me; best of all was the time when I was learning to appraise the value of things to myself, and learning to love them for their own sake and mine.

Respect of a deferential and constitutional type is out of place in art and literature. It is a good enough guide to begin one's pilgrimage with, if one soon parts company from it. Rather one must learn to give honour where honour is due, to bow down in true reverence before all spirits that are noble and adorable, whether they wear crowns and bear titles of honour, or whether they are simple and unnoted persons, who wear no gold on their garments.

Sincerity and simplicity: if I could only say how I reverence them, how I desire to mould my life in accordance with them! And I would learn, too, swiftly to detect the living spirits, whether they be young or old, in which these great qualities reign.

For I believe that there is in life a great and guarded city, of which we may be worthy to be citizens. We may, if we are blest, be always of the happy number, by some kindly gift of God; but we may also, through misadventure and pain, through errors and blunders, learn the way thither. And sometimes we discern the city afar off, with her gates of pearl; and there may come a day, too, when we have found the way thither,

and enter in; happy if we go no more out, but happy, too, even if we may not rest there, because we know that, however far we wander, there is always a hearth for us and welcoming smiles.

I speak in a parable, but those who are finding the way will understand me, however dimly; and those who have found the way, and seen a little of the glory of the place, will smile at the page and say: "So he, too, is of the city."

The city is known by many names, and wears different aspects to different hearts. But one thing is certain—that no one who has entered there is ever in any doubt again. He may wander far from the walls, he may visit it but rarely, but it stands there in peace and glory, the one true and real thing for him in mortal time and in whatever lies beyond.

II. STEPHEN LEACOCK

ON THE NEED FOR A QUIET COLLEGE

IF SOMEBODY would give me about two dozen very old elm trees and about fifty acres of wooded ground and lawn—not too near anywhere and not too far from everywhere—I think I could set up a college that would put all the big universities of to-day in the shade. I am not saying that it would be better. But it would be different.

I would need a few buildings—but it doesn't take many—stone, if possible—and a belfry, and a clock. The clock wouldn't need to go; it might be better if it didn't. I would want some books—a few thousand would do—and some apparatus. But it's amazing how little apparatus is needed for scientific work of the highest quality: in fact 'the higher, the fewer'.

* * * *

Most of all I should need a set of professors. I would only need a dozen of them—but they'd have to be real ones: disinterested men of learning, who didn't even know they were disinterested. And, mind you, these professors of mine wouldn't sit in 'offices' dictating letters on 'cases' to stenographers, and only leaving their offices to go to 'committees' and 'conferences'. There would be no 'offices' in my college and no 'committees,' and my professors would have no time for conferences, because the job they were on would need all eternity and would never be finished.

My professors would never be findable at any fixed

place except when they were actually giving lectures. Men of thought have no business in an office. Learning runs away from 'committees.' There would be no 'check up' on the time of the professors; there would be no 'hire and fire,' or 'judge by results' or standards or norms of work for them: nor any fixed number of hours.

But, on the other hand, they would, if I got the ones I want, be well worth their apparent irresponsibility: and when they lectured, each one would be, though he wouldn't know it, a magician—with such an interest and absorption that those who listened would catch the infection of it, and hurry from the lecture to the library, still warm with thought.

It must be understood that the work of professors is peculiar. Few professors, real ones, ever complete their work: what they give to the world is fragments. The rest remains. Their contribution must be added up, not measured singly. Every professor has his 'life work' and sometimes does it, and sometimes dies first.

I can recall—I say it by way of digression—one such who was working on Machiavelli. When I first met him he had worked fourteen years. He worked in a large room covered a foot deep with Machiavelli—notes, pamphlets, remains. I asked him—it seemed a simple question—what he thought of Machiavelli. He shook his head. He said it was too soon to form an opinion. Later—ten years later—he published his book, *Machiavelli*. One of the great continental reviews—of the really great ones; you and I never hear of them: they have a circulation of about 300—said his work was based on premature judgements. He was hurt, but he felt it was true. He had rushed into print too soon.

Another such devoted himself—he began years ago

—to the history of the tariff. He began in a quiet lull of tariff changes when for three or four years public attention was elsewhere. He brought his work up to within a year or so of actual up-to-date completeness. Then the tariff began to move: two years later he was three years behind it. Presently, though he worked hard, he was five years behind it. The tariff moved quicker than he did. He has never caught it. His only hope now is that the tariff will move back towards free trade, and meet him.

* * * *

Not that I mean to imply that my professors would be a pack of nuts or freaks. Not at all: their manners might be dreamy and their clothes untidy but they'd be—they'd have to be—the most eminent men in their subjects. To get them would be the main effort of the college: to coax them, buy them, if need be, to kidnap them. Nothing counts beside that. A college is made of men not by the size of buildings, number of students and football records. But no trustees know this, or, at best, only catch a glimmer of it and lose it. Within a generation all the greatest books on the humanities would come from my college.

* * * *

The professors bring the students. The students bring, unsought, the benefactions. The thing feeds itself like a flame in straw. But it's the men that count. A college doesn't need students: it's the students that need the college.

After twenty years my college would stand all alone. There are little colleges now but they ape bigness.

There are quiet colleges but they try to be noisy. There are colleges without big games but they boom little ones. Mine would seem the only one, because the chance is there, wide open, and no one takes it. After twenty years, people will drive in motor cars to see my college: and won't be let in.

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Round such a college there must be no thought of money. Money ruins life: I mean to have to think of it, to take account of it, to know that it is there. Men apart from money—men in an army, men on an expedition of exploration, emerge to a new life. Money is gone. At times and places whole classes thus lift up—or partly: as in older countries like England the class called 'gentry' that once was. These people lived on land and money from the past—stolen, perhaps, five hundred years ago—and so thought no more of it. They couldn't earn more, they didn't know how. They kept what they had, or dropped out, fell through a trestle bridge of social structure and were gone in the stream. This class, in America, we never had. They grow rare everywhere. Perhaps we don't want them. But they had the good luck that in their lives money in the sense here meant, didn't enter. Certain money limits circumscribed their life, but from day to day they never thought of it. A cow in a pasture, a fairly generous pasture, doesn't think it's in. It thinks it's outside. So did they.

So I would have it in my college: students not rich and not poor—or not using their wealth and not feeling their poverty, and equality as unconscious as that where Evangeline lived.

Nor would their studies lead to, or aim at, or con-

nect with, wealth. The so-called practical studies are all astray. Real study, real learning must, for the individual, be quite valueless or it loses its value. The proper studies for my college are history and literature, and philosophy, and thought and poetry and speculation, in the pursuit of which each shall repeat the eager search, the unending quest, or the past. Looking for one thing he shall find another. Looking for ultimate truth, which is unfindable, they will learn at least to repudiate all that is false.

I leave out at one sweep great masses of stuff usually taught: all that goes under such a name as a university faculty of commerce. There is no such thing. The faculty of commerce is down at the docks, at Wall Street, in the steel mills. A 'degree' in commerce is a salary of ten thousand a year. Those who fail to pass, go to Atlanta—and stay there. Certain things in commerce are teachable—accountancy, corporate organization, and the principles of embezzlement. But that's not a university.

Out goes economics—except as speculation: not a thing to teach in instalments and propositions like geometry. You *can't* teach it. No one knows it. It's the riddle of the Sphinx. My graduates will be just nicely fitted to think about it when they come out. A first-year girl studying economics is as wide of the mark as an old man studying cosmetics. The philosophical speculative analysis of our economic life is the highest study of all—next to the riddle of our existence. But to cut it into classes and credits is a parody. Out it goes.

Out—but to come back again—goes medicine. Medicine is a great reality: it belongs in a *school* not a college. My college fits people to study medicine—study it in crowded cities among gas-lights and ambulances

and hospitals and human suffering—and keeps their souls alive while they do it. Then later, as trained men in the noblest profession in the world, the atmosphere of the college which they imbibed among my elm trees, grows about them again. The last word in cultivation is, and always has been, the cultivated 'medicine man.'

The engineers?—that's different. Theirs is the most 'manly' of all the professions—among water power and gold mines and throwing bridges half a mile at a throw. But it's a *school* that trains them, not a college. They go to my college but they don't like it. They say it's too damn dreamy. So they kick out of it into engineering. For a time they remember the Latin third declension. Presently they forget it. Doctors grow cultivated as they grow older. Engineers get rougher and rougher.

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What I mean is that our studies have drifted away, away from the single-minded absorption of learning. Our students of to-day live in a whirl and clatter of 'student activities.' They have, in any large college, at least a hundred organizations and societies. They are 'all up!' for this to-day and 'all out!' for that to-morrow. Life is a continuous rally! a rah, rah! a parade! They play no games: they use teams for that. But exercise, and air, is their life. They *root*, in an organized hysteria—a code of signals telling them what to feel. They root, they rush, they organize, they play politics, run newspapers—and when they step from college into life, they fit it absolutely, having lived already.

No one is denying here what fine men and women college makes, physically and mentally alert. Any one

of them could operate a lift the day he steps out of college.

But there's something wanting—do they *think*, or is there anything after all to think about?—and yet, surely, in the long run the world has lived on its speculative mind—or hasn't it?

Some who think, of course, there must be. You can't submerge humanity in two generations. But mostly, I believe, the little poets fade out on their first year benches, and the wistful intelligence learns to say '*Rah! Rah!*' and is lost.

Not so in my college. There will be no newspaper, except a last week's paper from the back counties of New England. There will be no politics because there will be no offices to run for. My students will control nothing. The whole movement of student control is a mistake. They're so busy controlling that they're not students.

They shall play games all they want to, but as games, not as a profession, not as college advertising—and no gate receipts. Till only a few years ago the country that taught the world its games played them as apart from money—as far apart as sheer necessity allowed. If Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton (it wasn't really: it was won in Belgium), there was at least no stadium at two dollars a seat.

One asks, perhaps, about the endowments, about the benefactors of my ideal college. The benefactors are all dead: or at least they must act as if they were. Years ago on the prairies many authorities claimed that the only good Indian was a dead Indian. It may not have been true. But it is certainly true that the best college benefactor is a dead one. After all, the reward in the long run is his—those sculptured letters graven in the stones, 'To the greater glory of God and in memory of

Johannes Smith'—that, in a college among elm trees—that's worth a lifetime of gifts—given and given gladly. Such things should best be graven in Latin. In my college they will be—Latin and lots of it, all over the place, with the mystic conspiracy of pretence, the wholesome humbug, that those who see it know what it means. Latin lasts. English seems to alter every thousand years or so. It's like the tariff that I named above—too mobile for academic use.

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As with the benefactors, so with the managing trustees who look after the money and never lose it. Not dead these, but very silent: solid men who don't need to talk and don't, but who can invest a million dollars over three depressions, and there it still is, like gold in a pot in the pyramids. You find them chiefly in New England—at least I seem to have seen them there more than anywhere else. They are at the head of huge investment businesses, so big that you never hear of them. Mostly, if they don't talk, it means that they are thinking where to place fifty million dollars. You see, they hate to break it.

* * * *

And women? The arrangements in my college for the women students, and the women's dormitories? Oh no—no, thank you. There aren't any women. Co-education is a wonderful thing for women: college girls under co-education leave college more fit to leave than any others. College girls are better companions, better wives (as your own or as someone else's) than any others. It's the women who have made our college life

the bright happy thing it is—too bright, too happy.

But men can't *study* when women are around. And it's not only the students. If I let the women in, they get round some of my dusty old professors, and marry them—and good-bye to Machiavelli, and the higher thought.

III. BERTRAND RUSSELL

THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

WHAT is the value of philosophy and why ought it to be studied? It is necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.

This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of good which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science, through the medium of inventions, is useful to innumerable people who are wholly ignorant of it; thus the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. This utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it. It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of philosophy must be primarily sought.

But further, if we are not to fail in our endeavour to determine the value of philosophy, we must first free our minds from the prejudices of what are wrongly called 'practical' men. The 'practical' man, as this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the

body, but is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a waste of time.

Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was, until very lately, a part of philo-

sophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real; those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.

This is, however,only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of philosophy. There are many questions—and among them those that are of the profoundest interest to our spiritual life—which, so far as we can see, must remain insoluable to the human intellect unless its powers become of quite a different order from what they are now. Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by various philosophers. But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or not, the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge.

Many philosophers, it is true, have held that philosophy could establish the truth of certain answers to

such fundamental questions. They have supposed that what is of most importance in religious beliefs could be proved by strict demonstration to be true. In order to judge of such attempts, it is necessary to take a survey of human knowledge, and to form an opinion as to its methods and its limitations. On such a subject it would be unwise to pronounce dogmatically; but we shall be compelled to renounce the hope of finding philosophical proofs of religious beliefs. We cannot, therefore, include as part of the value of philosophy any definite set of answers to such questions. Hence, once more, the value of philosophy must not depend upon any supposed body of definitely ascertainable knowledge to be acquired by those who study it.

The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the cooperation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of

liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.

Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy has a value—perhaps its chief value—through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interest; family and friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in comparison with which the philosophic life is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the whole outer world, we remain like a garrison in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that ultimate surrender is inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but a constant strife between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will. In one way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife.

One way of escape is by philosophic contemplation. Philosophic contemplation does not, in its widest survey, divide the universe into two hostile camps—friends and foes, helpful and hostile, good and bad—it views the whole impartially. Philosophic contemplation, when it is unalloyed, does not aim at proving that the rest of the universe is akin to man. All acquisition of knowledge is an enlargement of the Self, but this enlargement is best attained when it is not directly sought. It is obtained when the desire for knowledge is alone

operative, by a study which does not wish in advance that its objects should have this or that character, but adapts the self to the characters which it finds in its objects. This enlargement of Self is not obtained, when, taking the Self as it is, we try to show that the world is so similar to this Self that knowledge of it is possible without any admission of what seems alien. The desire to prove this is a form of self-assertion, and like all self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of Self which it desires and of which the Self knows that it is capable. Self-assertion, in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means to its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than Self, and through its greatness the boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity.

For this reason greatness of soul is not fostered by those philosophies which assimilate the universe to man. Knowledge is a form of union of Self and not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and therefore by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves. There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view which tells us that man is the measure of all things, that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us. This view, if our previous discussions were correct, is untrue; but in addition to being untrue, it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of all that gives it value, since it fetters contemplation to Self. What it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in

such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might not be law.

The true philosophic contemplation, on the contrary, finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, every thing that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object, and hence impairs the union which the intellect seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free intellect will see as God might see, without a *here* and *now*, without hopes and tears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge—knowledge as impersonal, or purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter, than the knowledge brought by the senses, and dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs distort as much as they reveal.

The mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion. It will view its purposes and desires as parts of the whole, with the absence of insistence that results from seeing them infinitesimal fragments in a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man's deeds. The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action,

is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not only to those who are judged useful or admirable. Thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the objects of our actions and our affections: it makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one-walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thraldom of narrow hopes and fears.

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.

IV. E. M. FORSTER

WHAT I BELIEVE

I DO not believe in Belief. But this is an age of faith and there are so many militant creeds that, in self-defence one has to formulate a creed of one's own. Tolerance, good temper and sympathy are no longer in a world which is rent by religious and racial persecution, in a world where ignorance rules, and science who ought to have ruled, plays the subservient pimp. Tolerance, good temper and sympathy—they are what matter really, and if the human race is not to collapse they must come to the front before long. But for the moment they are not enough, their action is no stronger than a flower, battered beneath a military jack-boot. They want stiffening, even if the process coarsens them. Faith, to my mind, is a stiffening process, a sort of mental starch, which ought to be applied as sparingly as possible. I dislike the stuff. I do not believe in it, for its own sake, at all. Herein I probably differ from most people, who believe in Belief, and are only sorry they cannot swallow even more than they do. My lawgivers are Erasmus and Montaigne, not Moses and St. Paul. My temple stands not upon Mount Moriah but in that Elysian Field where even the immoral are admitted. My motto is: "Lord I disbelieve—help thou my unbelief."

I have, however, to live in an Age of Faith—the sort of epoch I used to hear praised when I was a boy. It is extremely unpleasant really. It is bloody in every sense of the word. And I have to keep my end up in it. Where do I start?

With personal relationships. Here is something comparatively solid in a world full of violence and cruelty. Not absolutely solid, for Psychology has split and shattered the idea of a "Person," and has shown that there is something incalculable in each of us, which may at any moment rise to the surface and destroy our normal balance. We don't know what we are like. We can't know what other people are like. How, then, can we put any trust in personal relationships, or cling to them in the gathering political storm? In theory we cannot. But in practice we can and do. Though A is not unchangeably A or B unchangeably B, there can still be love and loyalty between the two. For the purpose of living one has to assume that the personality is solid, and the "self" is an entity, and to ignore evidence is one of the characteristics of faith. I certainly can proclaim that I believe in personal relationships.

Starting from them, I get a little order into the contemporary chaos. One must be fond of people and trust them if one is not to make a mess of life, and it is therefore essential that they should not let one down. They often do. The moral of which is that I must, myself, be as reliable as possible, and this I try to be. But reliability is not a matter of contract—that is the main difference between the world of personal relationships and the world of business relationships. It is a matter for the heart, which signs no documents. In other words, reliability is impossible unless there is a natural warmth. Most men possess this warmth, though they often have bad luck, and get chilled. Most of them, even when they are politicians, *want* to keep faith. And one can, at all events, show one's own little light here, one's own poor little trembling flame, with the knowledge that it is not the only light that is shining in the darkness, and not the only one which the darkness

does not comprehend. Personal relations are despised to-day. They are regarded as bourgeois luxuries, as products of a time of fair weather which is now past, and we are urged to get rid of them, and to dedicate ourselves to some movement or cause instead. I hate the idea of causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country. Such a choice may scandalize the modern reader, and he may stretch out his patriotic hand to the telephone at once and ring up the police. It would not have shocked Dante, though. Dante places Brutus and Cassius in the lowest circle of Hell because they had chosen to betray their friend Julius Caesar rather than their country Rome. Probably one will not be asked to make such an agonizing choice. Still, there lies at the back of every creed something terrible and hard for which the worshipper may one day be required to suffer, and there is even a terror and a hardness in this creed of personal relationships, urbane and mild though it sounds. Love and loyalty to an individual can run counter to the claims of the State. When they do—down with the State, say I, which means that the State would down me.

This brings me along to Democracy, "even Love, the Beloved Republic, which feeds upon Freedom and lives". Democracy is not a Beloved Republic really, and never will be. But it is less hateful than other contemporary forms of government, and to that extent it deserves our support. It does start from the assumption that the individual is important, and that all types are needed to make a civilization. It does not divide its citizens into the bossers and the bossed—as an efficiency-regime tends to do. The people I admire most are those who are sensitive and want to create some-

thing or discover something, and do not see life in terms of power, and such people get more of a chance under a democracy than elsewhere. They found religions, great or small, or they produce literature and art, or they do disinterested scientific research, or they may be what is called "ordinary people," who are creative in their private lives, bring up their children decently, for instance, or help their neighbours. All these people need to express themselves; they cannot do so unless society allows them liberty to do so, and the society which allows them most liberty is a democracy.

Democracy has another merit. It allows criticism, and if there is not public criticism there are bound to be hushed up scandals. That is why I believe in the Press, despite all its lies and vulgarity, and why I believe in Parliament. Parliament is often sneered at because it is a Talking Shop. I believe in it *because* it is talking shop. I believe in the Private Member who makes himself a nuisance. He gets snubbed and is told that he is cranky or ill-informed, but he does expose abuses which would otherwise never have been mentioned, and very often an abuse gets put right just by being mentioned. Occasionally, too, a well-meaning public official starts losing his head in the cause of efficiency and thinks himself God Almighty. Such officials are particularly frequent in the Home Office. Well, there will be questions about them in Parliament sooner or later, and then they will have to mind their steps. Whether Parliament is either a representative body or an inefficient one is questionable, but I value it because it criticises and talks, and because its chatter gets widely reported.

So two cheers for Democracy: one because it admits variety and two because it permits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough: there is no occasion to give

three. Only Love the Beloved Republic deserves that.

What about Force, though? While we are trying to be sensitive and advanced and affectionate and tolerant, an unpleasant question pops up: does not all society rest upon force? If a government cannot count upon the police and the army, how can it hope to rule? And if an individual gets knocked on the head or sent to a labour camp, of what significance are his opinions?

This dilemma does not worry me as much as it does some. I realize that all society rests upon force. But all the great creative actions, all the decent human relations, occur during the intervals when force has not managed to come to the front. These intervals are what matter. I want them to be as frequent and as lengthy as possible, and I call them "civilization." Some people idealize force and pull it into the foreground and worship it, instead of keeping it in the background as long as possible. I think they make a mistake, and I think that their opposites, the mystics, err even more when they declare that force does not exist. I believe that it exists, and that one of our jobs is to prevent it from getting out of its box. It gets out sooner or later, and then it destroys us and all the lovely things which we have made. But it is not out all the time, for the fortunate reason that the strong are so stupid. Consider their conduct for a moment in the Niebelung's Ring. The giants there have the guns, or in other words the gold; but they do nothing with it, they do not realize that they are all powerful, with the result that the catastrophe is delayed and the castle of Walhalla, insecure but glorious, fronts the storms. Fafnir, coiled round his hoard, grumbles and grunts; we can hear him under Europe to-day; the leaves of the wood already tremble, and the Bird calls its warnings uselessly. Fafnir will destroy us, but by a blessed dispensation he is stupid

and slow, and creation goes on just outside the poisonous blast of his breath. The Nietzschean would hurry the monster up, the mystic would say he did not exist, but Wotan, wiser then either, hastens to create warriors before doom declares itself. The Valkyries are symbols not only of courage but of intelligence; they represent the human spirit snatching its opportunity while the going is good, and one of them even finds time to love. Brunhilde's last song hymns the recurrence of love, and since it is the privilege of art to exaggerate, she goes even further, and proclaims the love which is eternally triumphant and feeds upon Freedom, and lives.

So that is what I feel about force and violence. It is, alas! the ultimate reality on this earth, but it does not always get to the front. Some people call its absences "decadence". I call them "civilization" and find in such interludes the chief justification for the human experiment. I look the other way until fate strikes me. Whether this is due to courage or to cowardice in my own case I cannot be sure. But I know that if men had not looked the other way in the past, nothing of any value would survive. The people I respect most behave as if they were immortal and as if society was eternal. Both assumptions are false: both of them must be accepted as true if we are to keep open a few breathing holes for the human spirit. No millennium seems likely to descend upon humanity; no better and stronger League of Nations will be instituted; no form of Christianity and no alternative to Christianity will bring peace to the world or integrity to the individual; no "change of heart" will occur. And yet we need not despair, indeed we cannot despair; the evidence of history shows us that men have always insisted on behaving creatively under the shadow of the sword; that they

have done their artistic and scientific and domestic stuff for the sake of doing it, and that we had better follow their example under the shadow of the aeroplanes. Others, with more vision or courage than myself, see the salvation of humanity ahead, and will dismiss my conception of civilization as paltry, a sort of tip-and-run game. Certainly it is presumptuous to say that we *cannot* improve, and that Man, who has only been in power for a few thousand years, will never learn to make use of his power. All I mean is that, if people continue to kill one another as they do, the world cannot get better than it is, and that since there are more people than formerly, and their means for destroying one another superior, the world may well get worse. What is good in people—and consequently in the world—is their insistence on creation, their belief in friendship and loyalty for their own sakes; and though Violence remains and is, indeed, the major partner in this muddled establishment, I believe that creativeness remains too, and will always assume direction when violence sleeps. So, though I am not an optimist, I cannot agree with Sophocles that it were better never to have been born. And although, like Horace, I see no evidence that each batch of births is superior to the last, I leave the field open for the more complacent view. This is such a difficult moment to live in, one cannot help getting gloomy and also a bit rattled, and perhaps short-sighted.

In search of a refuge, we may perhaps turn to hero-worship. But here we shall get no help, in my opinion. Hero-worship is a dangerous vice, and one of the minor merits of a democracy is that it does not encourage it, or produce that unmanageable type of citizen known as the Great Man. It produces instead different kinds of small men—a much finer achievement. But people

who cannot get interested in the variety of life, and cannot make up their own minds, get discontented over this, and they long for a hero to bow down before and to follow blindly. It is significant that a hero is an integral part of the authoritarian stock-in-trade to-day. An efficiency regime cannot be run without a few heroes stuck about it to carry off the dullness—much as plums have to be put into a bad pudding to make it palatable. One hero at the top and a smaller one each side of him is a favourite arrangement, and the timid and the bored are comforted by the trinity, and, bowing down, feel exalted and strengthened.

No, I distrust Great Men. They produce a desert of uniformity around them and often a pool of blood too, and I always feel a little man's pleasure when they come a cropper. Every now and then one reads in the newspapers some such statement as: "The *coup d'etat* appears to have failed, and Admiral Toma's whereabouts is at present unknown." Admiral Toma had probably every qualification for being a Great Man—an iron will, personal magnetism, dash, flair, sexlessness—but fate was against him, so he retires to unknown whereabouts instead of parading history with his peers. He fails with a completeness which no artist and no lover can experience, because with them the process of creation is itself an achievement, whereas with him the only possible achievement is success.

I believe in aristocracy, though—if that is the right word, and if a democrat may use it. Not an aristocracy of power, based upon rank and influence, but an aristocracy of the sensitive, the considerate and the plucky. Its members are to be found in all nations and classes, and all through the ages, and there is a secret understanding between them when they meet. They represent the true human tradition, the one permanent vic-

tory of our queer race over cruelty and chaos. Thousands of them perish in obscurity, a few are great names. They are sensitive for others as well as for themselves, they are considerate without being fussy, their pluck is not swankiness but the power to endure, and they can take a joke. I give no examples—it is risky to do that—but the reader may as well consider whether this is the type of person he would like to meet and to be, and whether (going farther with me) he would prefer that this type should *not* be an ascetic one. I am against asceticism myself. I am with the old Scotchman who wanted less chastity and more delicacy. I do not feel that my aristocrats are a real aristocracy if they thwart their bodies, since bodies are the instruments through which we register and enjoy the world. Still, I do not insist. This is not a major point. It is clearly possible to be sensitive, considerate and plucky and yet be an ascetic too, and if anyone possesses the first three qualities, I will let him in: On they go—an invincible army, yet not a victorious one. The aristocrats, the elect, the chosen, the Best People—all the words that describe them are false, and all attempts to organize them fail. Again and again Authority, seeing their value, has tried to net them and to utilize them as the Egyptian Priesthood or the Christian Church or the Chinese Civil Service or the Group Movement, or some other worthy stunt. But they slip through the net and are gone; when the door is shut, they are no longer in the room; their temple, as one of them remarked, is the Holiness of the Heart's Imagination, and their kingdom, though they never possess it, is the wide-open world.

With this type of person knocking about, and constantly crossing one's path if one has eyes to see or hands to feel, the experiment of earthly life cannot be dismissed as a failure. But it may well be hailed as a

tragedy, the tragedy being that no device has been found by which these private decencies can be transmitted to public affairs. As soon as people have power they go crooked and sometimes dotty as well, because the possession of power lifts them into a region where normal honesty never pays. For instance, the man who is selling news-papers outside the Houses of Parliament can safely leave his papers to go for a drink and his cap beside them: anyone who takes a paper is sure to drop a copper into the cap. But the men who are inside the Houses of Parliament—they cannot trust one another like that, still less can the Government they compose trust other governments. No caps upon the pavement here, but suspicion, treachery and armaments. The more highly public life is organized the lower does its morality sink; the nations of to-day behave to each other worse than they ever did in the past, they cheat, rob, bully and bluff, make war without notice, and kill as many women and children as possible; whereas primitive tribes were at all events restrained by taboos. It is humiliating outlook—though the greater the darkness, the brighter shine the little lights, reassuring one another, signalling: "Well, at all events, I'm still here. I don't like it very much, but how are you?" Unquenchable lights of my aristocracy: Signals of the invincible army: "Come along—anyway, let's have a good time while we can." I think they signal that too.

The Saviour of the future—if ever he comes—will not preach a new Gospel. He will merely utilize my aristocracy, he will make effective the good will and the good temper which are already existing. In other words, he will introduce a new technique. In economics, we are told that if there was a new technique of distribution, there need be no poverty, and people would not starve in one place while crops were being ploughed

under in another. A similar change is needed in the sphere of morals and politics. The desire for it is by no means new; it was expressed, for example, in theological terms by Jacopone da Todi over six hundred years ago. "Ordina questo amore, O tu che M'ami," he said; "O thou who lovest me—set this love in order". His prayer was not granted, and I do not myself believe that it ever will be, but here, and not through a change of heart, is our probable route. Not by becoming better, but by ordering and distributing his native goodness, will Man shut up Force into its box, and so gain time to explore the universe and to set his mark upon it worthily. At present he only explores it at odd moments, when Force is looking the other way, and his divine creativeness appears as a trivial byproduct, to be scrapped as soon as the drums beat and the bombers hum.

Such a change, claim the orthodox, can only be made by Christianity, and will be made by it in God's good time: man always has failed and always will fail to organize his own goodness, and it is presumptuous of him to try. This claim—solemn as it is—leaves me cold. I cannot believe that Christianity will ever cope with the present world-wide mess, and I think that such influence as it retains in modern society is due to the money behind it, rather than to its spiritual appeal. It was a spiritual force once, but the indwelling spirit will have to be restated if it is to calm the waters again, and probably restated in a non-Christian form. Naturally a lot of people, who are not only good but able and intelligent, will disagree here; they will vehemently deny that Christianity has failed, or they will argue that its failure proceeds from the wickedness of men, and really proves its ultimate success. They have Faith, with a large F. My faith has a very small one, and I only

intrude it because these are strenuous and serious days, and one likes to say what one thinks while speech is comparatively free: it may not be free much longer.

The above are the reflections of an individualist and a liberal who has found liberalism crumbling beneath him and at first felt ashamed. Then, looking around, he decided there was no special reason for shame, since other people, whatever they felt, were equally insecure. And as for individualism—there seems no way of getting off this, even if one wanted to. The dictator-hero can grind down his citizens till they are all alike, but he cannot melt them into a single man. That is beyond his power. He can order them to merge, he can incite them to mass-antics, but they are obliged to be born separately and to die separately, and, owing to these unavoidable termini, will always be running off the totalitarian rails. The memory of birth and the expectations of death always lurk within the human being, making him separate from his fellows and consequently capable of intercourse with them. Naked I came into the world, naked I shall go out of it. And a very good thing too, for it reminds me that I am naked under my shirt, whatever its colour.

V. RABINDRANATH TAGORE

WHAT IS ART?

THE question has been asked, 'What is Art?' and answers have been given by various persons. They aim at supplying us with very definite standards by which to guide our judgment of art productions. Therefore we have heard judges in the modern time giving verdict, according to some special rules of their own makking, for the dethronement of immortals whose supremacy has been unchallenged for centuries.

This meteorological disturbance in the atmosphere of art criticism, whose origin is in the West, has crossed over to our own shores in Bengal, bringing mist and clouds in its wake, where there was a clear sky. We have begun to ask ourselves whether creations of art should not be judged either according to their fitness to be universally understood, or their philosophical interpretation of life, or their usefulness for solving the problems of the day, or their giving expression to something which is peculiar to the genius of the people to which the artist belongs. Therefore, when men are seriously engaged in fixing the standard of value in art by something which is not inherent in it—or, in other words, when the excellence of the river is going to be judged by the point of view of a canal—we cannot leave the question to its fate, but must take our part in the deliberations.

Should we begin with a definition? But definition of a thing which has a life growth is really limiting one's own vision in order to be able to see clearly. And clearness is not necessarily the only, or the most

important, aspect of truth. A bull's-eye lantern view is a clear view, but not a complete view. If we are to know a wheel in motion, we need not mind if all its spokes cannot be counted. When not merely the accuracy of shape, but velocity of motion, is important, we have to be content with a somewhat imperfect definition of the wheel. Living things have far-reaching relationships with their surroundings, some of which are invisible and go deep down into the soil. In our zeal for definition we may lop off branches and roots of a tree to turn it into a log, which is easier to roll about from classroom to classroom, and therefore suitable for a text-book. But because it allows a nakedly clear view of itself, it cannot be said that a log gives a truer view of a tree as a whole.

Therefore, I shall not define Art, but question myself about the reason of its existence, and try to find out whether it owes its origin to some social purpose, or to the need of catering for our aesthetic enjoyment, or whether it has come out of some impulse of expression, which is the impulse of our being itself.

A fight has been going on for a long time round the saying, 'Art for Art's sake,' which seems to have fallen into disrepute among a section of Western critics. It is a sign of the recurrence of the ascetic ideal of the puritanic age; when enjoyment loses its direct touch with life, growing fastidious and fantastic in its world of elaborate conventions, then comes the call for renunciation which rejects happiness itself as a snare. I am not going into the history of your modern art, which I am not at all competent to discuss; yet I can assert, as a general truth, that when a man tries to thwart himself in his desire for delight, converting it merely into his desire to know, or to do good, then the cause must be that his power of feeling delight has lost its natural

bloom and healthiness.

The rhetoricians in old India had no hesitation in saying, that enjoyment is the soul of literature,—the enjoyment which is disinterested. But the word 'enjoyment' has to be used with caution. When analysed, its spectrum shows an endless series of rays of different worlds of stars. The art world contains elements which are distinctly its own and which emit lights that have their special range and property. It is our duty to distinguish them and arrive at their origin and growth.

The most important distinction between the animal and man is this, that the animal is very nearly bound within the limits of its necessities, the greater part of its activities being necessary for its self-preservation and the preservation of race. Like a retail shopkeeper, it has no large profit from its trade of life; the bulk of its earnings must be spent in paying back the interest to its bank. Most of its resources are employed in the mere endeavour to live. But man, in life's commerce, is a big merchant. He earns a great deal more than he is absolutely compelled to spend. Therefore, there is a vast excess of wealth in man's life, which gives him the freedom to be useless and irresponsible to a great measure. There are large outlying tracts, surrounding his necessities, where he has objects that are ends in themselves.

The animals must have knowledge, so that their knowledge can be employed for useful purposes of their life. But there they stop. They must know their surroundings in order to be able to take their shelter and seek their food, some properties of things in order to build their dwellings, some signs of the different seasons to be able to get ready to adapt themselves to the changes. Man also must know, because he must live. But man has a surplus where he can proudly assert that know-

ledge is for the sake of knowledge. There he has the pure enjoyment of his knowledge, because there knowledge is freedom. Upon this fund of surplus his science and philosophy thrive.

Then again, there is a certain amount of altruism in the animal. It is the altruism of parenthood, the altruism of the herd and the hive. This altruism is absolutely necessary for race preservation. But in man there is a great deal more than this. Though he also has to be good, because goodness is necessary for his race, yet he goes far beyond that. His goodness is not a small pittance, barely sufficient for a hand-to-mouth moral existence. He can amply afford to say that goodness is for the sake of goodness. And upon this wealth of goodness—where honesty is not valued for being the best policy, but because, it can afford to go against all policies—man's ethics are founded.

The idea of 'Art for Art's sake' also has its origin in this region of the superfluous. Let us, therefore, try to ascertain what activity it is whose exuberance leads to the production of Art.

For man, as well as for the animals, it is necessary to give expression to feelings of pleasure and displeasure, fear, anger and love. In animals, these emotional expressions have gone little beyond their bounds of usefulness. But in man, though they still have roots in their original purposes, they have spread their branches far and wide in the infinite sky high above their soil. Man has a fund of emotional energy which is not all occupied with his self-preservation. This surplus seeks its outlet in the creation of Art, for man's civilization is built upon his surplus.

A warrior is not merely content with fighting, which is needful, but, by the aid of music and decorations, he must give expression to the heightened consciousness of

the warrior in him, which is not only unnecessary but in some cases suicidal. The man who has a strong religious feeling not only worships his deity with all care, but his religious personality craves, for its expression, the splendour of the temple, the rich ceremonials of worship.

When a feeling is aroused in our hearts which is far in excess of the amount that can be completely absorbed by the object which has produced it, it comes back to us and makes us conscious of ourselves by its return waves. When we are in poverty, all our attention is fixed outside us—upon the objects which we must acquire for our need. But when our wealth greatly surpasses our needs, its light is reflected back upon us, and we have the exultation of feeling that we are rich persons. This is the reason why, of all creatures, only man knows himself, because his impulse of knowledge comes back to him in its excess. He feels his personality more intensely than other creatures, because his power of feeling is more than can be exhausted by his objects. This efflux of the consciousness of his personality requires an outlet of expression. Therefore, in Art man reveals himself and not his objects. His objects have their place in books of information and science, where he has completely to conceal himself.

Let us here consider what are the contents of this personality and how it is related to the outer world. This world appears to us as an individual, and not merely as a bundle of invisible forces. For this, as everybody knows, it is greatly indebted to our senses and our mind. This apparent world is man's world. It has taken its special features of shapes, colour and movement from the peculiar range and qualities of our perception. It is what our sense limits have specially acquired and built for us and walled up. Not only the

physical and chemical forces, but man's perceptual forces, are its potent factors, because it is man's world, and not an abstract world of physics or metaphysics.

This world, which takes its form in the mould of man's perception, still remains only as the partial world of his senses and mind. It is like a guest and not like a kinsman. It becomes completely our own when it comes within the range of our emotions. With our love and hatred, pleasure and pain, fear and wonder, continually working upon it, this world becomes a part of our personality. It grows with our growth, it changes with our changes. We are great or small, according to the magnitude and littleness of this assimilation, according to the quality of its sum total. If this world were taken away, our personality would lose all its contents.

Our emotions are the gastric juices which transform this world of appearances into the more intimate world of sentiments. On the other hand, this outer world has its own juices, having their various qualities which excite our emotional activities. This is called in our Sanskrit rhetoric *rasa*, which signifies outer juices having their response in the inner juices of our emotions. And a poem, according to it, is a sentence or sentences containing juices, which stimulate the juices of emotion. It brings to us ideas, vitalized by feelings, ready to be made into the life-stuff of our nature.

Bare information on facts is not literature, because it gives us merely the facts which are independent of ourselves. Repetition of the facts that the sun is round, water is liquid, fire is hot, would be intolerable. But a description of the beauty of the sunrise has its eternal interest for us, because there it is not the fact of the sunrise but its relation to ourselves which is the object of perennial interest.

It is said in the Upanishads that 'Wealth is dear to us, not because we desire the fact of the wealth itself, but because we desire ourselves.' This means that we feel ourselves in our wealth, and therefore we love it. The things which arouse our emotions arouse our own self-feeling. It is like our touch upon the harp-string; if it is too feeble, then we are merely aware of the touch, but if it is strong, then our touch comes back to us in tunes and our consciousness is intensified.

But how can we express our personality, which we only know by feeling? A scientist can make known what he has learned by analysis and experiment. But what an artist has to say, he cannot express by merely informing and explaining. The plainest language is needed when I have to say what I know about a rose, but to say what I feel about a rose is different. There it has nothing to do with facts, or with laws; it deals with taste, which can be realized only by tasting. Therefore the Sanskrit rhetoricians say, in poetry we have to use words which have got the proper taste—which do not merely talk, but conjure up pictures and sing. For pictures and songs are not merely facts—they are personal facts. They are not only themselves, but ourselves also. They defy analysis and they have immediate access to our hearts.

It has to be conceded that man cannot help revealing his personality also in the world of use. But there self-expression is not his primary object. In everyday life, when we are mostly moved by our habits, we are economical in our expression; for then our soul-consciousness is at its low level—it has just volume enough to glide on in accustomed grooves. But when our heart is fully awakened in love, or in other great emotions, our personality is in its flood-tide. Then it feels the longing to express itself for the very sake of

expression. Then comes Art, and we forget the claims of necessity, the thrift of usefulness; the spires of our temples try to kiss the stars and the notes of our music to fathom the depth of the ineffable.

Man's energies, running on two parallel lines—that of utility and of self-expression—tend to meet and mingle. By constant human associations sentiments gather around our things of use and invite the help of art to reveal themselves—as we see the warrior's pride and love revealed in the ornamental sword-blade, and the comradeship of festive gatherings in the wine goblet.

The lawyer's office, as a rule, is not a thing of beauty, and the reason is obvious. But in a city, where men are proud of their citizenship, public buildings must in their structure express this love for the city. When the British capital was removed from Calcutta to Delhi, there was discussion about the style of architecture which should be followed in the new buildings. Some advocated the Indian style of the Moghal period—the style which was the joint production of the Moghal and the Indian genius. The fact that they lost sight of was that all true art has its origin in sentiment. Moghal Delhi and Moghal Agra show their human personality in their buildings. Moghal emperors were men, they were not mere administrators. They lived and died in India, they loved and fought. The memorials of their reigns do not persist in the ruins of factories and offices, but in immortal works of art—not only in great buildings, but in pictures and music and workmanship in stone and metal, in cotton and wool fabrics. But the British Government in India is not personal. It is official, and therefore an abstraction. It has nothing to express in the true language of art. For law, efficiency and exploitation cannot sing themselves into epic stones. Lord Lytton, who unfortunately was gifted with more

imagination than was necessary for an Indian Viceroy, tried to copy one of the state functions of the Moghals —the Durbar ceremony. But state ceremonials are works of art. They naturally spring from the reciprocity of personal relationship between the people and their monarch. When they are copies, they show all the signs of the spurious.

How utility and sentiment take different lines in their expression can be seen in the dress of a man compared with that of a woman. A man's dress, as a rule, shuns all that is unnecessary and merely decorative. But a woman has naturally selected the decorative, not only in her dress, but in her manners. She has to be picturesque and musical to make manifest what she truly is, because, in her position in the world, woman is more concrete and personal than man. She is not to be judged merely by her usefulness, but by her delightfulness. Therefore, she takes infinite care in expressing, not her profession, but her personality.

The principal object of art, also, being the expression of personality, and not of that which is abstract and analytical, it necessarily uses the language of picture and music. This has led to a confusion in our thought that the object of art is the production of beauty; whereas beauty in art has been the mere instrument and not its complete and ultimate significance.

As a consequence of this, we have often heard it argued whether manner, rather than matter, is the essential element in art. Such arguments become endless, like pouring water into a vessel whose bottom has been taken away. These discussions owe their origin to the idea that beauty is the object of art, and, because mere matter cannot have the property of beauty, it becomes a question whether manner is not the principal factor in art.

But the truth is, analytical treatment will not help us in discovering what is the vital point in art. For the true principle of art is the principle of unity. When we want to know the food-value of certain of our diets, we find it in their component parts; but its taste-value is in its unity, which cannot be analysed. Matter, taken by itself, is an abstraction which can be dealt with by science; while manner, which is merely manner, is an abstraction which comes under the laws of rhetoric. But when they are indissolubly one, then they find their harmonies in our personality, which is an organic complex of matter and manner, thoughts and things, motives and actions.

Therefore, we find all abstract ideas are out of place in true art, where, in order to gain admission, they must come under the disguise of personification. This is the reason why poetry tries to select words that have vital qualities—words that are not for mere information, but have become naturalized in our hearts and have not been worn out of their shapes by too constant use in the market. For instance, the English word 'consciousness' has not yet outgrown the cocoon stage of its scholastic inertia, therefore it is seldom used in poetry; whereas its Indian synonym *chetana* is a vital word and is of constant poetical use. On the other hand, the English word 'feeling' is fluid with life, but its Bengali synonym *anubhuti* is refused in poetry because it merely has a meaning and no flavour. And likewise there are some truths, coming from science and philosophy, which have acquired life's colour and taste, and some which have not. Until they have done this, they are, for art, like uncooked vegetables, unfit to be served at a feast. History, so long as it copies science and deals with abstractions, remains outside the domain of literature. But, as a narrative of facts, it takes its

place by the side of the epic poem. For narration of historical facts imparts to the time to which they belong a taste of personality. Those periods become human to us, we feel their living heart-beats.

The world and the personal man are face to face, like friends who question one another and exchange their inner secrets. The world asks the inner man, "Friend, have you seen me? Do you love me?—not as one who provides you with foods and fruits, not as one whose laws you have found out, but as one who is personal, individual?"

The artist's answer it, "Yes, I have seen you, I have loved and known you—not what I have any need of you, not that I have taken you and used your laws for my own purposes of power. I know the forces that act and drive and lead to power, but it is not that. I see you, where you are, what I am."

But how do you know that the artist has known, has seen, has come face to face with this Personality?

When I first meet any one who is not yet my friend, I observe all the numberless unessential things which attract the attention at first sight; and in the wilderness of that diversity of facts the friend who is to be my friend is lost.

When our steamer reached the coast of Japan, one of our passengers, a Japanese, was coming back home from Rangoon; we, on the other hand, were reaching that shore for the first time in our life. There was a great difference in our outlook. We noted every little peculiarity, and innumerable small things occupied our attention. But the Japanese passenger dived at once into the personality, the soul of the land, where his own soul found satisfaction. *He* saw fewer things, *we* saw more things; but what he saw was the soul of Japan. It could not be gauged by any quantity or number, but by

something invisible and deep. It could not be said, that because we saw those innumerable things, we saw Japan better, but rather the reverse.

If you ask me to draw some particular tree—and I am no artist—I try to copy every detail, lest I should otherwise lose the peculiarity of the tree, forgetting that the peculiarity is not the personality. But when the true artist comes, he overlooks all details and gets into the essential characterization. He looks on that tree as unique, not as the botanist who generalizes and classifies. It is the function of the artist to particularize that one tree.

The greatness and beauty of Oriental art, especially in Japan and China, consist in this, that there the artists have seen this soul of things and they believe in it. The West may believe in the Soul of Man, but she does not really believe that the universe has a soul. Yet this is the belief of the East, and the whole mental contribution of the East to mankind is filled with this idea. So we, in the East, need not go into details and emphasize them; for the most important thing is this universal soul, for which the Eastern sages have sat in meditation, and Eastern artists have joined them in artistic realization.

Because we have faith in this universal soul, we in the East know that Truth, Power, Beauty, lie in Simplicity—where it is transparent, where things do not obstruct the inner vision. Therefore, all our sages have tried to make their lives simple and pure, because thus they have the realization of a positive truth, which, though invisible, is more real than the gross and the numerous.

When we say that art only deals with those truths that are personal, we do not exclude philosophical ideas which are apparently abstract. They are quite

common in our Indian literature, because they have been woven with the fibres of our personal nature.

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In India, the greater part of our literature is religious, because God with us is not a distant God; He belongs to our homes as well as to our temples. We feel His nearness to us in all the human relationship of love and affection, and in our festivities He is the chief guest whom we honour. In seasons of flowers and fruits, in the coming of the rain, in the fulness of the autumn, we see the hem of His mantle and hear His footsteps. We worship Him in all the true objects of our worship and love Him wherever our love is true. In the woman who is good we feel Him, in the man who is true we know Him, in our children He is born again and again, the Eternal Child. Therefore, religious songs are our love songs, and our domestic occurrences, such as the birth of a son, or the coming of the daughter from her husband's house to her parents and her departure again, are woven in our literature as a drama whose counterpart is in the divine.

We have said before that where there is an element of the superfluous in our heart's relationship with the world, Art has its birth. In other words, where our personality feels its wealth it breaks out in display. What we devour for ourselves is totally spent. What overflows our need becomes articulate. The stage of pure utility is like the state of heat which is dark. When it surpasses itself, it becomes white heat and then it is expressive.

Take, for instance, our delight in eating. It is soon exhausted; it gives no indication of the infinite. Therefore, though in its extensiveness it is more universal

than any other passion, it is rejected by art.

In our life we have one side which is finite, where we exhaust ourselves at every step, and we have another side, where our aspiration, enjoyment and sacrifice are infinite. This infinite side of man must have its revealments in some symbols which have the elements of immortality. There it naturally seeks perfection. Therefore, it refuses all that is flimsy and feeble and incongruous. It builds for its dwelling a paradise, where only those materials are used that have transcended the earth's mortality.

For men are the children of light. Whenever they fully realize themselves, they feel their immortality. And, as they feel it, they extend their realm of the immortal into every region of human life.

This building of man's true world—the living world of truth and beauty—is the function of Art.

VI. MARIA PETRIE

ART AND SOCIETY

The increasing mechanization and urbanization of life has led further away from daily contact with nature and the crafts of the farm and the country-dwelling. Although there are greater facilities for the arts in the towns than there have ever been before, it cannot be said that on the whole their quality has improved. What has been the ersatz-food lately, nourishing heart and imagination, and supplying them with just sufficient driving-power for the daily grind, and what has been the result of such cheap and unsustaining fare?

The gramophone, the cinema and the wireless are results as well as expressions of mechanization and urbanization and have kept step with these developments. On the positive side of these techniques we can allow that an immensely greater number of people than before can be reached by music and some form of drama and that musical and general education has been greatly extended by them. We will not enter into the question of quality as it is obvious that the intermediary of the machine cannot compensate for contact with musicians and actors, for seeing as well as hearing them perform; and for the direct current between artists and audience, which accounts for so much of the enjoyment of a work. But broadcasting has evolved its own forms of art in the dialogue and the symposium and the drama interspersed by music-phrases, even though one might wish for a higher general level of programmes. The gramophone has great drawbacks which are, however, set off by the possibility of

repeated and detailed study of orchestral works which would be impossible without it. The cinema, which only very rarely produces a complete work of art, enlarges our field of vision with pictures of foreign countries, and of ways of life other than our own, and of beauty in nature. A very positive value of the cinema lies in this visual side, not in the sensational or comic drama. If it had not been commercialized from the beginning it might have become a powerful new medium of art, and of course there is no intrinsic reason why it should not be so one day. It may also be argued that these films, sordid and silly for the most part, pandering, as they do, to all the most primitive instincts, yet stand for some kind of sublimation. People are taken out of their own drab lives for a few hours and put themselves into the places of hero and heroine. Some of the glamour may get transformed into higher aspirations or better manners, and some of the beauty seen may enter their lives, even if unconsciously. Television will no doubt bring new possibilities, but also new problems of a social and aesthetic kind. Without this compensating medley of phantasy, life might be well-nigh unbearable in its monotony and starkness for many town-dwellers and workers.

On the negative side of these mechanical arts there is chiefly the inactivity and stupor in which we let them work upon us. No effort goes out to meet them and take part in them. We cannot practise these arts, we can only be passive and enjoy them in an all-too-easy and uncritical frame of mind, for they have a soporific effect and we have, except in the case of the gramophone, not even much choice in the matter.

When we turn to the applied arts the effect of the machine and the big city is felt here also; machine-made objects, often very beautiful ones, have replaced

the home crafts; hands and eyes remain unskilled except perhaps in some specialized machine-tending way. Trees and fields recede further and further and in the centre of big cities there is little or no contact with the earth, the changing season, with plants, animals and growing things. This contact, so necessary to art, the dweller in the country retains, but here too the crafts have declined and the arts hardly penetrate. In the towns the arts proper, as distinguished from the mechanized arts, cater for so limited a public that they need not enter into the present argument. If they were differently presented and distributed, their operating field might perhaps be far greater, but this is a question which demands separate enquiry.

There are other modern pastimes and attempts to entertain the masses and to stimulate and rouse their emotions, possibly even their imagination, but they sadly fail to provide that happiness and glow of satisfaction which the simplest task in any freely chosen art or craft can create. Drink and drugs, racing and betting in all their forms, cocktail and bridge-parties, cup-tie matches and all sport which has become too expert and professional; jazz-bands and tattoos; the popular beaches with their display of flesh and muscle and side-shows; the exaggerated use of cosmetics, the loitering at street-corners; the gangsterdom of children and youths; excessive smoking and cheap fiction; need one remind the reader of what is to be seen everywhere? There is no need either to remind him of the result of all this; the boredom and nervous illness, the disease, immorality and delinquency, the growing indiscipline of children and young people and the unhappiness and frustration which can be read in nine out of ten faces of any passers-by in the street.

The efforts made by public bodies and individuals

to combat these social ills are very determined and real. Social workers, clergy and teachers, with unending devotion, try to provide alternatives for the attractions of loafing. Clubs of all kinds have sprung up, lectures, concerts, dances and exhibitions are being organized privately or under the auspices of societies, and more recently opportunities for amateur painting and handwork have been provided, especially in London. But all this is only a beginning.

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The masses of people, the millions whom the peace has left drifting and, if not actually unemployed, then so utterly weary in body and mind after the strain of years, will want a far bigger, speedier, better organized provision for positive alternatives to cheap and demoralizing pleasures. More or less private and uncoordinated efforts will not be enough, nor will vague promises of facilities for leisure. Leisure to lounge about or to go to the cinema still more frequently will not mend matters. Something more constructive will have to be found. Better housing should go a long way, if it is adequate, for it would then give young people a room to stay in at home, not always under the eyes of nagging parents. Where there is happy family-life it could then be unfolded, more freely with the many activities for which the home is the most natural and fecund soil. Even if we should get the urgently needed club buildings and cultural town and village centres with their libraries, stages, workshops, baths, etc., in more than a few favoured spots and at the time when they are most wanted, it would not be enough. A leisurely planning for leisure will not turn the threatening social collapse into a vital renewal at the criti-

cal moment. Planning for the people's souls and their nerve-power and will to go on toiling, as they will have to do for years to come, is as urgent and has to be done on as big a scale as planning for housing and food and for the rest of their education.

In the first place, it is necessary that a wider public than social workers should become more fully acquainted with the importance and urgency of the re-education and re-orientation of adults towards a more satisfactory spiritual and emotional life. What is wanted besides is the realization by the proletariat that neither capital nor equal opportunities will grant them a happiness which they imagine the upper classes to possess and which they vaguely remember as the birthright of their artisan or farming forefathers. A certain proportion of the upper classes may be called moderately happy and devoid of economic worries and the necessity for daily drudgery. But capitalists and captains of industry do not belong to this minority; rather will you find in it impecunious artists and handworkers of all kinds, scientists and professional people and any workers engrossed in solving problems and furthering plans for the gradual emergence of man from the morass in which he is still floundering.

If in place of the mechanized arts, which only demand passive submission, not active collaboration, we wanted to put the old methods of working by hand, we should find this as impossible in the production of furniture, textiles and other consumer-goods as it has been found in farming. An artificial revival of something which has had to go for the obvious reason that the demand for such goods has far outstripped the possible supply by hand, would not be a natural, healthy activity and would defeat its own object. This is not to say that the hand-made artefact will disappear altogether. Not

only will the machine-made goods of the future be designed and created by artists in the first place, but those made by hand will approach more nearly than ever the unique expression of personal character that a work of art should possess, for this will be their only *raison d'etre* when serviceable objects can be produced cheaply and beautifully by machinery. The conscious mediaevalism of Eric Gill could not put the clock back, although his life and his work have kept alive the tradition of fine craftsmanship and have formed a link between the past and the future.

And thus we find on the one hand insufficiency and poverty of the emotional life as a result of mechanization and town-life and the breaking up of family life through modern social conditions, and also what remains of this life more or less perverted and degraded by commercialized, machine-made pleasure and by mass-emotions, always inferior in quality to individual emotion. On the other hand, we find a corresponding decline in the arts and handicrafts of all description. We would not replace the machine by handwork again if we could; moreover, we are haunted by the thought that whatever satisfaction and happiness the handworker of previous ages had above the machine-worker of the present, must have been offset by a very low standard of living and by the squalor of homes teeming with children who died all too frequently.

What then is the way out of this stalemate? Merely, it seems to me, a shifting of the balance of aims and values. Quality must be the aim as well as quantity; an emotional education as well as a physical, intellectual and spiritual one; a more generous recognition of woman and more help and understanding during her slow and painful ascent from a subordinated position to that of a comrade and partner; co-ordination and

conscious control of our physical and mental states of being.

Our problems are being recognized and probed from many different quarters, in terms of politics and reconstruction, of social work, education and training for the professions, but the integrating power, which would turn these efforts into one big, upsurging wave, carrying all before it, seems to be missing. If we want to be honest we must face the fact that Christianity is in exile and that the Church can no longer supply power on that scale. Too many now, who have looked annihilation in the face, will not sit down patiently any more to listen to the rhetoric of parsons.

Will men continue to help women with the daily chores in peace as well as in war? It would seem wise policy, for it is only with the goodwill and the particular contribution of free women that the new forces needed can be gathered and applied. But such a policy need not go beyond the stage at which most men will have acquired the necessary insight and sympathy to wish to change the conditions of domestic slavery still generally binding womenkind and to apply their inventive genius to the improvement of these conditions. The aim should be that women be set as free as possible, always allowing for a natural division of labour, not that men should be submerged as well, so that they may go forward together. This is not the place to enter more fully into the problem of the latent struggle between the sexes, which is just as much a fact as is the open struggle between races, nations, classes and the old and young. It is hushed up at present by common consent, but once the camouflage is removed it will stare us in the face as one of the post-war difficulties which needs most delicate handling, feminine handling preferably. Without at least touching on this important

point, no background of sociological trends can be sketched in fully enough to show where we stand and which are the key-positions from which the new spirit should be applied. To point to the many professions open to women now and the labour-saving homes they may have in good time does not prove equality; nor will it serve to quote the exceptional women who have achieved equality—only they can tell against what odds. If new spiritual and emotional strength is to enter family-life, if children are not to be educated solely for the labour market or too-specialized professions, if infants are to be more carefully nurtured and studied not only for their own sake but for the sake of a deeper knowledge of mankind as well, if the sick in mind and body are to be succoured, if the arts are to flourish, women will be needed in their own homes and beyond them. They must be free to think and act as they have never been before.

The other struggle going on simultaneously and also almost unvoiced politically is the endeavour of youth to free itself from the authority and preponderance of age as such, the demand to be given a chance to make the world in which it has got to live. Older children join in this revolt against parental authority. Children's personalities are beginning to be more recognized and respected and the educational reforms planned lay emphasis on greater freedom from examinations and other pressure. But the real freedom of individual children is closely bound up with social conditions, better and more school buildings and far larger numbers of teachers, all conditions not immediately realizable.

But perhaps the greatest struggle that is being waged at present, and which we have to face consciously, is that between the masses and the individual, between socialism, be it fascism, communism or a milder kind,

and the freedom of the individual. This struggle is not only on an international level, but is taking place within each nation and group and within our own minds. We must face it and try to find the right balance. Here also, art can help and show the way.

When we come to the individual, child or adult, we realize that we need intimate, individual art and must not be content to cater for the masses only. Mass art is provided by the films and the theatre, by dancing and ballet, by orchestral music and big picture-exhibitions, like those at Burlington House or the Grand Palais in Paris.

These communal forms of art have a socializing and equalizing effect, it is true. They demand mass-audiences and numbers of people can take part in them. There are choirs and orchestras of over a hundred performers; the Eisteddfods and the Albert Hall have audiences of thousands; the large cinemas or dance halls are swayed by mass emotion to the sickly strains of the flood-lit organ or the primitive rhythm of jazz or swing. At their best these mass-arts grant a release from the bonds of self and of loneliness; the shared feeling, the communion with the nameless and unknown fellow-beings, creates an illusion of happiness and even bliss, however fleeting, which acts like a purging of pent-up emotions and may have a clearing and refreshing effect. This crowd hypnosis levels down individual taste and feeling and the arts in question then form a dangerous weapon in the hands of the propagandist, the war-mongers and any fanatics with an axe to grind. At their worst they can become debased into fashions, crazes and aphrodisiacs.

The arts also have different and separate social functions; that not only in their interior organization specialized, but that they also differ in their external as-

pect and in the effect they have upon the world. For this purpose we must divide them into categories of those which appeal to man as a social being, comprising the mass-arts mentioned above, and those which can only be practised and enjoyed by the individual, comprising painting, sculpture, poetry, musical composition and soloist music. There is a third category between the two which I will call a border category, to which a great deal of music belongs. Such music may have soloist (that is individual) elements, but these form part of a work in which either a limited number of other instruments (chamber-music) or an accompaniment by an instrument or orchestra form the social back-ground against which the individual part is played. To this category also belong the individual parts on the stage and much applied art in which social usefulness or response is important. These arts form the link between the lonely creative artist and the world's response, which is less direct.

The terms mass-art and mixed or border-art are not here used in a derogatory sense, for they encompass some of the greatest works of art, oratorios, symphonies and classical chamber-music, for instance. But in a declining civilization such as ours, in which mob-and mass-standards are introduced from below and imposed by dictators from above and in which the lowest common denominator of culture is also unduly powerful, it is imperative that the individualist arts should be stressed more than the mass arts. Where mass-standards and mob-passions rule, rebirth can only come from the better quality of individual effort, and from the finer differentiation it brings with it. In the poet's or the composer's lonely vigils, in the great painter's or sculptor's agonized struggle to give form to their inner vision, in the hard daily discipline and practice of the

individual musician and actor, lies salvation. They show the way out of this soulless mechanization which is threatening to turn men into robots. Was it not Karel Capek, the individual poet, who gave us the warning image of the robot; and was it not Mrs. Shelley who gave us in "Frankenstein" a prophetic vision of what has now almost come to pass?

It is for such reasons that it is at the present moment more important to foster the individualist arts than to send round touring companies and hold concerts and exhibitions, excellent as these activities most certainly are. But it is not as easy in the nature of things to bid the poet and the composer write. Their's is the loneliest track which only a few can follow. Listen to the words of a poet: "Loneliness is great and not easy to bear and there comes to nearly everyone the hours when he would gladly exchange it for any intercourse, however commonplace and cheap, for the semblance of a slight understanding with the next best, with the most unworthy.....But it is still only loneliness that is necessary—great inner loneliness. As the bees bring together their honey, so do we take the sweetest from everything and build God. Even with what is slight and unpretentious, as long as it comes to pass out of love, we begin; with work and with rest after work, with a silence of a little lovely joy, with everything that we do without participation or followers, we begin to form Him."

But again the position is not as simple as it seems at first glance. The work may be created by an individual during lonely hours in the white heat of inspiration without thought of others. Yet eventually the wish to communicate and to work for the joy of at least a few others will arise and the social element, driven out at the front-door, comes in once more through the back-

entrance. This is as it should be. Art is a dynamic process, beginning as one thing and ending as another. It is a compound of the active and the receptive principle, it is a dialogue between one person and another or it is a conversion between friends, even a speech to the masses. It is a constant play between opposite forces and it only exists like a ball tossed to and fro between them.

However lonely may be the furrow ploughed by the individual artist, writer or musician, his very genius is not of his own. Quite apart from heredity and education, it is as much the creation of social forces which by their accidental combination may bring some special gifts into the limelight. The fame of a man recognized as a genius may change several times during periods of history and may rise or fall in value as times and tastes change. The valuation of a genius does not necessarily correspond to his work; it may be the creation partly of his followers and his critics, of art-dealers, impressarios and art-historians of accidental settings in time and place or of purposeful advertisement and skilful use of opportunities. A small talent may achieve more than a greater one if it is coupled with determination and industry. Genius may be discovered early and trained painstakingly, as was Mozart, or it may never know itself or rise from the gutter. Great achievements of ancient art may remain buried for ever, while mediocre works which happen to have been found are extolled beyond merit. In short, art is as much the creation of society as of the individual.

But since human society as a whole now finds itself at a dead end, drained of vitality, this gives the individual his cue again. The visual arts in particular will have to come forward with a rush to prevent a final

breakdown. Mankind must branch out in a new direction as the crown of the tree of life is withering, and this fresh shoot must be the individual personality reinstated, respected and lovingly brought out in all its qualities. Only by the visual arts can it be so brought out at a tender enough age to ensure a lasting effect and a real change of heart.

VII. A. D. RITCHIE

SCIENCE AS A CREATIVE POWER

THE theme of this essay is the place of science in the development of civilized life, as one of the valuable things that can flourish only in a free society and as one of the instruments which, properly used, go to make a free society. That is to say, as something which is both an end in itself and a means to other ends. I must begin with some explanations to remove possible misunderstandings about science and its place in social life, but these explanations will, I hope, themselves develop my theme. Let me put certain points first in a summary and perhaps paradoxical form and then attempt to justify them. Science begins with the pursuit of what is useful, but it is only by abandoning that for the pursuit of the useless that it can reach its full status and increase its usefulness. Only by abandoning all claim to infallibility can science become a sure guide to truth. The pursuit of science implies an act of faith or a dogma, if that term is preferred, that if you pursue truth whole-heartedly and persistently with no other aim in view, you will find it; though often the truths you find are not those you expected and hoped for and may even destroy what you previously held to be truths.

Many people think of science as a doctrine about the nature of the universe. It is true that theories are a necessary part of science, but only a part, and not always the most important part. Moreover, the theories are not constant but changing. Those that most excited popular enthusiasm yesterday may be the least

heard of to-morrow. Theories are necessary but they are makeshifts; each is just something to go on with till a better one turns up. Science is permanently and essentially a way of acting and thinking, a combined practical and theoretical activity. It is the activity, not its results or byproducts, that properly constitutes science. Science begins with acquiring technical skill in everyday occupations. Physics has its origin in house building, in shipbuilding, seamanship and navigation, in mining and metal working; chemistry has its origin in metallurgy, bleaching and dyeing, glassmaking, cooking and many other crafts; biology in agriculture, fishing and forestry. Even mathematics, the one branch of science which can plausibly claim to be purely theoretical and not practical originated in land surveying, measuring goods in the market, and keeping accounts. The humblest kind of practical skill and rule of thumb knowledge is a rudiment of science, provided it is genuine and not bogus; provided, that is to say, it springs from genuine acquaintance with the facts of the case and embodies rules which anybody can apply and which can be tested by new experience. Otherwise it is sham science, wishful thinking, magic or superstition. If the fisherman believes and acts on the belief that certain kinds of fish bite better on the flood than on the ebb tide, that is the beginning of science, provided he and his friends have actually taken pains to observe the difference in behaviour of the fish. It is still the beginning of science even if the belief turns to be partly mistaken. But if the fisherman acts on the belief (which used to prevail in some places) that meeting a pig on the way down to his boat brings bad luck, so that he refuses to go out fishing after the encounter, that is not science but is in fact the kind of attitude science is concerned to eradicate.

The useful arts are no more than the rudiment of science. In the pursuit of them experience is sought and tested only so far as it appears to be directly advantageous for some purpose, for obtaining food or clothing, shelter or means of transport, or something else. In the pursuit of science in full sense, experience is sought for its own sake, for no purpose other than discovering facts. Of course it is useful to know the truth because if you do not know it you are liable to blunder, but to produce science truth must be sought first because it is true, not because it is useful. It is for this reason that the ancient Greeks are rightly considered the originators of science and why in this respect it matters very little how much or how little of any of the ordinary useful arts they learnt from other people. Incidentally, they also freed science from the priestly *hocus pocus* which had surrounded some of its origins. They were the ones who began to observe, occasionally to experiment, to theorize and to argue (specially to argue) for the sake of knowing the truth and not for the sake of some useful consequence. Of course they were pleased if their knowledge turned out to be useful, but that was not why they sought it. The true is useful only because it is true; those who invert the order and assume that because something seems useful it will be true are likely to fail to achieve the useful. There is a good parallel in the sphere of morals. Those who seek happiness as their sole end are very unlikely to achieve happiness. Those who seek virtue regardless of whether or not it makes them happy are the most likely to achieve happiness too.

Perhaps it is necessary to interpose a remark here. What I have said so far might suggest that I considered the natural sciences to be the only ones. So let me say at once that no such suggestion is intended. There are

scientific studies of history, of language, of human political and social institutions, and so on, whose aim and method do not differ radically from those of the natural sciences. Neither do I suggest that there are no truths other than those attainable by scientific method. But the kind of truths I am now concerned with are those of science.

Of all the sciences there is none that is more obviously useful or practical than medicine, so that many would be inclined to say that the sole aim or purpose of medical science is to cure or prevent disease. My contention is that if that were its sole aim it would be doomed to almost complete frustration. It is as great a misunderstanding of medicine to think of it as purely practical as it is of physics to think of it as purely theoretical. Theoretical physics is simply the speculative branch of engineering as medicine is a practical application of biological theory. Practical needs provide the essential stimulus by pointing out our ignorance, but needs alone do not provide the solution to any problem.

It so happens that most people recover from most diseases; in fact everybody recovers from every disease, except the last, the one that kills him. If physicians were content to see that their patients were warm and quiet and suitably fed, but to leave them alone otherwise, and if surgeons were content not to interfere except in the most obvious cases of broken bones and other injuries, medicine could make some showing as a practical art, though it would have to admit complete helplessness in the face of serious disease, for instance, epidemics of plague, cholera, or yellow fever. But it would be a rudimentary practical art with no real science about it and quite unprogressive. To become a science and to be able to cope with serious disease it

must acquire systematic knowledge of the structure and working of the human and animal body, both in health and disease, regardless of whether that knowledge is *prima facie* useful or not. This kind of knowledge, the theoretical basis or the art of healing, has gradually accumulated through the work of anatomists, physiologists, and various sorts of biologists, not to mention chemists, physicists, and mathematicians. Some of these men were directly interested in the art of healing, some were not and some probably had no idea their work would ever have any such application; for instance, the mathematicians, physicists, and instrument makers to whom we owe that indispensable medical tool, the microscope. There is an historical example which shows clearly how it is that the pursuit of 'pure' knowledge leads to practical results when the pursuit of practical results leads nowhere. It is a story often told, but it will bear telling again.

One of the great problems of medical practice is to deal with infectious and epidemic diseases. This means an understanding of how the disease is acquired, what is happening in the patient's body when he has it, how he comes to recover if he does recover, and why he is usually less susceptible to that type of disease after recovery. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, medical science in this sphere had advanced little further than in the days of Hippocrates. For a few such diseases, it is true, specific treatments had been discovered and were used with some success; quinine to mitigate the effects of malaria, vaccination to confer immunity to smallpox and some others. But these were rule of thumb methods, discovered more or less by accident. There was no theory behind them, no understanding how they worked, and above all no experimental method for extending systematically the small amount of

knowledge available. It was not that people had not tried hard to treat epidemic diseases. They had, but their purposes and efforts were in vain. There were plenty of theories about but they were shots in the dark. How black that darkness was can be seen from some names still current—'malaria', 'influenza'. The deadlock was broken and the foundations of this branch of medical science securely laid by one man, not a medical man but an experimental chemist, who used a microscope. His interest in biological matters was first roused by observing that moulds would grow on one form of tartaric acid and not on another, and then, more decidedly, by his being asked by a brewer why beer sometimes turned sour. The brewer probably thought he was asking a chemical question. Pasteur, using his microscope, decided it was a biological question. The sound beer he found contained only the rounded cells of normal yeast; the sour beer contained quite different objects which he thought were also living organisms. He then conceived the bold hypothesis that fermentation, putrefaction, and all similar processes might be due to the activity of micro-organisms. That was an important step, but an even more important one was the extremely bold hypothesis he was led to by the experiments he then made, namely, that fermentation and putrefaction do not occur at all unless organisms already living are introduced from without. It was a bold hypothesis because it ran counter to the agelong and almost universal belief that the smaller forms of life, not only the micro-organisms known since the seventeenth century, but even moulds, worms, and maggots, arise spontaneously in decaying organic matter. Pasteur in the face of fierce opposition from men of science and laymen alike, most of it sheer prejudice, finally succeeded, by means of ingenious and careful

experiments in establishing both hypotheses. It may be thought he was labouring at a merely academic point, and many of his contemporaries thought so at the time. Actually it was a question of the greatest practical utility. A great part of modern medical practice, the whole of surgical practice, not to mention vast modern industries concerned with preparing and preserving food and drink and manufacturing many chemicals depend upon it, and are continual and constant witnesses to the correctness of Pasteur's views. Consider for a moment what it means for medicine. If you find that any animal (or plant for that matter) which shows sign of disease harbours certain organisms while healthy specimens do not, then you know that these parasitic organisms have not arisen spontaneously within the host but have somehow entered from outside and are descended from similar organisms with similar properties and life histories. Given this, you know how to proceed: study the life history of the parasites, find out how they obtain access to the host, and what they do when they get there; then you can find the means of preventing them from entering and possibly of mitigating the harm they do when they have entered. The valuable, and almost miraculous, new drugs now available for combating some of the most fatal of infections prevalent in this country, such as pneumonia and puerperal fever, are the direct outcome of Pasteur's work. Of course, not all diseases are due to micro-organisms, but many are and most of the worst ones.

The new method of attack and the theory behind it were first used by Pasteur to prevent beer from souring, then to stop an epidemic among silkworms, then against anthrax in cattle and lastly to protect men and animals against rabies. What were Pasteur's special talents that enabled him to turn medicine from confus-

ed groping in the dark to triumphant progress? An eye for the important facts (not the obvious ones); fertility in devising hypothetical explanations for what he saw; ingenuity, persistence, and systematic care in testing them by experiment; ruthlessness in discarding even the most promising hypothesis if it failed when tested; in a word, love of truth for its own sake. Besides, he was free to pursue his quest wherever it led him. Thus he became one of the benefactors of mankind, conferring benefits far in excess of those we owe to any practical man—remembering Disraeli's definition that 'the practical man is one who practises the errors of his forefathers'.

A word at this point on the ambiguity of the terms practice and practical. In its widest sense, practice means activity of any sort. It is in this sense that science is always doing something; it is in fact the systematic enlargement of experience. The peculiar case of pure mathematics which is apparently an exception must be noted simply as such and cannot be discussed here. In the narrower sense, activities are said to be practical when they are useful for something else and are not done for their own sake. In this sense, science, though starting from practical pursuits, is not necessarily practical and often needs to be unpractical.

One reason for labouring this matter of Pasteur is that it shows clearly that you cannot have discoveries to order. No dictator, Fuehrer, or other panjandrum can do it. Discoveries *may* be made by free men in a free society and that in their essential condition. In a free society knowledge *may* confer benefits to increase its freedom by increasing its power. In a society that is not sufficiently free any benefits available are perverted to ill use because power is wrongly directed and the source of the benefits, that is to say, the pursuit of truth,

dries up. Of course no society is as free as it should be and what freedom there is may not be altogether the right sort and may not be used in the right way. It will be readily granted that the power conferred by the practical applications of science may be misused. It may not be so readily granted that pure science, the pursuit of truth for its own sake, cannot persist in the absence of political freedom. It might be granted that Pasteur could not have applied his discoveries to medicine in a totalitarian state, because in such a state there would be state medical and veterinary services with an orthodox creed as to theory and strict rules as to practice, and Pasteur would have been 'liquidated' on both counts. But why should not pure science which has no obvious applications flourish? The answer is that science is necessarily sceptical and critical and doubt and criticism are what tyranny and totalitarianism cannot abide.

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Now criticism is the very life blood of science. Its method is sceptical: take nothing whatever on trust, however well vouched for: put everything to the test wherever it is humanly possible: work out and test the consequences of your theories as though you took them seriously, but do not take them too seriously for they are probably wrong somewhere. You cannot say more in favour of the best of scientific theories than the curate said about his egg. But scientific method is not disrespectful of authority in its proper sense and use, only of people who profess to have a monopoly of truth. Any testimony has some weight and must be considered in order to see how much. The correct beginning for any inquiry is that of the scholastic philosophers; to see

what all the various authorities say on the subject and try to sum up their statements to make a preliminary tentative hypothesis. The only fault of the scholastics was to be content to stop there as though nothing more were needed.

If anybody says 'Science has proved so and so', then he proves that he knows nothing about science. If another says 'Science gives some ground, or reasonable. ground, or strong ground, or, even, sufficient ground for believing so and so,' then he is likely to be talking sense. Of course the first man may go on to talk sense, but if so it is an accident.

Science is sceptical in its method and tentative in its conclusions (and therefore should be modest in its claims), but it needs as its starting point an act of faith, or, rather two acts of faith. The first is the belief, mentioned already, that truth can be found if it is sought hard and persistently. This does not imply that truth is actually completely attained or embodied in any formula. On the contrary any formula is likely to be defective. It means rather that truth can be approached, in the same way as in geometry a hyperbola approaches its asymptotes. It never reaches the asymptote within any finite space but it always gets nearer as it is extended further. In science conclusions and results are never perfect but properly directed effort will always improve them. One can admit the imperfection of scientific results with the utmost frankness because their imperfection does not deprive them of usefulness. The reason for this is that any alternative is worse. For example, no responsible medical authority claims that inoculation gives complete protection against the typhoid group of diseases. It is only claimed that if you are not inoculated you are far more likely to be infected and more likely to die of the

infection when you get it. Even if inoculation were a failure in 10 per cent of the cases, it would be worth using, because a 10 per cent risk is better than a 100 per cent risk. Actually, the risk to the inoculated is far less than 1 per cent. Nevertheless, the method is not perfect and therefore capable of improvement.

The second act of faith is needed because the method of science is piecemeal. Science does not try to envisage one single all embracing Truth, but attains a series of small separate truths, each serviceable but none complete. Therefore, we must believe that all separate truths are consistent with one another. If theories appear to conflict, either there is something wrong with some of the theories, or the conflict is not a genuine one, but due to misunderstanding of the nature and consequences of the theories. The last possibility needs mentioning because in several cases apparent discrepancies among theories arise from people's reluctance to face the consequences of queer and unexpected discoveries.

I would insist that these assumptions are acts of faith, they do not depend upon evidence because they are logically prior to all evidence whatsoever, in fact preconditions for obtaining and discussing evidence. Apart from these, I believe, no other act of faith is needed. In particular it is not possible, much less necessary, to assume that everything whatsoever is amenable to scientific method. Science assumes that there are truths, that they can be found, that they are mutually compatible, but there is no reason to suppose that these truths are so all embracing that what cannot be discovered by the use of scientific method is nothing. It is not necessary even to assume that science can solve all its own technical problems. At some stage or other scientific method may meet an impassable barrier and have to

confess mere ignorance and impotence in some respects. This confession would in no way invalidate knowledge already gained or imply similar limitations in other directions.

Science, let me repeat, can develop only in free society, in surroundings where men may and do think for themselves. It cannot develop or even exist for long in a society where men do not trouble to think or have their thinking done for them by infallible rulers. Now no society is as free as it should be and nobody thinks as much and as consistently as he should. Even the ancient Greeks, who at their best were the freest and most enterprising of thinkers, suffered from serious restraints and limitations which hampered and distorted their thinking. To some extent this is inevitable; people suffer from the defects of their qualities. Had the Greek men of science been great experimentalists, like the men of the seventeenth century, it is most likely they would not have been such great mathematicians. As our ancestors would have phrased it, God in His wisdom probably saw that mathematics must come first and experimental science second. Therefore, He made His Greeks primarily mathematicians and then His seventeenth-century Europeans both mathematicians and experimentalists, and very likely had to arrange it so that His medieval schoolmen intervened. Such phraseology, I know, is unfashionable nowadays and we mostly prefer more confused and complicated modes of expression, but it makes clear my point. The piety of earlier days was quick to see the working of God's Providence where things seemed to go well, but did not always know what to make of events that went badly, because they often forgot that God works through instruments that are both imperfect and free (though limited in their freedom). Every obstacle is a chal-

lenge, which, if accepted, is an opportunity and most opportunities arise out of obstacles. If the opportunity is used with success, that success itself becomes in time a new obstacle and possibly therefore a new opportunity. But if an obstacle is not overcome, it may become the source of disaster. Men never succeed in overcoming all obstacles and the mere fact that they seize certain opportunities makes them miss others. Progress in knowledge, or indeed progress of any sort, is therefore partial, irregular, and erratic in direction. The failures, imperfections, and perversions of science at any period will be closely related to the general defects of the society within which its practitioners live. But of all possible defects lack of freedom to think is the greatest. Restrictions on freedom may be imposed from outside by a tyrannical government but may also be imposed from below or from within by force of traditions, customs, conventions and also by material circumstances. Routine in thought and action is all that is possible where there is no freedom, and routine discovers nothing. Genuinely creative thought is attainable only by a very few specially gifted individuals under specially favourable circumstances. But given these few men and occasions; given, that is, the pioneers to make a few vital advances, other men less gifted or less fortunate can use these advances for minor creative acts of thought of a derivative and subordinate type. Other still can then help by means of routine work, which can be organized and directed from above. The value of routine work should not be underestimated or the value of organization, but its value is that of an accessory or subordinate. Science cannot grow by routine work alone, it cannot even live, because, like a tree, if it is not growing it is dying. If routine gets the upper hand science becomes fossilized into formulae and

rules. Once these become rigid they become fallacious, reflecting the errors and limitations of those who originated them in their once living form. Discovery and creative thought always means breaking through and even upsetting routine thought. There is one thing that can be predicted with complete certainty about new discoveries, that they will reveal something nobody expected. Similarly we can predict about future science that it will be very different from present day science, while preserving all that is valuable in it.

I could use the story of Pasteur to point the moral here, but let me use another illustration. The thought must frequently have occurred to medical men that if only the human body could be made transparent, diagnosis of disease would be much easier and more certain. One can easily imagine some benevolent despot or benevolent millionaire founding a research institute for the purpose of discovering how to make the human body transparent. It is easy too to imagine the person who would become its Director. Of course given such a problem the workers in the institute could start doing almost anything and might incidentally make valuable discoveries, but they would not succeed in making the human body transparent.

However, it is not necessary to start imagining at all because the feat has already been accomplished. In the 1890's a certain physicist was investigating one of the latest discovered and most interesting physical phenomena, electric discharges in high vacua. He was, if you like, playing with the latest scientific toy, the Crookes' Tube. He noticed that something escaped from the tube which could produce fluorescence although the tube was screened from the fluourescent material with black paper. Having noticed this, perhaps casually at first, he immediately put aside everything

else and worked almost continuously day and night, first of all to satisfy himself that the phenomenon was really as he supposed and secondly to find out something more about it. Then when he was certain of his ground he published his discovery, calling the something or other which escaped from the tube, passed through an opaque layer of paper and made his screen fluoresce, X-rays, though they are often called after him Rontgen-rays. These were novelties entirely unexpected. Once their properties were known it was obvious to everybody that in principle the problem of making the human body transparent was solved.

While insisting on the newness and unexpectedness of the discovery it is equally important to insist that it was not just a lucky accident. Other physicists at the same time were playing with the same toy and had their laboratories full of X-rays but never noticed anything. Indeed, there is a story that Crookes himself, the inventor of the high vacuum discharge tube, had been annoyed to find that photographic plates he had kept in his room inside their black wrappers became fogged. Opportunity, as you know, knocks but once; she had knocked and he had not answered. Almost any fool can find a thing he is looking for, if it happens to be there; it takes a clever man to find something he is not looking for. At the crucial moment Crookes' mind was working on routine lines. Rontgen's was not, and he used his opportunity exactly as it should be used. Of course he was actually better prepared. He had his fluorescent screen there, so he was expecting something to produce fluorescence. The new and unexpected thing was something that could penetrate objects opaque to light.

I have chosen Rontgen's discovery and Pasteur's work as examples for the special reason that they were dis-

coveries of new realms of fact hitherto unthought of; of invisible penetrating rays and of pathogenic micro-organisms. These discoveries have had theoretical consequences of the greatest importance and they arose out of theoretical presuppositions, but they were primarily enlargements of experience, bringing the unknown into the sphere of the known, for that is what new experience means. It is this, far more than new theories, which are generally old theories dressed in new clothes, that stretches our minds and also puts new instruments into our hands.

It is this therefore that is the most genuinely creative aspect of science. Of course there are creative theories, but not many. The Kinetic Theory of Gases is one, which, as has been said, first gave insight into a realm of very small things in themselves entirely beyond the reach of experience and which one might have thought would be for ever concealed from human knowledge.

I have been emphasizing, perhaps labouring, the point that science is discovery, and that discovery is the fruit of freedom. But this kind of freedom, unlike X-rays, is not born in a vacuum. The discoverer is the child of his environment; of his age, of the society in which he lives and his special place in it. All these direct and limit the kind of use he makes of his freedom, the kind of thing he discovers. Rontgen was free to make his discovery because the determining environment for him was the opinion of his professional colleagues, the physicists of the world, and no extraneous factors interfered with him. Moreover, every discovery is a tool itself or a means of supplying tools. The powers conferred by tools are conferred equally on the just and the unjust, like the sunshine. A society which prefers guns to butter will undoubtedly get guns and the more highly developed the scientific technique of

its day, the bigger and the more destructive the guns. Once the fruits of science begin to be misused there is no end to the process, apart from the fortunate fact that those who call the loudest for guns are the first to forget that guns can shoot in either direction. Similarly, in a society which prefers dividends to justice, the fruits of science will go to swell dividends and increase injustice. Even the relatively innocent public desire for the immediately and obviously useful has bad effects. The public will devote millions of pounds to Cancer Research, but grudges hundreds devoted to the fundamental biological problems which alone can solve the problem. It is natural then to ask: is the discoverer to be blamed for the misuse of his discoveries? If the fruits of science are misused, would it not be better to cut down the tree and do without the fruits? These are rather large questions to which I hope a summary answer will suffice. To the first question I should reply: of course the discoverer is to blame for anything that is a consequence of the evil of the society he lives in, but no more so than any other member of that society who enjoys such advantages as it supplies. If he refrained from discovery, he would be sinning against the truth and he would not benefit anyone either. This really answers the other question too, but that needs a further answer. If mankind were stripped of the fruits of science, it would not mean merely no aeroplanes, no submarines, no high explosives; it would mean no clothes, no tools, no cultivation of the land, no domestic animals, no houses, no art or music, no books; in fact life reduced to the animal level—'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. Of course science is not the only thing that separates man from the animals, but it is a part of what separates him. It is his strongest bulwark against slipping back, because the

process of acquiring scientific knowledge is cumulative and some of its benefits are cumulative too. Therefore, on the whole the risk of misuse must be taken. There is no certain cure for the evil consequences of knowledge, but more knowledge must be part of the cure. Having eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, we cannot return to the Garden of Eden and we should not like it if we could.

It is sometimes said that the trouble is due to our excessive cultivation of the physical sciences and our neglect of the social and humanistic sciences. I quite agree that the backward state of these latter is to be deplored, but I think it is a fallacy that their greater cultivation would in itself prevent the misuse of knowledge, because any knowledge can be misused. A better understanding of psychology, particularly of crowd psychology, puts more power into the hands of those who lead or govern the crowd, equally whether their ends in government are good or bad. A better knowledge of economics, puts more power into the hands of government equally whether its aims are good or, like those of the Nazis, to cheat their own subjects and all those abroad who trade with them. And so on. The devil is interested in physical science for making the obvious weapons of war, but he does not leave the humanistic science alone. Any tool is dangerous in the hands of malicious man, and the better the tool, the greater the danger.

Another panacea that is occasionally suggested is that all would be well if men of science took a hand in government. Now I do not believe that men of science as class would be either better or worse as rulers than, let us say, musicians or plumbers as a class. What is required in a ruler or a member of government is, first of all, certain moral qualities or qualities of character,

so that he has the right aim in view and persists in them; secondly, a gift for understanding and dealing with other people, which I believe is mainly intuitive and hardly to be acquired by any effort of learning; thirdly, sufficient intelligence to select adequate means to his ends. A man in a position of authority who does not take pains to acquire sufficient elementary knowledge of the facts that are relevant to his work and how they come to be known (if he does not know that much already) is obviously lazy or stupid, in any case incompetent. For instance, a Chancellor of the Exchequer, who does not learn enough economics to know something about the consequences of his action and to know who are the reliable economists to consult, but who merely does what the Governor of the Bank of England tells him to, is obviously incompetent. But there is no reason to suppose that a professional economist would necessarily be a better Chancellor of the Exchequer than an equally intelligent member of any other profession or calling. On the other hand, it is important that the working scientist should have a social conscience, should realize the results of what he does and should not shut himself up in his ivory tower, but we need not expect immediate drastic consequences to follow his descent from the tower or even his return to it.

One must keep in mind that all governments, whatever their political complexion and whatever their professed aims, are concerned first and foremost with maintaining the *status quo* because any *status* is better than none; any order is better than anarchy. The majority of people too are more or less content with the *status quo* for the quite good reason that the evils we know are to be preferred to those we know not. Science, however, has no bias in favour of the *status quo* and may be largely employed in upsetting it. Scientific

discovery is in the hands of a small minority; a minority that may at any time be very unpopular. Innovators of any sort, including genuine political reformers, nearly always are. (The sham reformer who promises contradictory things to please everybody can always command a large following).

Another point to be kept in mind is that, as Niebuhr has argued so convincingly in his book *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, group morality lags behind individual morality, whether the group is the state or classes within the state. What it all comes to is that the fruits of science are misused and there is no panacea for the cure of the disease. But of all the suggested panaceas the most foolish is the suggestion that scientific activities should be directed and controlled from above. Without spontaneity and autonomy, science dies. This is not to deny that science depends on co-operation; it does, it lives by it, but the emphasis must be on the co—; tion; it must be a working together of free men.

There is something to be said, in conclusion, that is not easy to state at all, much less to state briefly, but is necessary, in order to avoid putting the claims of science in the wrong perspective. Science is the pursuit of truth by a definite kind of method. This pursuit is a development of one aspect of man's attempts to cope with his environment and because of the pursuit of truth those attempts have been more fruitful. Thus, science has drawn its inspiration from the tools or material means of life, has enormously increased them and so has transformed life in many ways, not all of them entirely advantageous. Scientific activity has these two inseparable aspects, the useful and the theoretical. Now it must be recognized that human action is directed towards ends and hence there must be some absolute ends or values; absolute in the sense that they are good in

and for themselves and not as means to other ends. Three absolute ends are generally named—Truth, Beauty, Charity. Some would add a fourth, Happiness. But Happiness is a consequence of attaining ends rather than a separate end in itself. Of these Science is concerned directly only with truth, and with the others only indirectly and in a subordinate way. Moreover, science is concerned with one kind of truth, the kind that its method is calculated to attain and its method is applied successfully to certain subjects only. There are people who say that in principle scientific method is universally applicable and there are no truths other than scientific ones. It is not easy to refute these people directly, but if they were right then there would be one truth at least which was not a scientific truth, namely, this doctrine of theirs, which is a piece of dogmatic speculative metaphysic (though it might be true). I take it, however, to be an aesthetic truth, not a scientific truth, that Milton is a better poet than Martin Tupper, and a moral, not a scientific truth, that treachery is evil. And I conclude that while the truths of science are indispensable and therefore give science a place in the realm of spiritual values, its place is not the only one or even the principal one.

However, science has a very special place in the heritage of what may be called Western European civilization (though it began in the Eastern Mediterranean and has spread to the Americas and elsewhere). Not only because the Western Europeans have specially cultivated science, but because its cumulative character gives special stability to that heritage. It is the one important aspect of civilized life in which each succeeding generation can quite literally start where the preceding generation left off. In art, morals and religion each generation has to recreate its own tradition to a

very large extent, to work out its own salvation. The work of past generations may be a help, but it may be a hindrance. In these other spheres of activity tradition from past generations cannot by itself supply the impulse or internal life that is needed. That is something which grows, flourishes and then decays. During growth tradition is a help, in the time of decay it is a hindrance. The history of the arts shows this very clearly; it always tells of a succession of 'movements' which after a time exhaust themselves. The history of religion shows the same thing and, more obscurely, it can be seen in morals and politics. Science, however, seems to be free of this spasmodic development; or, if it is not, the spasms are so long drawn out that our historical record does not span them. Isaac Newton said, 'If I have been privileged to see farther that most, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants.' He meant Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, and his own teacher Barrow. It is true that his age was an age of giants and he himself the greatest. But his metaphor applies to the advance of science at any time even in an age of pigmies so long as free thought is not stifled.

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VIII. JULIAN HUXLEY AND A. C. HADDON

RACIALISM AND SCIENCE

'RACIAL PROBLEMS' are among the urgent actualities of twentieth-century politics. But as soon as we subject the concept underlying them, that of *race*, to dispassionate analysis, it turns out to be a pseudo-scientific rather than a scientific term. In other words, its use implies an appeal to the accuracy and to the prestige of science; but on investigation it turns out to have no precise or definable meaning. Further, like other pseudo-scientific terms, it can then readily be employed to rationalize emotion, and to bolster up the appeals of prejudice, by giving it a meaning to suit the context.

The term 'race' is currently used in several quite different senses. In the first place, it is used to denote one of the major divisions of mankind—black, white, yellow, and brown. Secondly, it is used to denote the actual human material of a particular country, group, or nation and its biologically transmissible characteristics: for instance, even the most ardent upholders of the Nordic theory cannot mean by the 'British race' anything more than the actual inhabitants of Great Britain and their descendants overseas. Thirdly, it is used to denote a hypothetical 'pure race' which is taken to have existed in the past and later to have become contaminated by admixture with foreign elements; this, for instance,lies behind the idea of the 'Germanic race'. Fourthly, it is sometimes used as equivalent to a recognizable or supposedly recognizable physical type, as Arab, Irish, etc. Fifthly, it is occasionally applied to a local population which by reason of isolation, or supposed iso-

lation, has become or is supposed to have become fairly uniform and stable in physical type—for example, the 'Cornish race'. Sixthly, it is also sometimes used in a wholly inadmissible sense to denote the peoples who speak a certain type of language: for example, in such a phrase as 'the Aryan race', 'the Latin races'.

On all these uses, scientific analysis, backed by the results of modern genetics, throws a pitiless light.

It is probable that during the early evolution of our species, it became divided up into geographical varieties, each more or less isolated from the others, and each evolving so as to become adapted to its climatic environment. The black variety adapted to hot climates, the yellow variety to dry conditions, and the white variety to north-temperate latitudes, are the most prominent examples.

Such varieties would then correspond to the 'geographical races', or *sub-species* as they are now generally called, to be found in many animal species. If we wish to retain the term *race* for such groups, they should be called 'primary races'. However, since the term race has been largely abandoned in zoology, and since in anthropology is it used in such a confusing multiplicity of senses, we had better employ the term *primary sub-species*. But—and this cannot be too strongly emphasized—such primary human sub-species are entirely hypothetical, a matter of inference only. Man's incurable and increasing propensity to wander over the face of the globe had effected a thorough mixing between the hypothetical primary sub-species long before the dawn of the historic period and blurred the sharpness of their outlines and in some cases made it all but impossible to deduce their original type. A typical white man is very different from a typical Chinese or a typical Negro. But white is connected with black and

also with yellow through every gradation of type, and in each case along several distinct main lines of crossing. Again, the simple classifications which at first suggest themselves all break down at one or another point. For instance, the Australians, though deeply pigmented and undoubtedly primitive in many ways, show the same character of hair as Europeans. We cannot with certainty assign them to a definite original subspecies. No single scheme of classification, in point of fact, has been devised which will provide a satisfactory pigeon-holding for the various human types in existence.

It is here that genetics steps in. The modern study of heredity, based on Mendel's great discoveries, has shown that after a cross between two distinct strains, blending inheritance, such as used to be assumed by anthropologists, does not occur, but that all kinds of different combinations of the original characters of two stocks are brought into being. This is due to the fact that hereditary transmission is by means of discrete living particles, called *genes*, which reproduce themselves, and can be recombined in the most various ways.

Accordingly, if two primary sub-species meet and mix, their characteristics may be combined in their descendants. Originally, black skin might invariably have gone with flat nose and thick lips. That, however, provides not the slightest reason why it should always do so. After a cross with a stock with light pigmentation and delicate features, the combination of dark skin and delicate features may occur. Since dark skin is an advantage in low latitudes, such a new combination of characters has, it appears, been favoured in several instances of actual crossing, notably, for instance, in India.

Similarly, yellow skin and a round head seem to have been originally associated. But the two become un-

coupled with the greatest facility after crossing with strains possessing different head-form and skin-colour.

Another result of the existence of definite genes as the carriers of hereditary constitution is that after a cross the resulting population will not tend to a mere average between the two original ingredients, but will, in the absence of social or natural selection, continue to produce a great diversity of types, generation after generation. There is not the slightest tendency for the population of Britain to become all medium brown in hair-colour, nor for that of Germany to become all medium long in skull-shape. In each generation, black and yellow hair, long and round heads, continue to be produced, and to be produced in about the same percentage of the population.

It will now be clear why no single scheme of classification can satisfactorily pigeon-hole all known human types, or even deduce without danger or error the number and characteristics of the original 'primary races' of man. Whereas in the evolution of animals there is constant branching, each branch being permanently isolated after a certain degree of differentiation by becoming incapable of fertile crossing with other branches, in man the branches constantly meet and unite and produce new types of shoots. The conventional ancestral tree may have some advantages for representing the descent of animal types; it is wholly unsuitable and misleading for man. Further, while, in general, animal types can be reasonably classified on the basis of using degrees of resemblance to indicate degrees of relationship, no such simple scheme will serve for man. In fact, with a species in which intercrossing of divergent types is so prevalent as our own, *no* simple system of classification can ever be devised to represent the realities of the situation.

Before proceeding further, there are one or two other popular fallacies to be noted. One is the misconception that a 'race' is a collection of people all descended from a single original couple. This idea seems to spring largely from the family trees beloved of genealogists, in which a family is traced back to a single founder and his wife. Such family trees in reality trace the descent of a name, and have to do with biological heredity: they are social, not genetic, documents. On the genetic plane, the idea of descent from a single couple is in any case vitiated for man by the amount of inter-crossing which has taken place between groups. Our ancestry will diverge as well as converge as we trace it back. With animal evolution, in tracing back the pedigree of a group you will, it is true, find convergence of separate branches (species, genera, etc.) to a common stem. But this is not the same thing as convergence to a common ancestral pair, and as a matter of fact we can be certain that the common stem is always a large body of individuals, with a certain degree of genetic variability. *Change in evolution does not take place through the sudden appearance of a new sport in a single couple, who then become the ancestors of the new species or strain; it occurs by means of spread of mutant genes through the population. The evolving strain is the whole population of a given area.*

Another and even more serious misconception is that language is any criterion of 'race'. There are a great many examples in history of a conquering people forcing its language on the conquered; and also a great many examples of the converse process, of the conquering invaders adopting the language of the country they have invaded. It is thus quite improper to speak of the 'Celtic race'. There is a group of Celtic-speaking peoples, but the fact of their all speaking Celtic is no

proof of common descent or genetic affinity. Similarly, there is not and cannot be such a thing as an Aryan race, since the term Aryan refers to language.

This fallacy with regard to language is a particular case of a similar fallacy with regard to social culture in general. Habits, traditions, machines, dress, art, institutions, gestures, ideas—all these as well as language are part of the social environment of human beings. They are not inborn, but have to be learnt or built up by experience. None of these can serve as any criterion of racial affinity between peoples. For instance, if we had nothing to go by but specimens of machinery and other material objects, we might conclude that the modern Japanese were much more closely related to the Europeans than to the Tibetans or other Mongol peoples: we should, however, be wrong. Culture, both material and spiritual, can spread by culture-contact, whereas physical characters can only spread by actual inter-crossing.

Nor can the cultural level of a people serve as evidence of its innate ability or the reverse. The ancient Romans, perfectly correctly, regarded the inhabitants of this country and of Germany as uncivilized. They would have been considerably surprised to find them leading the way in civilization a mere fifty or sixty generations later. In ancient Greece, some very eminent philosophers went further and ascribed to the northern 'barbarians' an innate incapacity to rise to the attainments of the Greeks. They were confusing cultural level with innate capacity. The rapid rise of Arab culture to a high intellectual level and its subsequent fall and stagnation is another example. We must ourselves beware of falling into the same fallacy as regards the so-called 'backward peoples' of the modern world.

On *a priori* ground we may expect differences in

innate ability to exist between different peoples. But achievement by itself is no guide; and so far no satisfactory method has been devised of testing differences in innate intelligence or other psychological qualities between peoples with very different education and culture. The differences in social environment override differences in genetic equipment.

Finally, there is the fallacy which equates 'race' with 'nation'. Here again there is confusion between a genetic and a social concept, but the case demands special treatment because of the special dangers inherent in this particular fallacy. The most obvious way of demonstrating that it is a fallacy is to consider the United States of America. There is, very definitely, an American nation, whose nationalism has indeed been growing more pronounced during the last few decades; but equally definitely, there is no possibility of speaking of an American race. Rather the popular phrase so often applied to the United States of America, the *melting-pot of race*, displays the true situation. All great nations are 'melting-pots of race', but America affords the most obvious example. A nation is a group of people with a common tract of country, bound together in a common State by common history, common sentiment and traditions, common social organization, and usually (though not always, as, for example, Belgium or Switzerland) by common language. It is also bound together by being the unit to which the individual belongs, so that he regards other individuals belonging to the same unit as in some way allied with him, while individuals belonging to other similar units are 'foreigners', in some way alien to him. This sense of solidarity with co-nationals and of separateness from other nationals is of the essence of nationality. The nation, however, is a particular phase in the evolution

of human groups, not anything permanent or inherent in human nature. It is in essentials a product of the three hundred years, and quite different in nature and organization from other units of the same general type, such as clan, tribe, city-state, or empire. The idea of the 'blood-tie' has been used to strengthen national sentiment because of the importance of such sentiment for unity and effectiveness in war. But mass-migration and military conquest, and the adoption of foreigners into the group by legal change of citizenship and by marriage, when the wife and children follow the father's nationality, make the thesis of common descent impossible to uphold. The idea of a British, a French, a German, or an Italian 'race' is a political fiction, and a dangerous one at that.

Coming down from the general to the particular, we can here deal with two so-called 'race' problems which are of immediate political importance—the Nordic and the Jewish. Beginning with the latter, we find that the Jewish problem is far less a 'racial' or genetic than a cultural one. The Jews are no more a distinct, sharply-marked 'race' than are the Germans or the English. They are originally of mixed descent. During their dispersal they have interbred with the surrounding populations, so that a number of genes derived from the immigrant Jews are scattered through the general population, and the Jewish communities have come to resemble the local population in many particulars. In this way, the Jews of Africa, of eastern Europe, of Spain and Portugal, and so on, have become markedly different from each other in physical type. What they have preserved and transmitted is not 'racial qualities', but religious and social traditions. The Jews do not constitute a definite race, but a society forming a pseudo-national group with a strong religious basis and with

peculiar historic traditions. Biologically, it is almost as illegitimate to speak of a 'Jewish race' as of an 'Aryan race'.

The Nordic theory is in another category. Instead of ascribing racial qualities to a group which is to-day essentially held together on a cultural basis, it takes a hypothetical past 'race', ascribes to it a number of valuable qualities, notably initiative and leadership, and then, whenever it finds such qualities in the mixed national groups, ascribes them to the Nordic elements in the population. It then goes further, and sets up as a national idea a return to purity of Nordic stock.

The facts of the case are as follows. The Nordic race, like other human races, has no present existence. Its former existence, like that of all 'pure race', is hypothetical. There does, however, exist a Nordic type. This occurs with only a moderate degree of mixture in parts of Scandinavia, and is also to be found, but much mixed with other types, so that all intermediates and recombinations occur, in northern Europe from Britain to Russia, with pockets here and there in other countries. On various grounds we can be reasonably sure that this distribution is the result of the invasion of Europe by a group largely composed of men of this type—perhaps in the degree of purity in which the type is now found in parts of Scandinavia. This group was the 'Nordic race'—a secondary sub-species in our sense. It is not certain where it originated or when its important migration took place, but most authorities believe that it came originally from the steppes of southern Russia.

But besides these facts and deductions, there exists what one can only characterize as a Nordic myth, ascribing to this 'Nordic race' most of the great advances of mankind during recorded history, and asserting

that their qualities of leadership fit them to rule over other races. The Aryan and Germanic myths are variants on the same theme.

These contentions appear to be based on nothing more serious than self-interest and wish-fulfilment. In the first place, it is quite certain that the great steps in civilization, when man learned to plough, to write, to build stone houses, to transport his goods in whecled vehicles, were first taken in the near East, by peoples who by no stretch of imagination could be called Nordic, but who seem in point of fact to have been largely of the dark, Mediterranean type. Secondly, it is true that great advances in civilization have sometimes been observed in history when invaders of a relatively light-skinned type have irrupted into countries populated by other groups—notably in Greece, though here round-headed as well as long-headed elements were included in the invaders. But in such cases, both types appear to have made their contribution, and the result can be ascribed to the vivifying effects of mixture and culture-contact with as much propriety as to the inherent qualities of one of the types concerned. Indeed, where the Nordic type is most prevalent, in northern Scandinavia, there is also found among the people a tendency to introspection, accompanied by a very high suicide-rate; this may well be an effect of the northern environment, but may equally well be a characteristic of the type or due to social conditions. Generally speaking, the greatest achievements of modern civilization have occurred in regions of the greatest mixtures of types—Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, to mention only four nations. In all these countries of 'mixed races', owing to the nature of Mendelian inheritance, it is rare to find pure Nordic types. The great bulk of the population will contain genes derived from many original

sources. In a nation like Britain or Germany, the pure Nordic type is irrecoverable for the country at large: the population as a whole is an inextricable mixture. The Nordic type may be held up as an ideal, but this ideal is genetically unattainable, and will not effect the biological realities of the situation.

Furthermore, when we look into the facts of history, we find it far from established that men of pure or even approximately Nordic type have been great leaders of thought or action. The great explorers of Britain displayed initiative, but hardly one of them was physically of Nordic type: the majority of the most celebrated Germans, including Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant, were medium—or round-headed, not long-headed like the typical Nordics. Napoleon, Shakespeare, Einstein —a dozen great names spring to mind which in themselves should be enough to disperse the Nordic myth. The word *myth* is used advisedly, since it frequently plays a semi-religious role, as basis for a creed of passionate racialism.

From what has been said, it will be clear that 'race mixture' has in the past been beneficial. The British contain strong Nordic and Eurasiatic elements, with a definite admixture of Mediterranean types. In the Germans there is a very large Eurasiatic element which includes the Slavonic, and genes from the Mongoloid peoples have crept in via Russia. In France, the population is largely Alpine, especially in the centre, but there is a strong Nordic admixture in the north and a slighter Mediteranean one in the south. The Jews are of mixed origin, and have steadily been growing more mixed. America is proverbially a melting-pot. The Japanese are also a mixture of several ethnic types.

But this does not imply that ethnic mixture must always be good. In the above examples, we are dealing

with mixture between minor sub-divisions of one 'primary race' or sub-species. What of mixture between the major sub-divisions of mankind—between black and white, for instance, or white and yellow? In this field the most violent feelings are aroused. We need only cite the strong feeling in the United States against white inter-marriage with Negroes or Chinese and in South Africa against Bantu admixture.

If the primary sub-species of man were really developed in comparative isolation, each adapted to a different main type of environment, it may be argued that to upset the adjustment brought about by thousands of years of selection is bound to produce some disharmony. Further, if it be true that some ethnic groups possess a low average level of innate intelligence, to allow crosses between them and more intelligent types is a retrograde step.

These objections undoubtedly have validity. There are, however, arguments on the other side. Even if wide crosses should produce some disharmonic or maladjusted types, this will occur as the result of the great variability induced by such crosses; and this same variability may be expected to throw up also some exceptionally well-endowed types. Again, that types were well adapted in the past does not imply that new types may not be better adapted to the wholly new environments which man is ever busily creating for himself, and it may well be that new combinations of characters will be needed to cope with the problems of the future.

Crosses between groups or classes of markedly different ethnic types within the same country, when they differ also in standard of living, social status, or general outlook, will have the effect of blurring the social barriers and economic distinctions between them. In

certain cases, the ruling caste or class may find itself or its ideas swamped or diluted to vanishing-point; in other cases it feels impelled to guard its privileges. From a purely biological standpoint it might conceivably be a good thing to undertake mass-crossing between say the British and the Bantu, or the Americans and the Chinese, on account of the genetic recombinations to be obtained. But the social systems involved would be unable to stand the strain. There is a limit to the amount of foreign stock which can be taken up by a nation in a given time. This is not due to the quantity of foreign genes *per se*, but to the mass of alien habits, prejudices, ideas, and resistances which have to be overcome and assimilated.

Once again the term 'race' proves to de misleading. The question of 'race-mixture' turns out not to be primarily a matter of 'race' at all, but a matter of nationality, class. or social status. 'Racial crossing' may be inadvisable, but chiefly because the ethnic groups involved happen to be in different national worlds or on different cultural levels. Policy in this matter can only be determined on its economic and social merits: the biologist and the eugenist have here a negligible or at best a minor role to play as advisers. When politicians and propagandists seek to make out a purely biological case against intermarriage with such and such a people or ethnic type. we can always be sure that this is a rationalization, and the real antagonism is to be sought in some other sphere. The biological reasoning is a cloak to fling over obscure, perhaps unconscious, feelings. The ethnic group thus discriminated against serves as the scapegoat for some economic fear, some class prejudice, some nationalist ambition, some cultural pride, even some 'inferiority complex'. Similar types of rationalization, with the same

lack of biological validity, have been employed to justify slavery, the caste system, class oppression, religious persecution. The argument against so-called miscegenation is only one among many thrown up by groups power to justify themselves in their own eyes or in the eyes of others.

It may well be that in many cases the discouragement of 'racial crossing' may be the correct policy. But this will be primarily because such crossing will be a symptom of culture-contact on a large scale and that this culture-contact is in the danger of bringing about economic or cultural changes which are undesirable, either in themselves or as a matter of immediate policy. In such cases it is desirable so far as is possible to hinder intermarriage and extra-marital intercourse, which might be done by preventing culture-contact on a large scale.

So long as nationalist ideas, even in modified form, continue to dominate the world scene, the large-scale segregation of areas. each developing their own general type of culture, may be the policy to pursue. If unrestricted immigration seems likely to upset such a policy, restriction is justifiable, as with Asiatic races in Australia and the United States. But do not let us in such cases make it a question of 'race', or become mystical on the subject, or justify ourselves on false biological grounds.

Such considerations, however, apply only to major differences of type and culture. Within a single main ethnic group or cultural area they are irrelevant. Notably in Europe, both ethnic inter-crossing and culture-contacts have proceeded so far that 'racial purity,' like complete isolationism or self-sufficiency, is impossible of attainment. And because they are impossible to attain, they are dangerous to aim at: as an ideal, they

contain unrealities and impossibilities which may destroy essential realities and thwart true possibilities.

The violent racialism to be found in Europe to-day is a symptom of Europe's exaggerated nationalism: it is an attempt to justify nationalism on a non-nationalist basis, to find a firm basis in objective science for ideas and policies which are generated internally by a particular economic and political system, and have real relevance only in reference to that system. The cure for the racial mythology, with its accompanying self-exaltation and persecution of others, which now besets Europe, is a reorientation of the nationalist ideal, and, in the practical sphere, an abandonment of claims by nations to absolute sovereign rights. Meanwhile, however, science and the scientific spirit can do something by pointing out the biological realities of the ethnic situation, and by refusing to lend her sanction to the absurdities and the horrors perpetrated in her name. Racialism is a myth, and a dangerous myth at that. It is a cloak for selfish economic aims which in their uncloaked nakedness would look ugly enough. And it is not scientifically-grounded. The essence of science is the appeal to fact.

IX. SIR JOSIAH STAMP

THE CITIZEN OF THE FUTURE

WHEN men peer into the future, as H. G. Wells may do from time to time, we usually get anticipations of the world men will live in, the advance of invention and its effect upon men's lives, the Utopian institutions and conditions and we shall evolve—a picture of fancy and delight which gives the thrill of romance and touches the borders of credulity. These pictures are based on an underlying conception of progress in society, and very rarely do we get any suggestion that civilization may go downhill. The Robots and Butler's Erewhon gave a hint of the problem of mechanization, but most of our prophets are incurable optimists. They do not often have much to say about the man who will inhabit that world, his character and disposition. But we have to lead towards him, and shape our ends. What will he be like, this Citizen of the Future?

How far ahead is my future? Not so far ahead, I think, for the picture I draw to be unreal or fanciful, giving us to-day no impetus and no incentive to begin to make it; but on the other hand, it should not be so close that we can see only ourselves slightly larger and better, but still ourselves, with all our weaknesses. Shall we aim at four or five generations hence? What will be the characteristics of the citizen of that age?

The leading characteristic will be, I think, a far greater sense of civic responsibility. For he will have a much keener appreciation of the solidarity of society and of the whole civilized world, which will bring a sense of shame if he feels that he is the weak link in the chain,

that to-day is quite the exception and not the rule. For the sense of solidarity or of collective quality may be conceived in various ways. A good society may mean at least three things. We may liken it to a bag of shot, which we may call *good*, meaning that there is a very small percentage of bad or misshapen shot in it, and the removal or betterment of these will improve the reliability of the whole. But they are independent units, and their interdependence is *statistical* only. Or we may compare society to a machine in which the whole functions badly because of one defective part—a badly made piston-rod or badly centred wheel. But remove this, and substitute a perfect part, then all the other perfect parts perform their action perfectly in a perfect whole. The parts are independent, but they have an interdependence which is *essential*. But, better still, we may liken society to an organism of which the parts are cells, and, if one group is diseased or injured, the others are not only impaired in action, but may become diseased and die too. This is the physiological or functional analogy for society which will give that acute personal sense of responsibility to the future citizen. The sense of solidarity will include not merely intense interdependence in economic life, but in their whole moral, mental, and philosophic development, national and international, and this sense will be a new common denominator for a civic responsibility.

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It will not mean that independence and personality will be less respected; far from it. A recognition of essential and valuable differences will be more gladly given than it is to-day. Dr. Glover said, in *The Influence of Christ in the Ancient World*, "Independence is

a great thing, but a depraved sense of quality is not the way that leads to it, as Greece found to her cost." The notions of the nineteenth century which Graham Wallas has called the intellectualist fallacy will be quite superseded, although they will then be much nearer the truth. We have been all prone to the view that by some mysterious alchemy the ballot-box and democratic representation would distil leadership and wisdom out of masses of ignorant and prejudiced individuals under the mob influence and sway of partisanship. We are slowly becoming emancipated from it. The citizen of the future will have passed beyond the cruder democratic ideals, and the history of our times will have shown him that, failing certain important individual characteristics in the people, they can be led as fatally astray by democracy as by any autocrat. His superiority in public affairs will be due to the fact that the formation of opinion will have a technique, and be in itself scientific, instead of being haphazard or induced. In the manufacture of any product, the machine must be right, and well adapted to the desired end; it must be well designed and also well made; it must be regularly fed with material; the material must be the right kind; there must be something to make the machine "go"; and, when the product is delivered, it must be used and usable. All these are but analogous to the processes which must precede right action as the result of scientific processes of thinking. The art of thinking in the individual is quite empirical at present—no one knows precisely the kind of mental discipline that is necessary for original and progressive and inclusive thinking—just a few have the knack, without quite knowing how.

Let us first take the material. The citizen of the future will have a genuine aptitude for facts, and a dis-

tinctive attitude towards them. He will have a horror of false facts and misjudgments. He will not give a mental verdict first, from habit, or liking, or impression, or influence, and then select the facts to make his case, or save his face, or perhaps honestly only see the facts he has learned to look for. He will know that if he tried to form a well-balanced judgment from the first-hand knowledge of all the relevant facts on all the subjects that came before him, even in the ample leisure left from his daily work, he would go mad in a week. So division of labour in selection and preparation of facts, and in the earlier process of thinking upon them, will be most consciously and deliberately undertaken, and discharged as a responsible trust, just as responsible as the handling of other people's money by a bank. So he will be far less partisan towards facts, and his choice will not be determined by the tint of the glasses he may wear. He will have such self-control that he will allow for his own personal equation. Then he will have become emancipated from what is to-day a terrible drawback, and will not be blunderbussed into believing things by the trick of repetition, the imposition on the sub-conscious, and all the paraphernalia of the publicist of to-day. He will not accept that "B's tyres are best," merely because he sees the statement a hundred times a day; and advertisement will consist in making known the existence of particular goods, and in certified and carefully worded statements of their average, not selected, performance. The creation of public opinion by megaphone processes and slogans will be first bad form, and then inimical to its own case.

The citizen will be careful to judge matters from a non-personal standpoint; he will know where the other man's shoe pinches, and be *conscious*, in a sense to-day we hardly understand, and only reach in rare moments

of objectivity. He will be less obfuscated by an array of facts, and not get hot and bothered if he has to keep half a dozen in the air at once; his technical mastery of their manipulation and arrangement, and his observation, will be highly developed. This will partly arise from practice, but also because he will have orderly principles of arrangement, and a sense of proportion and importance in selection. William James once said in a vein of good-natured irony: 'To Bryce all facts are born free and equal.'

The seen facts will no longer have the tremendous advantage over the unseen facts, either in their favour or against them. To-day we either hate strangers amongst facts, and heave half-bricks at them, or else we go to the other extreme, and every fact has honour save in its own country. You remember the darkie who had been called before the bench on a rather serious charge, and the judge explained to him that he ought to be defended. The accused asked whom he might have, and the judge saw several advocates in the court and said, "Well, there's Mr. Smith over there, or Mr. Brown just here, or there's Mr. Robinson upstairs," The prisoner took a good look at Smith and Brown, and then exclaimed, "Guess, judge, I'll have Mr. Robinson." This is the attitude of many novelty-hunting and intellectually snobbish people towards facts—they have no use for the tried and proved facts under their noses.

The citizen of the future will furnish his mind with them. He will make a far greater use of the public libraries, using them as a part of the civic machinery, to come to a ripe judgment. He will have his own tool-box of books, of course, but he will know the value of communally owned reference—the truest communism. With the greater efficiency of industrial life, and perhaps the wise spending of his money, he will have eman-

cipated that four or five shillings a week given to waste now, and a library will be a compassable asset of every home. So the citizen will hate to let bad facts into his thinking mill, because nothing good can come out, and he will have organized new ways of getting his facts. The permanent "fact-finding" commissions of America are a germ of this development. All this I conclude as the logical outcome of some generations of better education, of the breakdown of isolation through the broadcast, the cinema, television, and universal rapid air travel; through the failure of merely popular representative government, and of organized Press opinion through drapery catalogues masquerading as purveyors of factual truth. There will certainly be more than one newspaper where an intelligent idea of what has taken place at a meeting, and the serious ideas expressed, can be found, in place of one or two humorous bits, or engaging "stories" which were the least important feature to the serious followers of the movement.

Next we must look at the machine of judgment or thinking. The most carefully selected and beautiful facts will be ruined if they are fed into a bad machine. The first essential is to distinguish fact from thought about fact. Hobbes said, in a most memorable phrase, "No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact," but of course to-day the world of idea is becoming the world of facts to us; still, however, the distinction remains valid and important over a large part of the formation of opinion about "what ought to be done next," and practical living may still be distinguished from speculation about the ultimate constitution of matter and force. In that future day there will be two great advances; first, there will be training for thinking as a practical art, as for work or a profession, and each will be taught to find his own knack or vein

along which the best results can be found, and thinking will no longer be regarded as something that every gentleman can do by instinct.

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Secondly, thinking will be organized, so that, instead of vast efforts failing to come into the focal point of general recognition, and dying, almost wasted, so that many thoughts have to be born many times, till one survives to manhood and self-assertion, every infant thought will get its chance of survival. But there will be birth-control in thinking, and no pseudo-thinking will get rushed into print and clog the time and energies of men. A canalization of thinking, an elaborate but natural referencing, will make the thought product richer and full of energy. But competition will be keen, the standard high, and selective criticism high-toned but severe. Men will no longer mistake "busyness" for business, and an active mind will, as in Lord Oxford's story of a certain divine, have the activity "not of hinges, but of wheels." Thinking will have direction and purpose. There will not be incessant motion without progress. I believe that it will have considerable freedom from personal bias, and be more impersonally logical.

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Thinking will be recognized to be what it actually is—hard work and highly personal. "God gives the nuts, but the squirrels have to crack them," is an old German saying. Thinking will be recognized to be what it actually is—the most acute pleasure. An Ame-

rican writer on a strictly utilitarian plane said recently:

> Intensive thought is required in order to conceive its splendid possibilities, and human nature will always be human nature. Thinking has never been a popular pastime. It is conceivable, however, that in some future time youth will be taught that the most intense pleasure that can be experienced by a human being is the sudden conception of a new thought, and that even the grasping of an idea already known which, like a random butterfly, has eluded the pursuer, provides a rare satisfaction.

The citizen of the future will achieve a real poise between holding to past ideas and practices and emancipation from them for new needs, and he will carry this, not merely into science, art, and music, but even into religious faith, where he will not be un-Christian even if he has travelled far from verbal creeds of today. Canon Streeter says very wisely:

> In his attitude to the religious authorities of the day Christ was a revolutionary. The notion that it is the duty of a religious man to accept uncriticized anything that the past has held venerable and sacred, finds no support in Him. Christ was conspicuously a critic of tradition. He was constantly condemning accepted conception of God, accepted canons of morality, and, above all, that ecclesiastical tradition by which the word of God, then as so often since, was made of none effect.

The debt to the past is one we can only satisfactorily discharge by putting posterity equally into ours. Whatever we may owe to particular ancestors and their efforts, our generation and environment "enjoys life as a whole at a higher level and of a richer quality because of the acquisitions of all the preceding generations." As Professor Pigou says, "Environments have children as well as individuals," and the future citizen will have an environment which will be the lineal descendant of the environment we at this moment are creating.

I am not so clear in my mind as to where my future citizen will stand in relation to the aims of life and the

"realms of ends." He will have a definite programme for social development and government, but I do not know whether the new physical science will not have left him more helpless than ever as to the final meaning of the universe. I do not think that sufficient time will have elapsed for new senses to be markedly developed with which to approach and master reality, and particularly whether spiritualism will have any scope for the ordinary individual. But I am sure that *direction* will be the quest of that day. One can procure a car, one can learn to drive—both these I have postulated—but this is useless without the motive power and somewhere definite to go. Life will be less negative, I believe. The social virtues of avoiding will be less the test of "good form" than positive achievement, and individuality in direction will not be frowned upon as eccentricity—even in a public school.

In that day, the problem of a stable measurement of value will have been practically solved, memory being still acutely alive to the ghastly escape from complete shipwreck that civilization will have had because of its intellectual and democratic cowardice in facing it. Mental power in thought will be more general, and Aristotle less of an Everest than he still is to-day. Men will, as they have at last begun to do to-day, recognize, and not persecute, genius in their midst. "Civilization as a whole gradually moves up to the level from which the voice of the genius in the wilderness was first heard, and the children posthumously ennoble the man whom the fathers starved or crucified."

The citizen will, at any rate, have got beyond the hobbledehoy stage of regarding enjoyment and progress as a function of speed in moving about, and an incessant wandering of the eyes, and titillation of new scenes.

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The future citizen will have a right sense of work, thinking not only of its dignity, but of the joy in it. "The best worship is stout working," said Carlyle. He will be better adapted for it by vocational choice. Again, the pool of silence will serve, not only spirit, but brain and muscle. He will have outlived the fad of worshipping as a man "devoted to duty" the one who drives on till 6.30, and will think much more of him if, by exercise of brain and ingenuity, he can find a way of getting away fairly at half-past five, realizing that long, continuous hours often result from muddle and lack of drive, and often create them. He will have a little more respect for the man with his heels on his desk and creation in his brain than for the man with his head over the desk and lead in his spirit. Both Lord Balfour and my friend Owen Young have been most devastating as thinkers when their bodies have been at an angle of twenty-five degrees from the horizontal.

Practical brotherhood will be a more general achievement, for men will care more, and realize, even from a personal point of view, the reactions upon themselves of disability in others. But pity will extend not merely to distress and trouble in others; it will be just as solicitous for inefficiency and overweeing pride, and the underlying causes of distress. Solidarity means more than common suffering and common prosperity. For if we are aiming at self-realization we are failing abjectly. To forget ourselves and our vanities, and lose ourselves in the cause and the chain of life, is to achieve a real end. Brotherhood has to be extended to the unseen and unknown in our own age, and, ideally, to the brothers of generations ahead, and our actions are not brotherly if they are inimical to either, however sweet they may look to the poor blighter next door. Unselfishness is a bigger problem than charity. "Spi-

ritual education," says Clutton Brock, "is an education in moral, intellectual, and aesthetic disinterestedness."

To the future citizen, quality will count as much as quantity, and we shall revert to the two mites. All the great things in life are qualitative. Streeter says:

> The essence of personality and of its inward life does not consist in quantity, but in quality. A man's passion for his lady love takes up no more room in space than his affection for his great-aunt; the difference is one of intensity and quality, not of size.

I am not competent or rash enough to prophesy what discoveries science will have made, or how man may live. But in gauging man's development I have tried not to "think of a number, and double it." I have steeped myself in contemporary eighteenth-century thought, and tried to make a jump forward not wholly out of keeping with the lessons of the past, and what I have dared to prophesy has been, in my judgment, the development of tiny seeds now planted or the logical adaption to the conditions that are in sight. Perhaps I have unconsciously drawn upon the recognized Utopias, or the standard criticisms of to-day. At any rate, I agree with H. G. Wells, in *The Open Conspricy*, that "Our antagonists are confusion of mind, want of courage, want of curiosity, and want of imagination, indolence, and spendthrift egotism.....These are the jailers of human freedom and achievement."

To sum up. The citizen of the future will find out more, think and judge better, have clearer aims, and weigh the spiritual aims of life against the material, with greater success; he will work more wisely—perhaps I should say sagaciously—and he will do more of it for love—true love of himself, love of humanity, love of the future in a developed race-consciousness, and the glory of God.

X. PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL IDEA: CHANGES NECESSARY IN INDIA

A BLIND reverence for the past is bad and so also is a contempt for it, for no future can be founded on either of these. The present and the future inevitably grow out of the past and bear its stamp, and to forget this is to build without foundations and to cut off the roots of national growth. It is to ignore one of the most powerful forces that influence people. Nationalism is essentially a group memory of past achievements, traditions and experiences, and nationalism is stronger to-day than it has ever been. Many people thought that nationalism had had its day and must inevitably give place to the evergrowing international tendencies of the modern world. Socialism with its proletarian background derided national culture as something tied up with a decaying middleclass. Capitalism itself became progressively international with its cartels and combines, and overflowed national boundaries. Trade and commerce, easy communications and rapid transport, the radio and cinema, all helped to create an international atmosphere and to produce the delusion that nationalism was doomed.

Yet whenever a crisis has arisen nationalism has emerged again and dominated the scene, and people have sought comfort and strength in their old traditions. One of the remarkable developments of the present age has been the rediscovery of the past and of the nation. This going back to national traditions has been most marked in the ranks of labour and the proletarian ele-

ments, who were supposed to be the foremost champions of international action. War or similar crisis dissolves their internationalism and they become subject to nationalist hates and fears even more than other groups. The most striking example of this is the recent development of the Soviet Union. Without giving up in any way its essential social and economic structure, it has become more nationalist-minded and the appeal of the fatherland is now much greater than the appeal of the international proletariat. Famous figures in national history have again been revived and have become heroes of the Soviet people. The inspiring record of the Soviet people in this war, the strength and unity they have shown, are no doubt due to a social and economic structure which has resulted in social advances on a wide front, on planned production and consumption, on the development of science and its functions, and on the release of a vast quantity of new talent and capacity for leadership, as also on brilliant leadership. But it may also be partly due to a revival of national memories and traditions and a new awareness of the past, of which the present was felt to be a continuation. It would be wrong to imagine that this nationalist outlook of Russia is just a reversion to old-style nationalism. It is certainly not that. The tremendous experiences of the Revolution and all that followed it cannot be forgotten, and the changes that resulted from it in social structure and mental adjustment must remain. That social structure leads inevitably to a certain international outlook. Nevertheless nationalism has reappeared in such a way as to fit in with the new environment and add to the strength of the people.

It is instructive to compare the development of the Soviet State with the varying fortunes of the Communist Parties in other countries. There was the first flush of

enthusiasm among many people in all countries, and especially in proletarian ranks, soon after the Soviet Revolution. Out of this grew Communist groups and parties. Then conflicts arose between these groups and national labour parties. During the Soviet Five Year Plans there was another wave of interest and enthusiasm, and this probably affected middleclass intellectuals even more than Labour. Again there was a reaction at the time of the purges in the Soviet Union. In some countries Communist Parties were suppressed, in others they made progress. But almost everywhere they came into conflict with organized national Labour. Partly this was due to the conservatism of Labour, but more so to a feeling that the Communist Party represented a foreign group and that they took their policies from Russia. The inherent nationalism of Labour came in the way of its accepting the co-operation of the Communist Party even when many were favourably inclined towards communism. The many changes in Soviet policy, which could be understood in relation to Russia, became totally incomprehensible as policies favoured by Communist Parties elsewhere. They could only be understood on the basis that what may be good for Russia must necessarily be good for the rest of the world. These Communist Parties, though they consisted of some able and very earnest men and women, lost contact with the nationalist sentiments of the people and weakened accordingly. While the Soviet Union was forging new links with national tradition, the Communist Parties of other countries were drifting further away from it.

I cannot speak with much knowledge of what happened elsewhere, but I know that in India the Communist Party is completely divorced from, and is ignorant of, the national traditions that fill the minds of

the people. It believes that communism necessarily implies a contempt for the past. So far as it is concerned, the history of the world began in November 1917 and everything that preceded this was preparatory and leading up to it. Normally speaking, in a country like India with large numbers of people on the verge of starvation and the economic structure cracking up, communism should have a wide appeal. In a sense there is that vague appeal, but the Communist Party cannot take advantage of it because it has cut itself off from the springs of national sentiment and speaks in a language which finds no echo in the hearts of the people. It remains an energetic but small group with no real roots.

It is not only the Communist Party in India that has failed in this respect. There are others who talk glibly of modernism and modern ways and yet lack all true appreciation of the modern spirit and the essence of Western culture, and are at the same time ignorant of their own culture. Unlike the Communists, they have no ideal that moves them and no driving force that carries them forward. They take the external forms and outer trappings of the West (and often some of the less desirable features), and imagine that they are in the vanguard of an advancing civilization. Naive and shallow and yet full of their own conceits, they live, chiefly in a few large cities, an artificial life which has no living contacts with the culture of the East or of the West.

National progress can, therefore, neither lie in a repetition of the past nor in its denial. New patterns must inevitably be adopted but they must be integrated with the old. Sometimes the new, though very different, appears in terms of pre-existing patterns, and thus creates a feeling of a continuous development from

the past, a link in the long chain of the history of the race. Indian history is a striking record of changes introduced in this way, a continuous adaptation of old ideas to a changing environment, of old patterns to new. Because of this there is no sense of cultural break in it and there is that continuity, in spite of repeated change, from the far-distant days of Mohenjo-daro to our own age. There was a reverence for the past and for traditional forms, but there was also a freedom and flexibility of the mind and a tolerance of the spirit. So while forms often remained, the inner content continued to change. In no other way could that society have survived for thousands of years. Only a living and growing mind could overcome the rigidity of traditional forms, only those forms could give it continuity and stability.

Yet this balance may become precarious and one aspect may overshadow and to some extent suppress this other. In India there was an extraordinary freedom of the mind allied to certain rigid social forms. These forms ultimately influenced the freedom of the mind and made it in practice, if not in theory, more rigid and limited. In Western Europe there was no such freedom of the mind and there was also much less rigidity in social forms. Europe had a long struggle for the freedom of the mind, and, as a consequence, social forms also changed.

In China the flexibility of the mind was even greater than in India and for all her love of and attachment to tradition, that mind never lost its flexibility and essential tolerance. Tradition sometimes delayed changes, but that mind was not afraid of change, though it retained the old patterns. Even more than in India, Chinese society built up a balance and an equilibrium which survived through many changes for thousands of

years. Perhaps one of the great advantages that China has had over other countries is her entire freedom from dogma, from the narrow and limited religious outlook, and her reliance on reason and commonsense. No other country has based its culture less on religion and more on morality and ethics and a deep understanding of the variety of human life.

In India because of the recognized freedom of the mind, howsoever limited in practice, new ideas are not shut out. They are considered and can be accepted far more than in countries which have a more rigid and dogmatic outlook on life. The essential ideals of Indian culture are broadbased and can be adapted to almost any environment. The bitter conflict between science and religion which shook up Europe in the nineteenth century would have no reality in India, nor would change based on the applications of science bring any conflict with those ideals. Undoubtedly such changes would stir up, as they are stirring up, the mind of India, but instead of combating them or rejecting them, it would rationalize them from its own ideological point of view and fit them into its mental framework. It is probable that in this process many vital changes may be introduced in the old outlook, but they will not be superimposed from outside and will seem rather to grow naturally from the cultural background of the people. This is more difficult to-day than it might have been because of the long period of arrested growth and the urgent necessity for big and qualitative changes.

Conflict there will be, however, with much of the superstructure that has grown up round those basic ideals and which exists and stifles us to-day. That superstructure will inevitably have to go because much of it is bad in itself and is contrary to the spirit of the age. Those who seek to retain it do an ill service to the ba-

sic ideals of Indian culture, for they mix up the good and the bad and thus endanger the former. It is no easy matter to separate the two or to draw a hard and fast line between them, and opinions will differ widely. But it is not necessary to draw any such theoretical and logical line. The logic of changing life and the march of events will gradually draw that line for us. Every kind of development—technological or philosophical—necessitates contact with life itself, with social needs, with the living movements of the world. Lack of this contact leads to stagnation and loss of vitality and creativeness. But if we maintain these contacts and are receptive to them, we shall adapt ourselves to the curve of life without losing the essential characteristics which we have valued.

Our approach to knowledge in the past was a synthetic one, but limited to India. That limitation continued and the synthetic approach gave place gradually to a more analytical one. We have now to lay greater stress on the synthetic aspect and make the whole world our field of study. This emphasis on synthesis is indeed necessary for every nation and individual if it is to grow out of the narrow grooves of thought and action in which most people have lived for so long. The development of science and its applications have made this possible for us, and yet the very excess of new knowledge has added to its difficulty. Specialization has led to a narrowing of individual life in a particular groove, and man's labour in industry is often confined to some infinitesimal part of the whole product. Specialization in knowledge and work will have to continue, but it seems more essential than ever that a synthetic view of human life and man's adventure through the ages should be encouraged. This view will have to take into consideration the past and the present,

and include in its scope all countries and peoples. In this way perhaps we might develop, in addition to our own national background and cultures, an appreciation of others and a capacity to understand and co-operate with the people of other countries. Thus also we might succeed to some extent in building up integrated personalities instead of the lop-sided individuals of today. We might become in Plato's word's 'spectators of all time and all being', drawing sustenance from the rich treasures that humanity has accumulated, adding to them, and applying them in building for the future.

It is a curious and significant fact that, in spite of all modern scientific progress and talk of internationalism, racialism and other separating factors are at least as much in evidence today, if not more so, than at any previous time in history. There is something lacking in all this progress, which can neither produce harmony between nations nor within the spirit of man. Perhaps more synthesis and a little humility towards the wisdom of the past, which after all is the accumulated experience of the human race, would help us to gain a new perspective and greater harmony. That is especially needed by those peoples who live a fevered life in the present only and have almost forgotten the past. But for countries like India a different emphasis is necessary, for we have too much of the past about us and have ignored the present. We have to get rid of that narrowing religious outlook, that obsession with the supernatural and metaphysical speculation, that loosening of the mind's discipline in religious ceremonial and mystical emotionalism, which come in the way of our understanding ourselves and the world. We have to come to grips with the present, this life, this world, this nature which surrounds us in its infinite variety. Some Hindus talk of going back to the *Vedas*, some

Moslems dream of an Islamic theocracy. Idle fancies, for there is no going back to the past; there is no turning back even if this was thought desirable. There is only one-way traffic in Time.

India must, therefore, lessen her religiosity and turn to science. She must get rid of the exclusiveness in thought and social habit which has become like a prison to her, stunting her spirit and preventing growth. The idea of ceremonial purity has erected barriers against social intercourse and narrowed the sphere of social action. The day-to-day religion of the orthodox Hindu is more concerned with what to eat and what not to eat, who to eat with and from whom to keep away, than with spiritual values. The rules and regulations of the kitchen dominate his social life. The Moslem is fortunately free from these inhibitions, but he has his own narrow codes and ceremonials, a routine which he rigorously follows, forgetting the lesson of brotherhood which his religion taught him. His view of life is perhaps even more limited and sterile than the Hindu view, though the average Hindu to-day is a poor representative of the latter view, for he has lost that traditional freedom of thought and the background that enriches life in many ways.

Caste is the symbol and embodiment of this exclusiveness among the Hindus. It is sometimes said that the basic idea of caste might remain but its subsequent harmful development and ramifications should go; that it should not depend on birth but on merit. This approach is irrelevant and merely confuses the issue. In a historical context a study of the growth of caste has some value, but we cannot obviously go back to the period when caste began; in the social organization of to-day it has no place left. If merit is the only criterion and opportunity is thrown open to everybody, then caste

loses all its present-day distinguishing features and, in fact, ends. Caste has in the past not only led to the suppression of certain groups but to a separation of theoretical and scholastic learning from craftsmanship and a divorce of philosophy from actual life and its problems. It was an aristocratic approach based on traditionalism. This outlook has to change completely for it is wholly opposed to modern conditions and the democratic ideal. The functional organization of social groups in India may continue, but even that will undergo a vast change as the nature of modern industry creates new functions and puts an end to many old ones. The tendency to-day everywhere is towards a functional organization of society, and the concept of abstract rights is giving place to that of functions. This is in harmony with the old Indian ideal.

The spirit of the age is in favour of equality, though practice denies it almost everywhere. We have got rid of slavery in the narrow sense of the word, that a man can be the property of another. But a new slavery, in some ways worse than the old, has taken its place all over the world. In the name of individual freedom, political and economic systems exploit human beings and treat them as commodities. And again, though an individual cannot be the property of another, a country and a nation can still be the property of another nation, and thus group slavery is tolerated. Racialism also is a distinguishing feature of our times, and we have not only master nations but also master races.

Yet the spirit of the age will triumph. In India, at any rate, we must aim at equality. That does not and cannot mean that everybody is physically or intellectually or spiritually equal or can be made so. But it does mean equal opportunities for all and no political, economic or social barrier in the way of any individual

or group. It means a faith in humanity and a belief that there is no race or group that cannot advance and make good in its own way, given the chance to do so. It means a realization of the fact that the backwardness or degradation of any group is not due to inherent failings in it but principally to lack of opportunities and long suppression by other groups. It should mean an understanding of the modern world wherein real progress and advance, whether national or international, have become very much a joint affair and a backward group pulls back others. Therefore, not only must equal opportunities be given to all, but special opportunities for educational, economic and cultural growth must be given to backward groups so as to enable them to catch up to those who are ahead of them. Any such attempt to open the doors of opportunity to all in India will release enormous energy and ability and transform the country with amazing speed.

If the spirit of the age demands equality, it must necessarily also demand an economic system which fits in with it and encourages it. The present colonial system in India is the very antithesis of it. Absolutism is not only based on inequality but must perpetuate it in every sphere of life. It suppresses the creative and regenerative forces of a nation, bottles up talent and capacity, and discourages the spirit of responsibility. Those who have to suffer under it, lose their sense of dignity and self-reliance. The problems of India, complicated as they seem, are essentially due to an attempt to advance while preserving the political and economic structure more or less intact. Political advance is made subject to the preservation of this structure and existing vested interests. The two are incompatible.

Political change there must be, but economic change

is equally necessary. That change will have to be in the direction of a democratically planned collectivism. 'The choice', says R. H. Tawney, 'is not between competition and monopoly, but between monopoly which is irresponsible and private and a monopoly which is responsible and public.' Public monopolies are growing even in capitalist States and they will continue to grow. The conflict between the idea underlying them and private monopoly will continue till the latter is liquidated. A democratic collectivism need not mean an abolition of private property, but it will mean the public ownership of the basic and major industries. It will mean the co-operative or collective control of the land. In India especially it will be necessary to have, in addition to the big industries, co-operatively controlled small and village industries. Such a system of democratic collectivism will need careful and continuous planning and adaptation to the changing needs of the people. The aim should be the expansion of the productive capacity of the nation in every possible way, at the same time absorbing all the labour power of the nation in some activity or other and preventing unemployment. As far as possible there should be freedom to choose one's occupation. An equalization of income will not result from all this, but there will be far more equitable sharing and a progressive tendency towards equalization. In any event, the vast differences that exist to-day will disappear completely, and class distinctions, which are essentially based on differences in income, will begin to fade out.

Such a change would mean an upsetting of the present-day acquisitive society based primarily on the profit motive. The profit motive may still continue to some extent but it will not be the dominating urge, nor will it have the same scope as it has to-day. It would

be absurd to say that the profit motive does not appeal to the average Indian, but it is nevertheless true that there is no such admiration for it in India as there is in the West. The possessor of money may be envied but he is not particularly respected or admired. Respect and admiration still go to the man or woman who is considered good and wise, and especially to those who sacrifice themselves or what they possess for the public good. The Indian outlook, even of the masses, has never approved of the spirit of acquisitiveness.

Collectivism involves communal undertakings and co-operative effort. This again is fully in harmony with old Indian social conceptions which were all based on the idea of the group. The decay of the group system under British rule, and especially of the self-governing village, has caused deep injury to the Indian masses, even more psychological than economic. Nothing positive came in its place, and they lost their spirit of independence, their sense of responsibility, and their capacity to co-operate together for common purposes. The village, which used to be an organic and vital unit, became progressively a derelict area, just a collection of mud huts and odd individuals. But still the village holds together by some invisible link and old memories revive. It should be easily possible to take advantage of these age-long traditions and to build up communal and co-operative concerns in the land and in small industry. The village can no longer be a self-contained economic unit (though it may often be intimately connected with a collective or co-operative farm), but it can very well be a governmental and electoral unit, each such unit functioning as a self-governing community within the larger political framework, and looking after the essential needs of the village. If it is treated to some extent as an electoral unit, this will

simplify provincial and all-India elections considerably by reducing the number of direct electors. The village council, itself chosen by all the adult men and women of the village, could form these electors for the bigger elections. Indirect elections may have some disadvantages but, having regard to the background in India, I feel sure that the village should be treated as a unit. This will give a truer and more responsible representation.

In addition to this territorial representation, there should also be direct representation of the collectives and co-operatives on the land and in industry. Thus the democratic organization of the State will consist of both functional and territorial representatives, and will be based on local autonomy. Some such arrangement will be completely in harmony with India's past as well as with her present requirements. There will be no sense of break (except with the conditions created by British rule) and the mass mind will accept it as a continuation of the past which it still remembers and cherishes.

Such a development in India would be in tune with political and economic internationalism. It would breed no conflicts with other nations and would be a powerful factor for peace in Asia and the World. It would help in the realization of that One World towards which we are inevitably being driven, even though our passions delude us and our minds fail to understand it. The Indian people, freed from the terrible sense of oppression and frustration, will grow in stature again and lose their narrow nationalism and exclusiveness. Proud of their Indian heritage, they will open their minds and hearts to other people and other nations, and become citizens of this wide and fascinating world, marching onwards with others in that ancient quest in which their forefathers were the pioneers.

XI. G. D. H. COLE

WESTERN EUROPE AND WORLD AFFAIRS

THE case against war, as a means of settling differences among men, has always been strong; and to-day it is very much stronger than it has ever been before, because of the very prodigiousness of the destructive power that science has put into the hands of the war-makers. The atomic bomb frightened the Japanese, who are not given to fright, into instant surrender; and it terrified the victors equally with the vanquished. For the time being, the United States holds a practical monopoly of atomic power; for other countries, even where they know most of the secrets, cannot at present apply them. No one, however, supposes that this monopoly will last or that any State strong enough to aim at playing a part in power politics will be for long without atomic weapons, or at any rate without the means of making them. What is still unknown is whether they will continue to be makeable only on the vast scale employed in producing the first examples, or will soon become easy to make on a relatively small scale—perhaps even by a few men, with a simple and cheap equipment such as can be easily set up and worked without attracting notice, in any country in which private enterprise remains the rule.

The Problem of Atomic Power

No one, except lunatics, can wish atomic bombs to become easy to make. In the extreme case, if any private 'dynamiter' could manufacture one at home, the world would be hard put to it to avoid becoming a prey

to fanatics who would not scruple to pull civilization about their ears. Even if the production needed moderate-sized factories and fairly expensive equipment, the prospect would be grim enough; for the new weapons, even if they could be denied to 'private enterprise,' would be within the productive capacity of a large number of separate sovereign States, and the devising of effective international controls could not be easy. If the feat remains for some time beyond the power of any except the largest and most highly equipped industrial countries, even that means that the very countries most likely to be antagonists in any future world war will enter it with atomic weapons and with the certainty, whoever wins, of doing a terrific amount of damage to each other—and probably to lesser countries as well—and of annihilating a great number of people on both sides before the issue is decided. Finally, even if the development of atomic energy can be and is made effectively an international monopoly under the control of a supreme international authority, and that authority thus gets the last word in everything, because nobody dare stand out against it, there remains the question: 'What sort of authority will it be, and for what purposes and to what ends will it exert its power?'

Or.....can we hope that the power will be so great that no one in fact will dare use it at all? Will the sheer terror of war, with the new weapons, be so great as to prevent war from happening? Will it be, in the event, not the Security Council, or any peace preserving organ of international government, but sheer terror that will induce the great States of the world to keep the peace? I have heard this suggested; and I agree that the fear of unloosing forces of sheer destruction is likely to make great States less ready to proceed to

extremes, and more disposed to compromise, when they can do this without loss of relative strength. But it would be utterly unsafe to rely on this factor to prevent a recurrence of war in a world in which there is a real conflict of ideologies.

The Americans themselves, though they hold at present a monopoly of atomic power, are desirous of finding some means of controlling it internationally, because they realise that their monopoly will not last. Even if their immense industrial resources give them an assurance of their ability to remain the most powerfully armed country in the world, with the greatest command of atomic weapons, they are still desirous of international control, because they realise that, in default of real international understanding, the Soviet Union is certain before long to find out ways of producing its own atomic plants, and do not relish the prospect of a war which would inevitably be fought largely with atomic blow and counter-blow. In a world war fought on this basis, the United States might be certain of having the advantage of weapons; but it is also, because of its high degree of urban development, more vulnerable than the Soviet Union—though infinitely less vulnerable than Great Britain. For Great Britain at any rate it is obviously futile to play the game of atomic armament with a view to a future war; for in such a war, however much damage we were able to inflict on our enemies, we should assuredly be wiped out. It follows that it is no less futile for us to plan to enter a future war as allies of either the United States or the Soviet Union; for whether we found ourselves on the winning or on the losing side, we should lose—so thoroughly that there should be nothing left erect of the society that we have made for ourselves, and are trying to remake.

Europe's Need for Peace

It is so much to our interest—nay, so much a matter of sheer survival—not to become involved in any future war that our weight as a nation is bound to be flung wholly and finally on the side of peace. Whoever may abandon U.N.O., we shall not abandon it, as long as there is any U.N.O. at all to stick by; because peace is overwhelming interest and necessity. Indeed for us, as a people, it is henceforth a case of peace at any price; and unpleasing as it is to have to say so, we shall be justified in future in abandoning *any* ideal sooner than go to war, if by doing so we can in fact keep out of war. We shall be justified, because no national leadership could be justified in condemning the entire people to mass-suicide. One can, for an ideal, be ready to give one's own life: one can even be ready, as citizen or as statesman, to send thousands or millions to their deaths in what is felt to be a good enough cause. Not for any cause, I think, can statesman or citizen be right in decreeing the unavoidable destruction of the entire society to which he belongs. Nor do I think that any Government could, in practice, act in such a way without being swept aside. The British people, I believe, will refuse, and will refuse rightly, to take part in any future world war. This is not to say that they might not be swept into it against their will; but, if they were, and were not wiped out before they had a chance of doing anything at all, I believe they would use any means in their power to get out again—including the power, which the French people exercised in 1940, of refusing to fight.

Can the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union Want War ?

Of the United States, and of the Soviet Union, I make no similar assertion. I can quite imagine both of them

preferring war to giving way over what the rulers of either regarded as a vital national interest, or as a matter of principle. I can imagine this because to neither of them would war mean inevitable annihilation. It would mean dreadful damage; but that is not the same thing. Either side could enter such a war with the hope of winning and of having enough man-power and resources left to reap the fruits of victory; for clearly the prize of victory would be world-domination. At the end of their conflict there would be no power left in the world able to challenge the victor, or even to offer any effective resistance to anything the victor ordered to be done. The prize is glittering—not because there is much to be gained from ruling the whole world by force, but rather because there does seem a great deal to be gained by having no opposition to fear, and by being free to impose one's own ideas and way of life on other peoples as much as one chooses so to do. The victor might not choose to rule the whole world; but, without this, on any really crucial issue, his will would be law.

Accordingly, I do not see the terror of the atomic bomb as sufficient of itself to restrain the potential war-makers, or to keep the world at peace. The conflict of ideas between American capitalism and Soviet Communism cuts too deep for them to come directly to terms and share world power between them—unless the ideas themselves can become mollified and modified, or even transformed, by internal evolution in the two great societies concerned. The hope of permanent peace rests, not on the creation in U.N.O. of a force powerful enough to deter the antagonists from ever flying at each other's throats; it rests rather, in the long run, on an internal change in one of the two countries, or in both—a change of such a nature as to make the two countries capable

of living side by side without continual quarrelling about their respective attempts to shape the conduct of other societies.

This does not mean that U.N.O. is unimportant, or that it is not worth while to make it as effective as it can be made in putting obstacles in the way of war. It is essential to do this; for by doing it we may gain for the world the indispensable factor—time. It will take time, even at the best, for the processes of internal change in the United States and in the Soviet Union to develop, so as to bring about the compatibility which is the only foundation for the comity of nations. Given time, there is no good reason to despair of this compatibility coming about. But there is no way of forcing the peace. U.N.O.'s task is to stall off war for the time, in the hope that it will not have to face an utterly intractable situation before the conditions of the problem have been radically altered.

The Changes Needed in American Society

What are the internal changes in American, or in Soviet, society, or in both, that would remove the imminent threat of war? As a Socialist, I naturally see need for much greater changes in America than in the Soviet Union. The most terrifying thing about the United States, under its present system, is its irresponsibility. It is committed, on principle, to letting its citizens do things, in pursuit of economic advantage, that are bound to endanger peace if, when trouble ensues, these trouble-makers receive their Government's support. In home affairs, the American people are by now mistrustful enough of Big Business to put at any rate some limits to what it dares attempt; but American Big Business, in its operations abroad, and above all in backward regions, is still entirely without inhibi-

tions. And American Governments, in the name of 'free enterprise,' are disposed to back up any line which American Big Business may choose to take in its dealings with other peoples.

The American people is not more ignorant of what is happening in the rest of the world than the people of Great Britain or of France; and it certainly knows a great deal more about such matters than the people of the Soviet Union. But that is not saying much, and in any case knowledge is not of much use unless it is applied in action. In the United States it is not so applied, except under the influence of temporary waves of feeling, which are often due mainly to the influence of 'pressue groups.' There is in America no steady popular sentiment about foreign policy; but there is a great deal of contempt. This is a dangerous attitude, because it renders American policy highly undependable. The Americans are very ready to lecture other Governments and give them any steady help in doing it. No doubt, the United States did in the end decide to fight the Nazis; but not until it had been practically kicked into doing so. Its instinctive sentiment is isolationist, not in the sense of leaving other people alone, but in that of refusing to accept the commitments that logically follow upon interference.

To a certain extent, these qualities of American opinion are calculated to make it less likely that the United States will plunge the world into a war which the Soviet Union will be anxious for a long time to avoid. The American citizen-soldier does not like foreign service, or take kindly to the life of other countries. His desire to go home as soon as possible was unmistakable all through the later phases of the second World War and subsequently in the occupied zone of Germany. A war for the American 'way of life,' waged in Europe

and in the Far East against the Soviet Union, would not be popular, however unpopular the Soviet Union might be in the United States. Nevertheless, popular or unpopular, it would happen in the end, if these two countries were continually disputing all over the world. War would be staved off again and again by the unwillingness of both parties to engage in it; but there would come a time when both would refuse to give way, and then war would follow, because there would be no force powerful enough to prevent it, and both parties would be unable to find any alternative to fighting it out.

At least, this would be so, unless there had been a fundamental change in the structure of American—or alternatively of Soviet—society. The change in America that would make all the difference would be the taming of American capitalism, including the capitalism that is in the minds of millions of Americans who are not capitalists in any ordinary sense of word. I mean, in effect, a weakening of the speculative temperament that has hitherto pervaded American society. If, economically, the Americans could settle down to the task of steady development of their own resources, of lifting up the backward sections of their own people, of establishing social security, and of regulating the processes of production and distribution with these ends in view, their attitude to other peoples would undergo a deep change corresponding to the change in their management of their internal affairs. They would begin to stand powerfully for international planning, and, instead of acting as a disturbing force upon other countries, would become the most powerful influence on the side of world stability.

Can such a change come about? I have suggested in a previous chapter that it is most unlikely to come

about until the American people has been caught by another slump comparable in intensity with that of the 1930's. As a sequel to such an experience it might come very rapidly indeed. I do not profess to know to what sort of new economic system it would give rise, and I feel sure that this would be neither Communism *a la Russe* nor Socialism *a l'Anglaise*, but something different, and yet incorporating elements akin to both. More than this I cannot say; for it is not for an Englishman to work out the solution appropriate to the American conditions. I see, however, nothing to suggest that the Americans need fail to find for themselves a solution that will reconcile the stable enjoyment of their riches with what they feel to be valuable in the American 'way of life.'

The Changes Needed in the Soviet Union

As for the Soviet Union, the internal change that is needed there should present, in itself, much less difficulty. In the theory of Marxism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has always been regarded as a phenomenon of transition. The proletariat, indeed, cannot continue to dictate indefinitely, because its historic mission is to abolish itself, by creating the 'classless society.' When that society has come into being, there can be no dictatorship in the Marxian sense; for such dictatorship is essentially the action of a class. It is designed to continue as long, and only as long, as there remain unresolved elements of the old society to threaten counter-revolution if it is relaxed. In proportion to its success in liquidating the class-system it is bound to wither away. As it does so, the need for rigid discipline and for the suppression of dissentient opinion will wither too, and controversy will be able to return as fruitful debate without the taint of treason. The

democratic freedoms which we value in the Western countries will be able to flourish in the Soviet Union on the firm foundation of the economic freedom which we do not at present possess. In effect, the Soviet Union will become an all-round democracy, with every chance of being very much more thoroughly democratic, in every sense, than any country in the world's history has ever been.

This, I know, will be vehemently denied. It will be contended that, whatever Marxist theory may prescribe, dictatorship in the Soviet Union will not wither away, and that dictatorship of a class will be replaced, if it has not been already, by that of a cabal. I do not believe this view to be correct. I agree that dictatorship in the Soviet Union may be expected to maintain itself, in one form or another, as long as the threat of another world war continues to exist, and that, accordingly, there is little chance of its disappearance as long as the United States continues to be the world champion of predatory capitalism. But as fast as the United States changes towards a more stable and equitable social system, I fully expect the Soviet Union to change too—towards a more liberal and less fear-ridden regime.

It is the task of the Security Council to hold war off, if it can, until these parallel internal changes in the world's two greatest countries can begin to produce their effect in relaxing the tension on the far-flung international front. In this task it can be greatly helped if there is always present a third party, with a supreme interest in keeping the peace. There can, in the nature of the case, be no third party strong enough to challenge either of the two Great Powers, or to constitute any threat to either within its own frontiers. But a third party, manifestly not dangerous to the security

a satellite of either of the two; for in that event it will merely be reckoned in on the one side or the other in estimating the balance of forces; nay more, it will most likely become the cockpit in which they will fight out their differences.

Instead of trying to find fresh words to say over again what I have said already as well as I can upon this vital 'third-party' question, I shall again at this point insert a number of paragraphs from the pamphlet on *Labour's Foreign Policy* which I published in April, 1946. Nothing that has happened since has modified my view that these are the lines on which we in Great Britain must work towards a solution of the great problem of world peace, as well as towards the rebuilding of our own society on foundations consistent with the present plane of world development.

The Problem of Western Europe

The imperative need for Socialist unity in Western Europe seems crystal clear. This is not because West European Socialists cherish ambitions to join forces with American capitalism in attacking the U.S.S.R. It is because Western Europe presents to them problems of its own which they cannot possibly hope to solve except by acting together, and because the chances of making Socialism strong and appealing to the people in Western Europe depend on this unity. Every Socialist movement in Western Europe would be immensely strengthened against the forces of reaction in its own country if it could act in the consciousness of having behind it a united policy, supported by the Socialists in other neighbouring countries, for concerted action to raise European standards of living and to provide a secure basis for a Socialist way of life that would dis-

card what is bad, while continuing what is good, in the West European political and social tradition.

Moreover, it is no small element in the case for West European unity, on a Socialist basis, that it would enable the nations of Western Europe, instead of being under the thumb of the United States on account of their divergences and economic weakness, to face the American capitalist pressures on much more equal terms. I am not suggesting that the West European Union would be directed against the United States, any more than against the Soviet Union. But it would be designed both to help the peoples of Western Europe to develop their own economic resources and lessen their dependence on the United States, and to enable them to carry out in common a programme of 'liberal Socialism' which would conserve what is good in their existing cultures while adapting their political and social, as well as their economic, institutions to the requirements of the modern world.

The West European Way of Life

Let me try, at this point, to make as clear as I can what I mean, and what I do not mean, by the unity of Western Europe. I mean, above all, a pact among the countries of Western Europe to maintain the Western way of life, while adapting it to the material conditions of living in the twentieth century. This way of life, which exists in different degrees of development in different countries, I regard as involving, as primary, the following things:

(1) A respect for the individual, as a person with a right to his own judgment and his own choice of interests and activities, within the general framework of a state system designed to safeguard personal liberty, and not to subordinate the individual to the State

more than is necessary in order to safeguard the liberty and welfare of others.

(2) Toleration of difference, in both habits and opinions, up to the very limit to which such toleration is consistent with the preservation of national way of life.

(3) Free speech, and freedom of writing and of association, including freedom to criticise the Government, up to the same limit.

(4) The practice of settling policies and programmes by free discussion, and of considering the claims of minorities to the fullest extent that can be made consistent with the adoption of the essentials of the majority view.

(5) Free elections, so conducted as to give minorities a reasonable chance of representation, not necessarily in proportion to their numbers, but to the fullest extent that can be squared with the need for strong and coherent government.

(6) Social behaviour which is designed not to carry political or religious differences into everyday life, so as to prevent friendly social intercourse between those holding different views.

(7) The pursuit of welfare and social security as conscious political and economic objectives, on the basis of recognising every person's right to an assured minimum standard of life.

(8) An educational system designed to give every child a chance of becoming a tolerably well-equipped human being, capable of active citizenship and of a satisfactorily rounded personal and family life.

(9) Legal safeguards, where necessary against the Government, for the individual in his enjoyment of the rights accorded to him under the law in accordance with the foregoing principles.

(10) A belief in morality, as binding upon States as well as on private persons, and as the necessary foundation of sound relations between as well as within national communities.

I realise, of course, that many of these "freedoms" are in fact very imperfectly recognised and safeguarded in the countries even of Western Europe. Never-

theless, I think the West European way of life does rest to an appreciable extent on an acceptance of them, strongest in Great Britain and in the Scandinavian countries, but plainly present also in Holland, in Belgium, in Switzerland, and in France. I agree that neither Spain nor Portugal belongs at present, in this sense, to the comity of Western Europe, and that Italy is on the margin, with her capacity to live by the Western rule still unproven. On the other hand, Austria, or at any rate Vienna, does belong to the West, whereas Greece clearly does not. What I want, then, is a unity of the West, based on close community of thought and action in accordance with these principles, above all between Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, with the door kept open for other possible but more doubtful members of a Western group.

What Western Unity Involves

The principles just stated are, of course, by themselves no more than underlying attitudes which make unity possible. The practical question is how to square them with the material conditions of life in the twentieth century. My essential contention is that this can be done only on a basis of what I have called 'liberal Socialism.' The authoritarian Socialism of the Soviet Union is not compatible with these essential freedoms, which form an essential part of the Western way of life. It has faced with great success the problem of devising a kind of Socialism that meets the material requirements of our time; but, heir to a very different social and cultural tradition from our own, it has seen no need to give many of the freedoms which we value most highly a place in its new way of life. The West, on the other hand, while showing considerable tenacity in

retaining its cultural traditions, has so far failed almost entirely in making the requisite adaptations to the changed material foundations of living, and has, even to-day, set about the work of reconstructing its damaged social structure on an obsolete basis of national sovereignty and purely national economic effort.

As against this, I claim that the problems of Western Europe are insoluble except on supra-national lines. The economic structure of the new Western Europe needs planning as a whole, on a basis of wholehearted co-operation. The tariff and currency barriers need taking down, so as to constitute a free trading area with a market comparable in extent with those of the United States and the Soviet Union. The transport system needs to be rebuilt on international lines; the movement of both goods and men needs to be made free of all impediment over the entire West European area. Industry and agriculture need planning as complementary services for the whole of Western Europe, and not in terms of respective national competition. The use of rivers for power as well as for transport needs supra-national planning. Unless these things are done, Western Europe will not be able to stand up economically to the commercial and capitalistic power of the United States, or to achieve social security for its peoples at a satisfactory standard of life.

It is, however, impossible even to begin planning such matters as these on the required supra-national lines unless the Governments of the countries concerned are like-minded, and are ready to pursue internal policies of economic planning with social security and social welfare as their essential objectives. The only Governments that can be relied on to do this are Socialist, or predominantly Socialist, Governments, such as exist already in Norway and Sweden, as well as in

Great Britain, and could exist in France and Holland and Belgium, and probably elsewhere, if only Great Britain would give the right lead.

The Political Structure of Western Unity

This is the economic aspect of Western unity, which is indispensable in order to give the political aspect a real and substantial content. Politically, the structure need not be at all elaborate, if only the right economic links can be successfully made. I see no necessity for a common Constitution or for a common Parliament, even of a federal type. The whole thing could be done by treaties, filled out by agreements for close economic collaboration; and the political machinery could be no more than a periodically-meeting Western European Congress, which could be created as a 'regional group' within the framework of the United Nations Organisation, and on lines parallel to those of the existing Pan-American Union. Such a Congress would debate policies and set up Commissions to draft agreements for ratification by the national Parliaments, and to supervise their execution when they had been duly ratified. There would be no need to supersede, or to interfere with, the separate forms and methods of Government in the different countries—only to persuade them to shape their policies in common on a number of questions which call imperatively for supra-national action.

There are, indeed, certain terms of unity which I should like to see written into the common agreement of the West European States. I should like complete freedom of movement, without passports or visas, to be established over the entire area. I should like any citizen of any country within the group to be recognised, on the basis of a simple residence qualification, as a citizen of any other, to the extent of acquiring full

legal and voting rights. I should like to see conventions agreed on by all countries in the group on such matters as patents, company laws, Trade Union rights, libel laws, double taxation, and, as far as possible, social insurance and minimum conditions of employment. And I should hope, as soon as possible, for a truly common currency, resting on the foundation of an agreed policy for the maintenance of full employment over the entire area.

Western Unity is not Military Alliance

As for military affairs, I do not want Western unity to be involved in them in any way. It would be a great mistake to create in Western Europe any sort of *bloc* of armed force, even if it were organised only as a common contribution to U.N.O. Any proposal to make a military, as well as an economico-political, group in Western Europe would inevitably arouse, as matters stand, all the worst suspicions in the Soviet Union; and, even apart from this, it could be represented as implying an abandonment of U.N.O. as the international instrument for the prevention of war. Hopes of U.N.O.'s effectiveness in this sphere have already sunk, in many places, uncomfortably low; but it would be altogether wrong, and contrary to the common sentiment of the West European peoples, to take any line that would further weaken U.N.O.'s position, or turn the West into an additional (and certainly ineffective) power *bloc* to match its strength against the Soviet Union or the United States, instead of standing as the champion of world order and a representative of the smaller countries in the endeavour to make an end of military power-politics as the determinant of world affairs.

I am not, then, urging any sort of military alliance among the countries of Western Europe. On the

contrary, I want them to eschew all projects of such alliance, both because it could not really help them to solve their problems and because it would inevitably be taken as a hostile move both by the Soviet Union and by those who are working to make U.N.O. a reality. The unity Western Europe needs is not military: it is cultural, economic, political in the sense in which politics are a matter, not of war, but of the arts of peace.

On this basis, which I hope I have made sufficiently clear, I am pleading for the recognition of Western unity as a primary objective of British foreign policy to-day. Of course, I am well aware that this unity cannot be easily achieved. There are many complicating factors, even apart from the present hostility of the Soviet Union to *any* proposal for closer grouping. For one thing, there are the complications which arise out of the existence of dependent empires attached to a number of the European States—to France and Holland, for example, as well as to Great Britain. Nor do I deny that the effective unity of Western Europe involves as a prior condition an agreed solution of the problem of Germany. What I am denying is that, in the circumstances that now exist, West European unity on a broadly Socialist basis could be to the detriment of the Soviet Union, or indeed to anything save its great and lasting advantage.

Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States

The case for West European unity, as I have set it out in the foregoing pages, is based on the belief that there exists among the peoples of Western Europe—or at all events among most of them—a deep-seated similarity resting on a common way of life and, at bottom,

to a great extent on a common set of values. There are, of course, large differences between these peoples—for example, between the French and ourselves—but I have written in the belief that these differences are, from the world standpoint, much less important than the underlying similarity of culture. Naturally, this view implies that other peoples, in other parts of the world, are separated from the peoples of Western Europe by much deeper differences, though we have all certain things in common as members of the human race. I have not attempted to define the values or ways of life of these other peoples, as I have those of Western Europe; for any such attempt would lead me much too far afield. There is, however, one aspect of the difference about which I must say a little, because it deeply affects the prospective relations of a united Western Europe with the rest of the world.

Our differences from the Americans in values and way of life are based mainly on this—we in Western Europe are old, settled peoples, with long, continuous national traditions, living thick on the ground, and long accustomed to the husbanding of scarce resources. The Americans are a new people, of very mixed racial composition, still imperfectly fused into an American nation, and living scattered over a vast continent, whose resources they have been accustomed, until quite recently, to regard as boundless. These conditions make us cautious, and the Americans immensely speculative, in temper: they make us think of planning in order to get enough to live on, whereas the Americans, despite their experiences in the 'thirties, still think in terms of personal adventure in a world where plenty is to be had for the snatching. These attitudes express themselves politically in our liberal Socialism and their passion for capitalistic enterprise. We and the Americans

have to live together in the world of to-day and to-morrow on a basis of recognition of these differences and of mutual accommodation between our several ways of life.

The Russian attitude is to some extent like the American; for it too starts from the assumption of vast resources waiting to be exploited. But it is also radically different, because it rests, not on the gradual filling up of an empty continent, but on the foundations of an old autocratic State whose inhabitants have been used to dire poverty. The problem for the Russians is not that of making a nation out of many heterogeneous groups living all mixed up and coming out of widely different cultural environments (though of course they too have their problems of nationalities and national cultures); it is rather that of lifting a vast mass of primitive peasants quickly to the level of an advanced industrial civilisation, and of making them capable of using the great resources of their country with enough skill to raise the entire standard of life. This task leads them to planning on a vast scale, whereas the Americans, with their higher standards, still put their trust in private enterprise. Moreover, the Russian kind of planning is designed to mass-produce not only goods but also men of the industrial age. It, therefore, insists on uniformity; and this insistence is the easier because insistence on uniformity comes natural to the primitive human material with which it has to deal. Primitive peoples do insist on uniformity: the growth of diversity is a characteristic of advanced economic civilisations and can be only gradual, if what Bagehot called "the cake of custom" is to be moulded and not broken in the process. We and the Russians have to live together in the world to-day and to-morrow on a

basis of recognition of these differences and of mutual accommodation between their way of life and ours.

Western European Unity and World Unity

There is no reason why we should not achieve this accommodation—we West Europeans, the Russians, and the Americans—to say nothing of the Indians, the Chinese, and the other great groups of the human family. Our differences can be prevented from developing into quarrels if the will to prevent this is present. We can divide the world between us, into our several spheres, within which we can practise our several ways of life; and indeed, we must do just this, if we are not to tear the whole world to pieces, and leave but a desert—if even that—behind. My plea for Western Unity is part of a wider plea for this zoning of world affairs. The time for closer world unity, based on a common set of values and a common way of living, may come; but it has not come yet. We can do something to work towards it through U.N.O. and its related organisations, particularly those which have for their mission the furtherance of common basic standards of living over the whole earth. What we cannot do is to hurry world unity ahead of the building of secure foundations for it; and, this being so, we must use regional unity as a bridge, wherever we find nation-groups like-minded enough to achieve a mutual accommodation of their own. The United States and the Soviet Union are regional units, by themselves or with immediate neighbours not comparable with them in size or resources. Such countries as Great Britain and France are not regional units; but they can make a regional unit by coming closer together, and in doing so can further world co-operation and the success of U.N.O. in working for unity over a wider field.

Will the Soviet Union Play?

Of course, success in this depends on all the leading parties being willing to play. But, I shall be asked, is there any real prospect of the Soviet Union doing this? Yes, there is. The Soviet Union's present attitude rests on a fear of attack from the combined forces of world capitalism—among which it reckons the countries where Social Democracy or liberal Socialism is in office, on the ground that these countries have not changed the essential basis of their institutions (much, by the way, as we are apt to see close resemblance between Czarist and Soviet policy in foreign affairs). We in Western Europe can overcome these suspicions by making it plain beyond a doubt that we stand not as the allies of American capitalism, or for any sort of capitalism of our own, but for Socialism—the liberal Socialism which is the appropriate twentieth-century form of our evolutionary way of life. If this is what in truth we do stand for, the leaders of the Soviet Union will be bound in the long run to see that it is, and to adapt their behaviour accordingly. *But we cannot expect them to see it unless we make it true; and it is not yet true in any full sense. Only West European unity, of the kind I have attempted to set forth, can make it true.*

The Liberal Socialist Foundations of Foreign Policy

It is, of course, an implied term of this expectation that the unity of Western Europe should rest on Socialist foundations; and I have tried to show that this can be the case in the near future only if the British Labour Government puts itself plainly at the head of the liberal Socialist forces in the West, comes to terms with France, and, in conjunction with the French Socialists, settles the German problem in such a way as to give hope to

the democratic elements in the German people of taking their due place in a Socialist federation of the West, based firmly on the liberal tradition and on the great cultural inheritance which is in danger of being obliterated by the clumsy hands of younger States armed with vaster material resources. This tradition and this culture it is the task of liberal Socialism not merely to preserve, but to transform into an instrument of equality and fraternity, as well as of personal liberty. The task is hard; for it is bound to be easier to let the old culture decay than to regenerate it, and it is idle at present, to look for help in the work of regeneration either to America or to the Soviet Union. The culture we are seeking to transform is ours and not theirs; and we cannot expect them to understand why we believe in it and cannot, as peoples of the Western tradition, be happy with either of the new mass-cultures which seem to them so manifestly superior. The task falls upon us—upon the Socialists of the West—to restore and transform our own values; and we cannot hope to succeed unless we act and think and feel together to a far higher extent than ever in the past.

The Patterns of World Culture and the Socialist Task

But, in acting together, we must not assume that our culture alone is right and good, and the others wrong and evil. The point is not that our way of life is better than the Russian or the American way—an issue on which I give no opinion—but that it is *our* way, and a necessary foundation for the happiness of the peoples whose inheritance it is. We must accordingly build up and reinterpret our way of life, so as to give it a liberal Socialist basis, not in hostility to other cultures, but as complementary to them, and especially as complementary to the different version of the Socialist faith that

has found acceptance in the Soviet Union, with its vastly different cultural inheritance. In the achievement of world cultural tolerance we value within our own culture but on a vaster scale, lies the hope of world peace and of advancing prosperity and well-being for all peoples.....

XII. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL

I

Our present Western outlook on history is an extraordinarily contradictory one. While our historical horizon has been expanding vastly in both the space dimension and the time dimension, our historical vision—what we actually do see, in contrast to what we now could see if we chose—has been contracting rapidly to the narrow field of what a horse sees between its blinkers or a what a U-boat commander sees through his periscope.

This is certainly extraordinary; yet it is only one of a number of contradictions of this kind that seems to be characteristic of the times in which we are living. There are other examples that probably loom larger in the mind of most of us. For instance, our world has risen to an unprecedented degree of humanitarian feeling. There is now a recognition of the human rights of people of all classes, nations, and races; yet at the same time we have sunk to perhaps unheard-of depths of class warfare, nationalism, and racialism. These bad passions find vent in cold-blooded, scientifically planned cruelties; and the two incompatible states of mind and standards of conduct are to be seen today, side by side, not merely in the same world, but sometimes in the same country and even in the same soul.

Again, we now have an unprecedented power of production side by side with unprecedented shortages. We have invented machines to work for us, but have less spare labour than ever before for human service—even

for such an essential and elementary service as helping mothers to look after their babies. We have persistent alternations of widespread unemployment with famines of man-power. Undoubtedly, the contrast between our expanding historical horizon and our contracting historical vision is something characteristic of our age. Yet, looked at in itself, what an astonishing contradiction it is!

Let us remind ourselves first of the recent expansion of our horizon. In space, our Western field of vision has expanded to take in the whole of mankind over all the habitable and traversable surface of this planet, and the whole stellar universe in which this planet is an infinitesimally small speck of dust. In time, our Western field of vision has expanded to take in all the civilizations that have risén and fallen during these last 6000 years; the previous history of the human race back to its genesis between 600,000 and a million years ago; the history of life on this planet back to perhaps 800 million years ago. What a marvellous widening of our historical horizon! Yet, at the same time, our field of historical vision has been contracting; it has been tending to shrink within the narrow limits in time and space of the particular republic or kingdom of which each of us happens to be a citizen. The oldest surviving Western states—say France or England—have so far had no more than a thousand years of continuous political existence; the largest existing Western state—say Brazil or the United States—embraces only a very small fraction of the total inhabited surface of the Earth.

Before the widening of our horizon began—before our Western seamen circumnavigated the globe, and before our Western cosmogonists and geologists pushed out the bounds of our universe in both time and space

—our prenationalist mediaeval ancestors had a broader and juster historical vision than we have to-day. For them, history did not mean the history of one's own parochial community; it meant the history of Israel, Greece, and Rome. And, even if they were mistaken in believing that the world was created in 4004 B.C., it is at any rate better to look as far back as 4004 B.C. than to look back no farther than the Declaration of Independence or the voyages of the *Mayflower* or Columbus or Hengist and Horsa. (As a matter of fact, 4004 B.C. happens, though our ancestors did not know this, to be a quite important date: it approximately marks the first appearance of representatives of the species of human society called civilizations.)

Again, for our ancestors, Rome and Jerusalem meant much more than their own home towns. When our Anglo-Saxon ancestors were converted to Roman Christianity at the end of the sixth century of the Christian era, they learned Latin, studied the treasures of sacred and profane literature to which a knowledge of the Latin language gives access, and went on pilgrimages to Rome and Jerusalem—and this in an age when the difficulties and dangers of travelling were such as to make modern war-time travelling seem child's play. Our ancestors seem to have been big-minded, and this is a great intellectual virtue as well as a great moral one, for national historic are unintelligible within their own time limits and space limits.

In the time dimension, you cannot understand the history of England if you begin only at the coming of the English to Britain, any better than you can understand the history of the United States if you begin only at the coming of the English to North America. In the space dimension, likewise, you cannot understand the history of a country if you cut its outlines out of the

map of the world and rule out of consideration anything that has originated outside that particular country's frontiers.

II

What are the epoch-making events in the national histories of the United States and the United Kingdom? Working back from the present towards the past, I should say they were the two world wars, the Industrial Revolution, the Reformation, the Western voyages of discovery, the Renaissance, the conversion to Christianity. Now I defy anyone to tell the history of either the United States or the United Kingdom without making these events the cardinal ones, or to explain these events as local American or local English affairs. To explain these major events in the history of any Western country, the smallest unit that one can take into account is the whole of Western Christendom. By Western Christendom I mean the Roman Catholic and Protestant world—the adherents of the Patriarchate of Rome who have maintained their allegiance to the Papacy, together with the former adherents who have repudiated it.

But the history of Western Christendom, too, is unintelligible within its own time limits and space limits. While Western Christendom is a much better unit than the United States or the United Kingdom or France for a historian to operate with, it too turns out, on inspection, to be inadequate. In the time dimension, it goes back only to the close of the Dark Ages following the collapse of the western part of the Roman Empire; that is, it goes back less than 1300 years, and 1300 years is less than a quarter of the 6000 years during which the species of society represented by Western Christendom has been in existence. Western Christendom is a

civilization belonging to the third of the three generations of civilizations that there have been so far.

In the space dimension, the narrowness of the limits of Western Christendom is still more striking. If you look at the physical map of the world as a whole, you will see that the small part of it which is dry land consists of a single continent—Asia—which has a number of peninsulas and off-lying islands. Now, what are the farthest limits to which Western Christendom has managed to expand? You will find them at Alaska and Chile on the west and at Finland and Dalmatia on the east. What lies between those four points is Western Christendom's domain at its widest. And what does that domain amount to? Just the tip of Asia's European peninsula, together with a couple of large islands. (By these two large islands, I mean, of course, North and South America.) Even if you add in the outlying and precarious footholds of the Western world in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, its total habitable present area amounts to only a very minor part of the total habitable area of the surface of the planet. And you cannot understand the history of Western Christendom within its own geographical limits.

Western Christendom is a product of Christianity, but Christianity did not arise in the Western world; it arose outside the bounds of Western Christendom, in a district that lies to-day within the domain of a different civilization: Islam. We Western Christians did once try to capture from the Muslims the cradle of our religion in Palestine. If the Crusades had succeeded, Western Christendom would have slightly broadened its footing on the all-important Asiatic mainland. But the Crusades ended in failure.

Western Christendom is merely one of five civilizations that survive in the world to-day; and these are

merely five out of about nineteen that one can identify as having come into existence since the first appearance of representatives of this species of society about 6000 years ago.

III

To take the four other surviving civilizations first: if the firmness of a civilization's foothold on the continent—by which I mean the solid land-mass of Asia—may be taken as giving a rough indication of that civilization's relative expectation of life, then the other four surviving civilizations are 'better lives'—in the jargon of the life insurance business—than our own Western Christendom.

Our sister civilization, Orthodox Christendom, straddles the continent from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Ocean: it occupies the northern half of Asia and the eastern half of Asia's European peninsula. Russia overlooks the back doors of all the other civilizations; from White Russia and North-Eastern Siberia she overlooks the Polish and Alaskan back doors of our own Western world; from the Caucasus and Central Asia she overlooks the back doors of the Islamic and Hindu worlds; from Central and Eastern Siberia she overlooks the back door of the Far Eastern world.

Our half-sister civilization, Islam, also has a firm footing on the continent. The domain of Islam stretches from the heart of the Asiatic continent in North-Western China all the way to the west coast of Asia's African peninsula. At Dakar, the Islamic world commands the continental approaches to the straits that divide Asia's African peninsula from the island of South America. Islam also has a firm footing in Asia's Indian peninsula.

As for the Hindu society and the Far Eastern society, it needs no demonstration to show that the 400 million Hindus and the 400 or 500 million Chinese have a firm foothold on the continent.

But we must not exaggerate the importance of any of these surviving civilizations just because, at this moment, they happen to be survivors. If, instead of thinking in terms of 'expectation of life,' we think in terms of achievement, a rough indication of relative achievement may be found in the giving of birth to individual souls that have conferred lasting blessings on the human race.

Now who are the individuals who are the greatest benefactors of the living generations of mankind? I should say: Confucius and Lao-tse; the Buddha; the Prophets of Israel and Judah; Zoroaster, Jesus, and Muhammad; and Socrates, and not one of these lasting benefactors of mankind happens to be a child of any of the five living civilizations. Confucius and Lao-tse were children of a now extinct Far Eastern civilization of an earlier generation; the Buddha was the child of a now extinct Indian civilization of an earlier generation. Hosea, Zoroaster, Jesus, and Muhammad were children of a now extinct Syrian civilization. Socrates was the child of a now extinct Greek civilization.

Within the last 400 years, all the five surviving civilizations have been brought into contact with each other as a result of the enterprise of two of them: the expansion of Western Christendom from the tip of Asia's European peninsula over the ocean, and the expansion of Orthodox Christendom overland across the whole breadth of the Asiatic continent.

The expansion of Western Christendom displays two special features; being oceanic, it is the only expansion of a civilization to date that has been literally world-

wide in the sense of extending over the whole habitable portion of the Earth's surface; and, owing to the 'conquest of space and time' by modern mechanical means, the spread of the network of Western material civilization has brought the different parts of the world into far closer physical contact than ever before. But, even in these points, the expansion of the Western civilization differs in degree only, and not in kind, from the contemporary overland expansion of Russian Orthodox Christendom, and from similar expansions of other civilizations at earlier dates.

There are earlier expansions that have made important contribution towards the present unification of mankind—with its corollary, the unification of our vision of human history. The now extinct Syrian civilization was propagated to the Atlantic coasts of Asia's European and African peninsulas westward by the Phoenicians, to the tip of Asia's Indian peninsula south-eastwards by the Himyarites and Nestorians, and to the Pacific north-eastwards by the Manichaens and Nestorians. It expanded in two directions overseas and in a third direction overland. Any visitor to Peking will have seen a striking monument of the Syrian civilization's overland cultural conquests. In the trilingual inscriptions of the Manchu Dynasty of China at Peking, the Manchu and Mongol texts are inscribed in the Syriac form of our alphabet, not in Chinese characters.

Other examples of the expansion of now extinct civilizations are the propagation of the Greek civilization overseas westwards to Marseilles by the Greeks themselves, overland northwards to the Rhine and Danube by the Romans, and overland eastwards to the interiors of India and China by the Macedonians; and the expansion of the Sumerian civilization in all directions overland from its cradle in Iraq.

IV

As a result of these successive expansions of particular civilizations, the whole habitable world has now been unified into a single great society. The movement through which this process has been finally consummated is the modern expansion of Western Christendom. But we have to bear in mind, first, that this expansion of Western Christendom has merely completed the unification of the world and has not been the agency that has produced more than the last stage of the process; and, second, that, though the unification of the world has been fully achieved within a Western framework, the present Western ascendency in the world is certain not to last.

In the unified world, the eighteen non-Western civilizations—four of them living, fourteen of them extinct—will assuredly reassert their influence. And as, in the course of generations and centuries, a unified world gradually works its way towards an equilibrium between its diverse component cultures, the Western component will gradually be relegated to the modest place which is all that it can expect to retain in virtue of its intrinsic worth by comparison with those other cultures—surviving and extinct—which the Western society, through its modern expansion, has brought into association with itself and with one another.

History, seen in this perspective, makes, I feel, the following call upon historians of our generation and of the generations that will come after ours. If we are to perform the full service that we have the power to perform for our fellow human beings—the important service of helping them to find their bearings in a unified world—we must make the necessary effort of imagination and effort of will to break our way out of

the prison walls of the local and shortlived histories of our own countries and our own cultures, and we must accustom ourselves to taking a synoptic view of history as a whole.

Our first task is to perceive, and to present to other people, the history of all the known civilizations, surviving and extinct, as a unity. There are, I believe, two ways in which this can be done.

One way is to study the encounters between civilizations, of which I have mentioned four outstanding examples. These encounters between civilizations are historically illuminating, not only because they bring a number of civilizations into a single focus of vision, but also because, out of encounters between civilizations, the higher religions have been born—the worship, perhaps originally Sumerian, of the Great Mother and her Son who suffers and dies and rises again; Judaism and Zoroastranism, which sprang from an encounter between the Syrian and Babylonian civilizations; Christianity and Islam, which sprang from an encounter between the Syrian and Greek civilizations; the Mahayana form of Buddhism and Hinduism, which sprang from an encounter between the Indian and Greek civilizations. The future of mankind in this world—if mankind is going to have a future in this world—lies, I believe, with these higher religions that have appeared within the last 4000 years (and all but the first within the last 3000 years), and not with the civilizations whose encounters have provided opportunities for the higher to come to birth.

A second way of studying the history of all the known civilizations as a unity is to make a comparative study of their individual histories, looking at them as so many representatives of one particular species of the genus Human Society. If we map out the principal phases

in the histories of civilizations—their births, growths, breakdowns, and declines—we can compare their experiences phase by phase; and by this method of study we shall perhaps be able to sort out their common experiences, which are specific, from their unique experiences, which are individual. In this way we may be able to work out a morphology of the species of society called civilizations.

If, by the use of these two methods of study, we can arrive at a unified vision of history, we shall probably find that we need to make very far-going adjustments of the perspective in which the histories of divers civilizations and peoples appear when looked at through our peculiar present-day Western spectacles.

In setting out to adjust our perspective, we shall be wise, I suggest, to proceed simultaneously on two alternative assumptions. One of these alternatives is that the future of mankind may not, after all, be going to be catastrophic and that, even if the Second World War prove not to have been the last, we shall survive the rest of this batch of world wars as we survived the first two bouts, and shall eventually win our way out into calmer waters. The other possibility is that these first two world wars may be merely overtures to some supreme catastrophe that we are going to bring on ourselves.

This second, more unpleasant, alternative has been made a very practical possibility by mankind's unfortunately having discovered how to tap atomic energy before we have succeeded in abolishing the institution of war. Those contradictions and paradoxes in the life of the world in our time, which I took as my starting point, also look like symptoms of serious social and spiritual sickness, and their existence—which is one of the portentous features in the landscape of contempo-

rary history—is another indication that we ought to take the more unpleasant of our alternatives as a serious possibility and not just as a bad joke.

On either alternative, I suggest that we historians ought to concentrate our own attention—and direct the attention of our listeners and readers—upon the histories of those civilizations and peoples which, in the light of their past performances, seem likely, in a unified world, to come to the front in the long run in one or other of the alternative futures that may be lying in wait for mankind.

V

If the future of mankind in a unified world is going to be on the whole a happy one, then I would prophesy that there is a future in the Old World for the Chinese, and in the Island of North America for the *Canadiens*. Whatever the future of mankind in North America, I feel pretty confident that these French-speaking Canadians, at any rate, will be there at the end of the story.

On the assumption that the future of mankind is to be very catastrophic, I should have prophesied, even as lately as a few years ago, that whatever future we might be going to have would lie with the Tibetans and the Eskimos, because each of these peoples occupied, till quite lately, an unusually sheltered position. 'Sheltered' means, of course, sheltered from the dangers arising from human folly and wickedness, not sheltered from the rigors of the physical environment. Mankind has been master of its physical environment, sufficiently for practical purposes, since the middle palaeolithic age; since that time, man's only dangers—but these have been deadly dangers—have come from man himself. But the homes of the Tibetans and Eskimos are shelted no longer, because we are on the point of managing to fly

over the North Pole and over the Himalayas, and both Northern Canada and Tibet would (I think) be likely to be theatres of a future Russo-American war.

If mankind is going to run amok with atom bombs, I personally should look to the Negrito Pygmies of Central Africa to salvage some fraction of the present heritage of mankind. (Their eastern cousins in the Philippines and in the Malay Peninsula would probably perish with the rest of us, as they both live in what have now come to be dangerously exposed positions.)

The African Negritos are said by our anthropologists to have an unexpectedly pure and lofty conception of the nature of God and of God's relation to man. They might be able to give mankind a fresh start; and though we should then have lost the achievements of the last 6000 to 10,000 years, what are 10,000 years compared to the 600,000 or a million years for which the human race has already been in existence?

The extreme possibility of catastrophe is that we might succeed in exterminating the whole human race, African Negritos and all.

On the evidence of the past history of life on this planet, even that is not entirely unlikely. After all, the reign of man on the Earth, if we are right in thinking that man established his present ascendency in the middle palaeolithic age, is so far only about 100,000 years old, and what is that compared to the 500 million or 800 million years during which life has been in existence on the surface of this planet? In the past, other forms of life have enjoyed reigns which have lasted for almost inconceivably longer periods—and which yet at last have come to an end. There was a reign of the giant armoured reptiles which may have lasted about 80 million years; say from about the year 130 million to the year 50 million before the present day.

But the reptiles' reign came to an end. Long before that—perhaps 300 million years ago—there was a reign of giant armoured fishes—creatures that had already accomplished the tremendous achievement of growing a movable lower jaw. But the reign of the fish came to an end.

The winged insects are believed to have come into existence about 250 million years ago. Perhaps the higher winged insects—the social insects that have anticipated mankind in creating an institutional life—are still waiting for their reign on Earth to come. If the ants and bees were one day to acquire even that glimmer of intellectual understanding that man has possessed in his day, and if they were then to make their own shot at seeing history in perspective, they might see the advent of the mammals, and the brief reign of the human mammal, as almost irrelevant episodes, 'full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.'

The challenge to us, in our generation, is to see to it that this interpretation of history shall not become the true one.

NOTES

I. A. C. Benson, (1862-1925), has been one of the most delightful of modern essayists. Born of a highly cultured English family, he was fortunate to be able to lead a life which suited his genius and appealed to him most. A master at Eton and then Fellow and Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, he led a quiet academic life of comparative leisure.

He wrote English with grace and ease. The present essay is in his best manner. It contains the reflections of a truly cultivated mind.

Benson believed in getting to know the other man's point of view, for he thought that it was an advantage to know how other people looked at life. It helps in correcting our balance and sense of proportion. Benson has left us in no doubt about his own point of view which, if it were to prevail more universally, would indeed make the world a better and happier place to live in.

Edward Fitzgerald, (1809-1883): His fame rests mainly on his exquisite translation of *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam.* He was also a famous writer of letters which bring out his wit and his warm human qualities.

Dilettante: One who is interested in fine arts and letters, generally a person who does not study these seriously, but merely as a pastime.

My father: E. W. Benson, Archbishop of Canterbury, a famous scholar and ecclesiastic, the range of whose interests was very wide.

Fellowship: A Fellow is a senior graduate of a college at Oxford or Cambridge and receives a fixed emolument out of the revenues of the college.

Combination room: The name given in the University of Cambridge to the college parlour where fellows meet after dinner.

'Borrow life and not grow old': Gain experience from life but retain the zest and enthusiasm of youth.

Don: A distinguished person, generally a Head, Fellow or Tutor of a college at Oxford or Cambridge.
Oriel: A recessed window on an upper storey, projecting from the outer surface of a building.
Melchizedek: 'The priest of the most high God' to whom even Abraham paid tithes. It is said of him that he had 'No father, no mother, and had neither beginning of days nor end of life.'
Pater, Walter Horatio, (1839-1894): Englishman of letters. A great stylist and a lover of beauty and the beautiful phrase. He is famous for his work on the Renaissance.
Dr. Johnson's simple friend Edwards: The subject of a delightful essay by E. V. Lucas, *A Philosopher that Failed.*
The Pharisaical temper: Characterised by a pedantic manner towards the outward forms of religion and morality.

II. Stephen Butler Leacock, (1869-1944), was born in Hampshire, England. He studied at Toronto, and was for thirty years Professor of Political Economy at Mcgill University. He is known as a humorist, and has written much on humour, its theory and technique. He is a delightful writer in the lighter vein. His works include *Literary Lapses, Nonsense Novels, Charles Dickens, How to Write.*

On the Need for A quiet College is in Leacock's characteristic manner, easy, conversational in tone and full of humour, yet hitting at what he considers to be wrong values in academic life.

Hire and Fire: Names of two departments in American business houses; the one for employing new workers and the other for dismissing them.
Machiavelli, (1469-1527): A statesman and historian, born in Florence, Italy. He wrote *A History of Florence,* and a treatise on statecraft called *The Prince,* in which his main theory is that the State is supreme and all means to preserve it are justified, morality having nothing to do with politics.
Tariff: A duty imposed on goods imported from abroad. According to this system the price of imported articles is raised so that home producers may compete on better terms in

the home market. Some tariffs are designed to raise revenue and may be imposed even when free trade exists.

Free Trade: A policy of strict non-intervention in international or foreign trade. It allows free competition of foreign goods with home goods in the home market.

Nut: An eccentric, abnormal person.

Humanities: Classical or literary studies.

Trestle: Framework of steel or timber used as the support of a trestle bridge.

Evangeline: A character in Longfellow's poem of that name. She leads a life of misery and poverty, and finally becomes a Sister of Mercy. She meets her lover when he is at the point of death.

Sphinx: In Greek legend a monster, half animal and half woman, who spoke in enigmas and destroyed those who were not able to answer them. The Sphinx asked what animals walked on four legs in the morning, two at noon and three in the evening. Oedipus recognized in these words an allusion to infancy, manhood and old age, whereupon the monster plunged into the sea and thus destroyed itself.

III. BERTRAND ARTHUR WILLIAM RUSSELL, (1872-), is an outstanding English philosopher and thinker of the times. He belongs to the English aristocracy. Bertrand Russell succeeded his elder brother as Earl Russell, but has preferred not to use the title.

He had a remarkable academic career. He took a first class degree in Mathematics and in Moral Science from Cambridge, and at the early age of thirty-six he was made a Fellow of the Royal Society.

He is a great writer and has written about forty books on educational and sociological problems. One of his most popular is *The Conquest of Happiness*, and his most outstanding *A History of Western Philosophy*, published in 1946. He has wielded great influence over the English-speaking world, not only by his writings but also by his remarkable broadcasts.

'The Value of Philosophy' is an extract from his book *Problems of Philosophy*. The study of Philosophy has a unique value and importance in modern times, because it enriches

our knowledge and intellectual curiosity and makes us liberal in outlook. Much of the unhappiness and bitterness in the world would disappear, if those in authority were to develop the habit of philosophic contemplation.

There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view.....: This passage is characteristic of Bertrand Russell who, with G. E. Moore, led the realistic reaction which set in during the present century against the idealism or transcendentalism of the previous century. Russell asserts the doctrine of the existence of the object, as unaffected by our knowledge or consciousness of it. In opposition to the ideallistic or transcendentalist view of relations as internal or organic, constituted by the knowing mind, it is insisted that relations are external, and do not affect the nature of the things or terms related.

Newton, Sir Isac, (1642—1727): English natural philosopher. At the University of Cambridge he applied himself to Mathematics and the theory of gravitation. His book *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica,* which embodies his laws of motion, was published in 1687.

IV. EDWARD MORGAN FORSTER, (1879-), is an English novelist and essayist. At the age of twenty-six he wrote his first novel *Where Angels Fear To Tread.* This was followed by other novels, *The Longest Journey, A Room with a View.* His last novel which is also his best, *A Passage to India,* was published in 1924. In that novel he shows insight in portraying Anglo-Indian life and character. Forster's output as a novelist is not great, but he is a precise and fastidious writer.

Forster is equally at home in the compass of an essay, as this extract shows. He can be very entertaining and thought-provoking. In his collection of essays *Abinger Harvest,* we get the reflections of a cultured and well-informed person on people, forms of government and values of life. Forster is also known for his work *Aspects of the Novel,* delivered first as the Clark Lectures at Cambridge in 1927. He has written a very sympathetic and delicate study of G. L. Dickinson, with whom he had made a lifelong friendship at Cambridge. Among his other works may be mentioned his Rede lecture on Virginia Woolf (1942).

Erasmus, (1466-1536): The great Dutch humanist. He prepared the way for the Revival of Learning. He was a profound scholar, and had a refined taste and wit. He had an inquiring mind, and he advocated reason as the guide in all questions, religious or political. He taught and discussed theology both at Oxford and Cambridge, and became a friend of Colet and Thomas More.

Montaigne, (1533-1592): Celebrated French philosopher. He was the author of the famous *Essais* of which Books I and II appeared in 1580. They were first translated into English by John Florio, 1603. Montaigne represents the Renaissance Spirit. His Essays are marked by intellectual curiosity and are sceptical in tone. It is of himself and of his experiences that Montaigne speaks. His egoism is most delightful.

Moses: The Hebrew law-giver who, after leading the Israelites out of Egypt, governed them for nearly forty years. He drew up a code of laws.

Saint Paul: Born at Tarsus in Cilicia about the same time as Jesus Christ was born in Juda. Originally a Jew, and was among the bitterest enemy of the Christian faith; but on the way to Damascus, where he was going to hunt out the Christians, he was converted by a vision. Thenceforth he became the devoutest missionary of this faith and lost his head in his endeavours for it, under Nero, at the instigation of the Jews.

Mount Moriah: The reference is to the temple which Solomon built on Mount Moriah in Jerusalem.

Elysian Field: Pertaining to Elysium in Greek mythology; the abode of the blessed after death; a place of ideal happiness.

Bourgeois: Originally a citizen, as distinguished from a peasant and a gentleman; now a member of the middle class, especially a shopkeeper; conventional and humdrum.

Dante, (1265-1321): A great Italian poet. He is famous for his *Divina Commedia,* his greatest work. The poem is an exposition of the future life and shows Dante's wide learning and scholarship.

Brutus, Marcus Junius, (85-42 B.C.): He joined the conspirators who assassinated Julius Caesar in the hope of restoring Republican Government.

Cassius, Gaius, (d. 42 B.C.): The friend of Brutus and leader of the Conspiracy against Julius Caesar.

A Private Member of the British Parliament: A member who does not hold a special official position.
Home Office: In England, the Government Department through which passes all communications between the King and his subjects. The Chief of Home Office is the Home Secretary who wields considerable power. Petitions or addresses to the King pass through his hands.
The Niebelung's Ring: Four musical dramas by Wagner (1813-83), based on the Norse Legends of Niebelungs, a mythical race of dwarfs.
Walhalla: The abode of dead heroes in Norse mythology.
Fafnir: The dragon slain by Sigurd. In the heroic songs, dealing with the families of the Volsungs and the Niblungs, the dragon guards a hoard of gold.
Nietzschean: A follower of the German ethical writer Nietzsche, who had contempt for pity and asceticism, and who preached the will to dominate.
Wotan: The Chief God of the ancient Scandinavians.
The Valkyries: Warrior-maids in Norse mythology who served as the hand-maidens of Odin and led dead heroes to Valhalla.
Brunhilde: A man-like queen who offered to marry the man who could beat her in feats of strength. Her story is told in the *Nibelungenlied.*
Sophocles, (495-406 B.C.): Greek tragic poet. His great tragedies are noted for the humanity, passion and morality that inspires them.
Horace, (65-8 B.C.): Roman poet, who shows his sagacity and wisdom in his Odes, Epistles and Satires.
Admiral Toma: An imaginary name.
Group Movement: A modern Christian revivalist movement, also known as M. R. A. (Moral Rearmament). The founder is the Rev. Frank Buchman, originally an American Methodist Minister.
Jacopone da Todi, (1230-1306): A Franciscan monk, author of the *Stabat Mater,* the Sorrows of the Mother of Christ.

V. RABINDRANATH TAGORE, (1861-1941), was one of the greatest Indians of modern times, and one whose name is still greeted with reverence in every part of the world. He was ac-

claimed the 'Poet Laureate of Asia' and his works have been translated into all the cultivated languages of the world.

He belonged to an ancient aristocratic family of Bengal. The earlier part of his life was spent in looking after his family estates. This was a formative period, for it gave him an opportunity to live in the midst of nature. He grew up when there was a Renascence in Bengal of Hindu thought and culture. He came under the influenc of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. He was influenced by the nationalist movement to which he contributed mainly through his writings.

He wrote in order to interpret the real soul of India to the world. This he was able to do so effectively that the prose translation of Gitanjali won him the Nobel Prize for Literature for the year 1913. The same year his play *The Post Office* was given a London production. His works include *The Crescent Moon, The Gardner, The Kind of the Dark Chamber, Sadhana, Fruit-gathering, My Reminiscences, Nationality, Personality, Broken Ties, Gora, The Home and the World.*

Tagore travelled widely. He addressed large audiences in many parts of the world on problems concerning the spiritual and moral welfare of mankind.

What is Art? is a lecture he delivered in America. Tagore says that it is difficult to define Art. Some modern critics have tried to define it according to special rules which they have framed; others have fixed the standard of value in Art by something which is not inherent in it. When we define a thing, we limit our vision in order to be able to see clearly. The ability to see clearly is not the only aspect of truth.

Tagore, therefore, without defining Art, would like to find out the real *impulse* behind it. Exuberance of emotional energy is such an impulse. A man feels his personality more intensely than do other creatures; this consciousness is an impulse behind Art. Tagore says, "Where there is an element of the superfluous in our heart's relationship with the world, Art has its birth", and "when our heart is fully awakened in love, or in other emotions, our personality is in its flood-tide. Then it feels the longing to express itself for the very sake of expression. Then comes Art....."

Bull's-eye lantern: A small lantern with a lens in one side of it to concentrate the light in a desired direction.

Art for Art's sake: Study and appreciation of Art with no other

purpose or motive except the pursuit of art for the pleasure that it gives.

The expression has also come to mean that art is unrelated to life and the artist lives in a world of his own which has nothing to do with the outer reality. This doctrine has led to a prolonged controversy, referred to as 'the fight' by Tagore in the passage. It had its origin in France, and during the eighteen-eighties, it became a veritable cult with men like Whistler and Oscar Wilde, and drew forth considerable opposition from men like Ruskin who went to the other extreme and propounded the view that the function of art was to convey moral truths, that all the fine arts must be 'didactic to the people, and that as their chief end'.

Spectrum: A coloured band into which a beam of light is broken up by being passed through a prison or by some other means.

Altruism: Putting the interests of others before one's own interest, unselfishness.

Effiux: That which flows out.

Perceptual: Which can be perceived.

Rasa: A theory of literary appeal. It signifies aesthetic pleasure or the thrill, invariably accompanied by joy, that the audience experiences while witnessing a play.

Analytical: Critical examination of an argument by separating it into its component parts.

VI. MARIA PETRIE is an artist and a teacher of art. Her remarks on the arts and their importance are based on practical experience.

Mrs. Petrie says that the mechanical arts like the gramophone, the cinema and the wireless cannot be adequate substitutes for contact with musicians and actors, because the direct current between artist and audience, which is an important factor in the enjoyment of a work of art is lost. Mechanical arts play upon us without any effort on our part to appreciate them. As far as applied arts are concerned, machine-made objects have replaced the handcrafts. The hands and eyes of an average citizen remain unskilled. In cities there is no contact with the earth, the changing seasons, with plants, animals and growing things.

Arts and crafts do not provide the satisfaction and happiness

which they should. People in towns lead a hectic life in order to get some happiness, but the result is boredom and nervous illness. This state of affairs has to be combated says Mrs. Petrie, and here Art can prove useful. Mrs. Petrie makes a plea for fostering the individual arts, and more particularly the visual arts.

Ersatz: A substitute.
Television: The transmission by wireless communication of visual representations of images and their re-production at a distance. Pictures broadcast and received by radio.
Jazz: Music which moves irregularly from bar to bar. It is derived from the native music of Africa.
Tattoos: Military pageants, staged to create popular interest in the army.
Proletariat: Term used by modern Communists for wage-earning workers, who are regarded as being exploited by capitalists and the bourgeoisie.
Raison d'etre: (French), Reason for the existence of, justification for anything.
Eric Gill, (1882-1940): British sculptor and designer. Among his best known works are *Mother and Child 1910, Christ Driving the Moneylenders out of the Temple,* and many other highly original designs, including decorations for Broadcasting House, London.
Chore: A small, domestic duty or odd job.
Burlington House: A public building in Piccadilly, London. Here each year the Royal Academy holds its annual exhibition of pictures.
Grand Palais: In Paris, famous for its annual exhibition of paintings and sculptures.
Eisteddfods: An annual gathering of Welsh poets for the encouragement of Welsh literature and music, and the preservation of the Welsh language and ancient national customs.
Albert Hall: A large circular hall in Kensington, London, used for oratorios, concerts and public meetings, and capable of holding ten thousand persons.
Aphrodisiac: Any food, drink or drug which stimulates sexual desire.
Psyche: The human soul or spirit.
Chamber-music: Vocal or instrumental music suitable for

performance before a small audience in a moderate-sized apartment rather than in a theatre.

Oratorio: A musical semi-dramatic setting to a religious theme, usually adapted from scriptural words or paraphrase, arranged for chorus and orchestra, and performed without costume, scenery or dramatic gesture.

Karel Capek, (1890-1938): The Czechoslovak dramatist used the word 'Robot' in his play *R.U.R.* to mean certain mechanical contrivances resembling human beings. Society is represented as depending on these mechanical men, who ultimately destroy their employers.

Mrs. Shelley, (1797-1851): Became wife of Shelley in 1816. She wrote Frankenstein, a tale of terror. Frankenstein, a Genevan student of natural pholosophy, collecting bones from the charnel houses, constructs the semblance of a human being and gives it life. The creature is filled with hatred for its creator and ultimately kills him.

Mozart Wolfgang, (1756-91): German-Austrian musical composer, was distinguished for his musical genius even as a boy, and produced over six hundred musical compositions, among them three great operas.

VII. Arthur David Ritchie, (1891-), has been Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Edinburgh University since 1945. Earlier he was Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester 1937-45. It was then that he contributed the present piece to a series published under the title *What we Defend, Essays in Freedom by Members of the University of Manchester.*

Among Prof. Ritchie's other publications are *Scientific Method, Natural History of Mind, Civilization, Science and Religion, Science and Politics,* and *Essays in Philosophy.*

In the essay 'Science as a Creative Power', Prof. Ritchie tells us about the true nature and method of Science. He tells us what ideals a scientist always puts before himself. He seeks truth for its own sake and not because it is useful. He believes that truth can be found if it is sought honestly and persistently. It has to be sought piecemeal: there cannot be one single truth. A scientist should be a free man in a free society. He is influenced by his environment and the

society in which he lives, and the benefit that he is likely to confer on society will ultimately depend on those factors. A scientist in a free society engaged in the disinterested pursuit of truth can help in maintaining the liberal and humane tradition in the life of society.

Dogma: An opinion enunciated as true and necessary to be believed.

Hippocrates, (c. 460 B.C.): Greek physician, a contemporary of Socrates and Plato. He practised and taught in Athens and is regarded as the father of medicine.

Pasteur, Louis, (1822-95): A famous French chemist whose researches in bacteriology, and especially the prevention and treatment of contagious diseases such as hydrophobia and cholera, have been of great benefit to humanity.

Micro-organism: A microscopic organism, bacteria.

Disraeli, Benjamin, (1804-81): Statesman and novelist. He was Prime Minister of England twice.

Panjandrum: A pompous, self-important high official.

The Curate and His Egg: The story appeared in *Punch* years ago. A vicar had invited his curate, and they had eggs for breakfast. While they were eating the vicar asked the curate how he liked his egg, whereupon the curate remarked that it was good in parts.

Hyperbola: Curve formed by a section of a cone when the cutting plane makes a greater angle with the base than the side of cone makes.

Asymptote: A line continually approaching a curve but never meeting it.

Crookes, Sir William, (1832-1919): A British scientist whose discoveries in chemistry and electricity have been of great importance. He made many researches into radio-activity and on the conductivity of electricity through gases.

Rontgen, William Konrad, (1845-1923): An eminent German scientist who discovered the Rontgen rays in 1895. He received the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1901.

Pathogenic Micro-organisms: Bacteria producing disease.

The Kinetic Theory of Gases: The theory that the molecules of a gas are in constant and rapid motion and, except in minute particulars, behave as perfectly elastic particles.

Niebuhr, (1766-1831): A distinguished German traveller. His great *History of Rome* was published in 1828. He was

the first to deal with the subject in a scientific spirit, paying more attention to the development of institutions and to social characteristics than to individuals and incidents.

Milton, John, (1608-1674): England's chief epic poet, whose *Paradise Lost* is the greatest poem of its kind in the English language.

Tupper, Martin, (1810-1887): He published in 1838-42 his *Proverbial Philosophy,* a book of commonplace maxims and reflections in a rhythmical form, which achieved great popularity.

Galileo, (1564-1642): The graet Italian astronomer who made discoveries in regard to the motions of planets.

Kepler, Johannes (1571-1630) was born in Wurthemberg. He endeavoured to find a law for the movements of Mars, and in 1609 published what are called his First and Second Laws. These Laws formed the groundwork of Newton's discoveries and are the starting point of modern Astronomy. Besides, we owe to Kepler many discoveries in Optics, General Physics and Geometry.

Descartes, Rene, (1596-1650): The famous French philosopher and mathematician, whose basis of philosophy is 'I think, therefore I exist'.

Barrow, Isaac, (1630-1677): A famous divine, mathematician and Greek scholar, tutor of Sir Isaac Newton.

VIII. JULIAN HUXLEY and his co-author A. C. HADDON are the right persons to present the correct scientific approach to the vexed racial problems of our times. A belief in racial superiority has been responsible for much misery and destruction in the world. It was the belief of the Europeans in their superiority that was responsible for some of the worst features of colonial rule.

The Germans believed in Herrenvolk and this belief in a large measure was responsible for the Second World War. Similar wrong ideas on racial problems are causing unhappiness and trouble in South Africa.

What Huxley and Haddon have to say is important and worth remembering. It should sweep away many wrong and mistaken notions about race which exist in the world to-day.

Julian Huxley, (1887-), is a grandson of Thomas

Henry Huxley. He is a great scientist, primarily a biologist. He believes that a dispassionate study of Science, and in particular of Biology, can solve some of the vexed problems of our times.

Haddon, A. C., (1855-1940), was a distinguished ethnologist and anthropologist and the author of several works on Anthropology.

Pseudo-scientific: False and not truly scientific.

Nordic: A term describing the Scandinavian states and their inhabitants. The theory that the Nordics are a superior race is the creation of French, English and German writers. The Aryan 'race', the Latin 'race'—these are not the names of races, but of languages.

Mendel's great discoveries: Gregory Mendel, (1822-1884), was an Austrian biologist. His researches on heredity were the first scientific approach to the subject. His theory is known as Mendelism.

Lysenko, (b. 1898), a Russian biologist, has advanced a new theory of heredity. He maintains that acquired characteristics can be inherited, or in other words nurture is all important. This theory is in keeping with the general ideas of Marxism and Communism. Julian Huxley has refuted the theory of Lysenko.

Eurasiatic: Of mixed European and Asiatic parentage or descent. Pertaining to the combined continents of Europe and Asia.

Ethnic: Characteristic or distinctive of a particular race.

Bantu: The name applied to most of the indigenous peoples of South Africa; the term suggests linguistic rather than ethnological distinction.

Per se: (Latin), By its very nature.

Eugenist: One who tries to improve the race.

Miscegenation: The inter-breeding of different races.

IX. STAMP, JOSIAH CHARLES, First Baron, (1880-1941), a Director of the Bank of England, and Chairman of the London Midland and Scottish Railway. He was a brilliant economist, and was Economic Adviser to the British Government, July

1937 to April 1941. With Lady Stamp, he was killed in an enemy air-raid on London in April 1941.

Sir Josiah Stamp says that men have always taken pleasure in having a peep into the future, but have seldom cared to guess what sort of a citizen the world will have in the time to come. The author thinks that the citizen of the future will develop 'from the seeds that are being planted to-day'. He will have an acuter sense of responsibility. He will have less faith in crude democratic ideals. He will form his opinions in a scientific manner. He will judge things in a better way and from a non-personal point of view. He will not think in a haphazard manner, but he will be trained to think in an organised manner. His aims will be clearer, and he will work more sagaciously for human happiness and the glory of God.

The Robots: Karel Capek, the Czechoslovak dramatist used the word *Robot* to mean certain mechanical contrivances resembling human beings in their ability to perform particular actions. Society is represented as depending on these mechanical men, who ultimately destroy their employers. See note on p. 178.

Butler's Erewhon: Samuel Butler, (1835-1902), describes a society in Erewhon in which machinery had no place lest it should overwhelm the inhabitants.

A bag of shot: A small sack for containing lead in small pellets of which a quantity is used for a single charge.

Dr. Glover (1869-): A Cambridge lecturer on Classics, History and Religion.

Graham Wallas, (1858-1932): Professor of Political Science in London University. Author of *The Art of Thought, The Great Society* and *Human Nature in Politics.*

The intellectualist fallacy: The 19th century notion that the extension of the franchise and compulsory education would produce enlightened citizens.

Blunderbussed: Persuaded to believe.

Obfuscated: Bewildered, confused.

William James, (1842-1910): American psychologist, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard.

Bryce, James, (1838-1922): British historian and politician, a member of Gladstone's last cabinet and, from 1907 to 1913,

Ambassador in America. Author of *The Holy Roman Empire*, *The American Commonwealth*, etc.

Hobbes, Thomas, (1588-1679): An English philosopher. His best known work is *Leviathan* which advocates the doctrine that absolute sovereign power in all matters of right and wrong is vested in the State.

Lord Oxford, (The Earl of Oxford and Asquith), (1852-1928): Prime Minister of England, 1908-1916. Had a literary bent of mind. He wrote *Reflections and Memoirs*.

Canon Streeter, (1874-1937): An English theologian, author of *Reality*.

Pigou A. C. (1877-): Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge and author of important works on Economics.

Aristotle, (384-322 B.C.): The most famous of all the Greek philosophers. He was a disciple of Plato, in whose Society he remained for twenty years. He established the Lyceum and founded the Peripatetic School of Philosophy. His writings cover an extraordinarily wide field and influence thought even at the present time. His most famous works are his *Ethics*, *Poetics* and *Politics*.

Hobbledehoy: Awkward, clumsy youth.

Caryle, Thomas, (1795-1930): Famous Scottish philosopher and historian.

Lord Balfour, (1848–1930): Distinguished statesman and philosopher. Prime Minister of England 1895-1906.

Owen Young (1874-): Eminent American lawyer and industrialist.

Clutton Brock, (1868-1924): An English essayist who wrote on Literature, Art and Religion.

X. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU (1889-), statesman, writer and Prime Minister of India. He was educated at Harrow and Cambridge. Practised law for some time at Allahabad, and then began to work for the cause of Indian freedom. He is one of the architects of the Indian Republic and his influence on Indian affairs has been second only to that of Mahatma Gandhi. He became Prime Minister on the establishment of the Dominion of India in 1947.

He has shown the world that he is a sagacious and sin-

cere leader of men, both by his work and by his writings and speeches. His writings, *An Autobiography, Glimpses of World History, The Discovery of India,* are known the world over.

He has brought a cultured, balanced and exceedingly well-informed mind to bear on the problems facing India, as the present extract from his book *The Discovery of India* shows.

This war: The reference is to the Second World War 1939-45.

The Revolution: A reference to the revolution in Russia (1919) by which the Czar was overthrown, and the power came into the hands of the Bolsheviks under Lenin.

Cartels: A combination of manufacturers for the purpose of regulating either the volume or price of output.

Five-Year Plans: The economic plans of Soviet Russia. Three such plans (1927-32), (1932-35), (1937-42) are known to have been enforced. They were based on the principle of self-sufficiency.

Purges: Refers to the systematic elimination of those persons who were opposed to the policy of the state in Soviet Russia. The purges became known to the world outside, when the five-year plans were enforced.

Mohenjo-daro: The excavations at Harappa (Mohenjo-daro) have revealed that there was a civilization in North-West India which flourished in the 3rd millenium B.C.

Plato, (429-347 B.C.): The Greek philosopher who taught at Athens. His *Dialogues* and *Republic* are considered amongst the greatest works of the ancients. He was a disciple of Socrates and was Aristotle's teacher. The influence of his thought continues to the present day.

Collectivism: A term covering all economic and political systems based on co-operation and central planning.

R. H. Tawney, (1880-):A Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, writer on economic and social subjects. His well-known book *The Acquisitive Society* is a plea for a new basis for society, in which rights should depend on the discharge of functions.

XI. G. D. H. Cole (1889-) was educated at St. Paul's School and Balliol College, Oxford, where he had a brilliant

record. From the University of London where he worked for six years (1919-25) he went to Oxford and was Reader in Economics for nineteen years. In 1944 he became Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University.

Professor Cole has been a member of the Labour Party and also of the Fabian Society. He is a very keen student of social conditions and both by his writing and his work he has tried to improve the lot of the common people. He is well known as an advocate of planned economy. He is the author of *Principles of Economic Planning*.

The present extract is taken from his book *The Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-war World*. It is a dispassionate study of some of the problems facing Western Europe and the world to-day. Professor Cole points out the changes necessary in American society as well as in the Soviet Union. These changes will make for better understanding between these powers an important factor in bringing about peace in the modern world.

Dynamiter: One who uses dynamite for criminal revolutionary purposes, especially for attacking a government.

Private enterprise: An economic system in which there are no restrictions on the activities of individuals to pursue economic advantage through trade and commerce.

Security Council: The most important body of the United Nations Organization, whose primary responsibility is to maintain peace. It consists of five permanent members with veto powers and six-non-permanent members.

U.N.O.: The United Nations Organization came into being in May 1945. Its Charter provides for collective action to be taken to maintain or restore international peace 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law'. It aims at developing friendly relations amongst nations and achievement of international co-operation in the solution of economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems.

Communism: A revolutionary movement which aims at the abolition of the capitalist system and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship instead. Its ideal is a just society of equal men with common property, to be established by force and not through peaceful means.

Free enterprise: A system of society with no restrictions on

the activities of men in pursuit of economic advantage, a feature of capitalist economy.
Pressure Groups: Men who try to influence the policy of the Government of their country to serve their own ends.
Slump: A sudden decline in the price or value of commodities or securities.
A la Russe: In Russian fashion.
A L'Anglaise: In the English style.
Bagehot, Walter, (1826-1877): An English economist and an authority on banking and finance. Author of *The English Constitution, Literary Studies,* etc. Pronounce 'Bagehot' as *Bejut.*

XII. Arnold Joseph Toynbee, (1889-), is the Director of Studies in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Research Professor of International History in the University of London. Professor Toynbee has brought to bear on the study of History and on the problems facing the world to-day a remarkable learning and insight.
His study of Six Principal Civilisations in *A Study of History* in six volumes has been one of the most remarkable books of modern times, a condensed version of which appeared in 1947. Professor Toynbee has recently published *Civilization on Trial,* a book of essays, from which the present piece has been taken.
In this essay the author has shown how our outlook on History is distorted and contradictory. While we seem to have faith in one world and in human rights, we also believe in class warfare and racialism.
Professor Toynbee says that Western Christendom should be regarded as one of the many civilizations that survive in the world to-day. We should not, however, attach undue importance to any one civilization. In the world all civilizations exert their influence. We should, therefore, take into consideration the history of all the civilizations and have a unified vision of history.
Professor Toynbee believes that the future of mankind can be a happy one, in spite of the two world wars. But a supreme catastrophe can also take place, with atomic energy now in the hands of man. Such a catastrophe may lead to the

extinction of man, and the world may again revert to the reign of armoured reptiles and winged insects. It is for the present generation to see that this eventuality shall not come true.

Blinkers: Pieces of leather fixed on the eyes of a horse to prevent it from seeing sideways.
U-Boat: A submarine used for the first time by the Germans, so called from the letter "*U*" (for *Untersee boot)* prefixed to the numbers, instead of names, by which these vessels were distinguished.
Periscope: An apparatus which enables an observer in a trench or a submarine to have a view of things above the surface.
Mayflower: The name of a small ship in which about a hundred Puritans sailed from Plymouth in 1620 and settled in Massachusetts. They left England in order to escape religious persecution.
Hengist and Horsa: Two Saxon brothers who came to help Vertigern, a British prince in the 5th century. They ultimately became masters of South Britain.
The Crusades: Military expeditions, undertaken by Christian princes for the recovery of the Holy Land from the Mohammedans. There were eight crusades from the 11th to the 13th century. They ended in failure.
Confucius: A Chinese sage and philosopher of the 5th century B.C. He gathered round him a large number of disciples. His wise maxims and sayings have been preserved and constantly quoted among the Chinese.
Lao-tse: A Chinese sage, who founded Taoism, one of the three principal religions of China. He was a contemporary of Confucius.
Hosea: A Hebrew prophet of the 7th century B.C.
Zoroaster or Zarathushtra: Founder or prophet of Zoroastrianism, strictly monotheistic religion flourishing between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C. It is now practised by the Parsees in India and Zoroastrian-Iranians in Persia.
Syrian civilization: As early as the 10th century B.C., Syria became the meeting place of Egyptian and Babylonian elements, and a type of Western Asiatic culture and civilization resulted which, through the commerce of the Phoenicians, was carried to the Western lands of the Mediterranean basin, and even to North-Western Europe.

Phoenicians: A Semitic people, industrious and enterprising, who became powerful about 1000 B.C.

Himyarites: A people who established their authority in South-West Arabia and attained prosperity due to the fact that the trade from India with Egypt came there by sea, and then went by land up the west coast.

Nestorians: The Sect of the Nestorians was formed in the 5th century and extended into Persia, India and even China. The sect grew rapidly and produced many learned theologians and philosophers.

Sumerian Civilization: An earlier name of Babylonia. Sumerian culture was at its height between 3500 and 2500 B.C.

Synoptic: The first three Gospels of Mathew, mark and Luke are known as the synoptic gospels because in matter, language, and order they have much in common, and can, therefore, be viewed together or synoptically.

Mahayana: A form of Buddhism. The name of a development in the later schools of Buddhism. It originated between the age of Ashoka and the Christian era.

Paleolithic: The age of human development marked by the use of rough stone implements; the stone age.

Negrito: Negro races of small stature found in Africa.

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